*RED THRUST STAR

April 1995

STAFF Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.....................................COL TERRY L. TUCKER Regimental S-2...................................................................................MAJ Richard A. Jodoin, Jr. Editor-in-Chief.................................................................................................Mr. Allen E. Curtis Managing Editor.........................................................................................SFC Edward L. Caum Administration & Graphics........................................................................SPC Jeffrey S. Booth

RED THRUST STAR is published for the U.S. Forces Command OPFOR Training Program by S-2, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5031. The purpose of the RED THRUST STAR is to publish timely, authoritative information on OPFOR training to increase the knowledge and understanding of OPFOR training throughout the Armed Forces. Articles published reflect views of the authors and should not be interpreted as official opinion of the Department of the Army, or of any branch, command, or agency of the Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to RED THRUST STAR and to the author(s), except where copyright is indicated. Articles, photographs, and new items of interest on all facets of OPFOR training are solicited. Direct communication is authorized to : Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, ATTN: AFZJ-AC-RT, Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5031, tel. (619)380-5289, or DSN 470-5289, FAX: (619)380-5127. Subscriptions are available to battalion size or larger units, as well as to training and readiness staffs, from the same address. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. RED THRUST STAR is published quarterly.
This medium is approved for the official dissemination of OPFOR related material.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official
JOEL B. HUDSON
Acting Administration Assistant to
the Secretary of the Army 02241
Distribution: Special

BULLETIN CONTENTS

1. Greetings Comrades
   BY COL TERRY L. TUCKER
   COMMANDER, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

2. Actions in the Security Zone at the NTC
   BY WO1 BRUCE DEJONG
   CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
   S-2 SECTION, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

3. The 7th Antitank Battalion:
   OPFOR'S Antitank Reserve at the NTC
   BY CPT J. MATTHEW LISSNER
   COMMANDER, ANTITANK COMPANY
   2ND SQUADRON, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

4. Threat Update: 2S6 Tunguska
   Self-Propelled Air Defense System
   BY SPC JEFFREY S. BOOTH
   S-2 SECTION, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

5. Antitank Reserves, Mobile Obstacle Detachments,
   and Remote Mining in Combat (Part II)
   BY MR. CHARLES J. DICK
   DIRECTOR, CONFLICT STUDIES RESEARCH CENTER
   ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY SANDHURST, CAMBERLEY, UK

6. Engineer Preparation of the Offense on the
   Opposing Force Battlefield
   BY CPT DAVID A. MATERSON AND 2LT CHRISTOPHER T. FABER
   58TH ENGINEER COMPANY, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

7. Rounding Out the OPFOR Fight: Augmentees
   BY SFC EDWARD CAUM
   NCOIC, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
   11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

8. OPFOR Update
   BY MAJ RICHARD A. JODOIN JR.
   REGIMENTAL S-2
   11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Greetings Comrades

This issue of the OPFOR professional bulletin begins with a feature on the security zone. One of the toughest OPFOR missions to counter is the security zone. It has become a regular OPFOR mission during rotational brigade operations. In his article on the subject, WO1 Bruce Dejong first summarizes the doctrinal mission of the security zone, then explains how a security zone battle is conducted at the NTC.

One of the NTC OPFORs most effective subunits is the regimental antitank battalion. In the next article, CPT J. Matthew Lissner describes the organization he commands and how it fights.

The threat update for this issue, written by SPC Jeff Booth, describes the 2S6 self-propelled air defense system. The NTC OPFOR has four of these systems, based on visually modified (VISMOD) M551 Sheridans. These accompany first-echelon motorized rifle battalions during nearly every mission.

Mr. Charles Dick, director of the Conflict Studies Research Center at Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, began a discussion of the antitank reserve, mobile obstacle detachments, and remote

by COL Terry L. Tucker

COL Terry L. Tucker

mining in the last issue. He concludes the article in this issue, along with several tactical examples.

SFC Ed Caum has authored an article on the augmentee companies that come to Fort Irwin each monthto round out the regiment's OPFOR portrayal. These companies are essential to the NTC's capability to provide a challenging OPFOR for rotational units.

Unfortunately, with this issue, I must also bid farewell to Sergeant First Class Caum. Since his arrival just over eighteen months ago. he has dramatically upgraded our ability to efficiently produce this bulletin, and has been responsible for the Stars new look over the past five issues. In addition, he has performed superbly as the first public affairs NCOIC for the 177th Armored Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. His retirement will leave a large space difficult to fill. I'd like to thank him especially for his outstanding efforts to improve this publication, and wish him and his family a happy and prosperous retirement.

This month, the NTC OPFOR update explains the reorganization of the NTC's OPFOR motorized rifle regiment into four motorized rifle battalions. If you plan to fight the NTC OPFOR, either live on the NTC battlefield, or in a JANUS exercise during the Leader Training Program, you need to be aware of this important organizational change.

Actions in the Security Zone at the NTC

BY WO1 BRUCE DEJONG
CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
S-2 SECTION
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Editors Note: The author expresses his appreciation to CPT Norman Fuss, S-2, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, and 1LT Scott Sweedler, Chief, Collection Management and Dissemination, 11th ACR, for their advice and assistance in preparing this article.

Mission of the Security Zone

Forces deployed in a security zone (SZ) exist primarily to delay, disrupt, or destroy advancing forces by establishing a series of defensive positions situated on the main avenues of approach. The SZ's purpose is to wear down the enemy and inflict maximum losses on enemy personnel and equipment before it arrives at the main defense. With this in mind, the SZ also deceives the enemy as to the composition and disposition of the main defensive area (MDA) and gives time for first echelon forces to prepare main defenses.

The depth of the SZ will depend on the goal and conduct of the operation, the nature of the terrain, and the time required to establish the defense. This prevents the enemy from reaching the forward edge of the MDA with his artillery, provides for coordination and artillery support of the forward deployed combat force with the main forces, and allows for sufficient maneuver space for the forces in the SZ. Defensive positions and obstacles are situated so that they cannot

be bypassed and are strong enough to make it difficult for the enemy to overcome without paying an expensive price in forces, resources, and time. Tankheavy forces and the majority of obstacles are positioned along potential armor axes of advance, while motorized rifle battalions normally defend secondary axes.

A division may form a SZ in front of its MDA when assuming the defense out of direct contact.

Reinforced battalions taken from second-echelon regiments are designated as forward detachments (FD); these establish a series of reinforced company-sized strongpoints sited on enemy main avenues of approach. These strongpoints are organized into initial, subsequent, and forward positions. The first position can be encountered asfar as fifteen kilometers from the MDA. The forward position is four to six kilometers from the MDA and is the closest position to the MDA. This position imitates the main defense, causes the enemy to conduct premature artillery preparations, and aids the disengagement of the FD. Regiments and battalions in the MDA may deploy combat security outposts up to reinforced platoon strength in the SZ forward of their sectors.

Because a battalion-sized FD in the SZ normally will be assigned to cover an axis with a frontage of 7-10 kilometers, it will deploy in

PHOTO BY SFC ED CAUM
AT-80 moves between fighting positions in the security zone.

a single echelon with a strong combined-arms reserve that can consist of up to a reinforced motorized rifle company. If there are multiple avenues of approach, the commander may divide the FD to cover them with individual reinforced company positions. Gaps or intervening terrain between company positions are covered with obstacles, reconnaissance patrols, and preplanned fire support.

The 60th Guards Motorized Rule Division at the NTC may form a security zone in front of its MDA when the scenario dictates that the 32nd Guards Motorized Rule Regiment fight a defense out of direct contact. While unit designations may change, concepts and principles for establishing the security zone will remain the same. The rest of this article will concentrate on how the regimental commander and his staff plan, develop, and execute operations within the SZ.

Force Identification

Based on organic training requirements, the operations officer for the squadron of the 11th ACR executing the rotation (acting as the OPFOR regiments chief of operations) will decide which units will be assigned designated missions. For the SZ battle, the chief of operations will task a specific motorized rifle battalion (MRB) and accompanying resources such as engineer, air defense, reconnaissance, and antitank assets, long-range artillery systems, and combat helicopters. Once these are identified, the subordinate commanders will conduct a brief mission analysis.

Planning Process

The commander's intent for the SZ battle is defined as preventing penetration of the forward position by attacking and defeating enemy units, and securing the MDA for the division. Definition of success might equate

to no penetration of the forward position until the first echelon defense is prepared. Since this is a battle that occurs nearly every rotation, subordinate commanders are fully capable of anticipating the commanders intent. Nevertheless, the staff, commanders, and all battlefield operating system (BOS) representatives conduct a mission analysis, develop courses of action, participate in an intense wargaming process prepare synchronization matrices, and conduct rehearsals for every mission.

Mission Analysis

A formal meeting is conducted to analyze each mission. These meetings are approximately ninety minutes long and focus on one fight. During this mission analysis, the key players are the regimental commander. chief of staff, chief of operations. chief of reconnaissance, subordinate commanders. and representatives from the battlefield operating systems. The chief of operations briefs the commanders on the area of operations, the area of interest and any unresolved issues. The chief of reconnaissance briefs terrain and weather considerations, order of battle, and presents enemy courses of action. At this time, the commander delivers his intent for the mission, his priority intelligence requirements. and preliminary planning guidance.

PHOTO BY SFC ED CAUM
A T-80 waits in ambush during a security zone battle.

Wargaming Process

Once the mission analysis is complete and the subordinate commander formulates his plan, the wargaming process begins. The wargaming process produces the synchronization matrix from which the operations order will be derived. The chief of reconnaissance lays down the most probable BLUEFOR course of action, using micro-armor on a 1:50,000 map of the battlefield. Simultaneously, the MRB commander will fight his course of action. Movement is broken down in fifteen-minute intervals so that all BOS slices, most notably the artillery, are considered at each point in time. Several maneuver options are identified and evaluated. The commander identifies his critical times and decision points for each maneuver option and the employment ofspecial munitions (chemical, scatterable mines, illumination, and smoke).

There are several products that emerge from the wargaming process. These consist of the synchronization matrix, reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S;) plan, essential elements of friendly information, enemy critical event list, electronic warfare synchronization matrix, fire support overlay, mine and obstacle plan, air defense overlay, and deception plan. While this is not a linear process, all of these products contribute to the operations order.

The leaders then conduct a Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) on the terrain on which they will be required to fight the security zone battle. During this "leaders' reconnaissance", the commanders refine company strongpoints and brief their plan on the ground where the SZ will be fought. This is done to ensure that overwatch is provided as forces move to subsequent and forward positions. They will also confirm repositioning and

withdrawal routes, overwatch positions, and firing lines,

The last critical step prior to the actual mission is conducting a full rehearsal. At this time, all commanders and key leaders of the combat units walk through the battle from LD until change of mission. Critical events and times, the fire support plan, required coordinating instructions, and the overall maneuver plan are all rehearsed. This will last until the regimental commander is satisfied that personnel know all aspects of the mission.

The MRB commander then tasks his company commanders to brief their subordinates on the full scope of the mission until each vehicle commander knows how the security zone battle will be fought. This may be a time consuming process, but it is the one critical step that ensures all contingencies are planned for and that every soldier knows his portion of the plan. This ensures that in the absence of communications, the mission will still be accomplished.

Maneuver

The FD in the SZ defends on a much broader front than an MRB in the MDA. It usually defends in a single echelon with a reinforced platoon in reserve two to three kilometers behind the lead forces in the SZ and along the most dangerous armor avenue of approach. This provides depth to the defense and secures the flanks and rear of the SZ. Companies and platoons occupy normal strongnoint frontages, but gaps between company strongpoints can exceed several kilometers. Obstacles, patrols and ambushes cover these gaps. The fire plan is based on antitank fires and integrates tank, BMP, attack helicopter, close air support, and indirect and direct artillery fires.

Doctrinally, the division commander expects the FD to defend aggressively. He retains control over its successive redeployment. Without his specific permission, this FD cannot relocate. The commander may need to gain time to permit the establishment of the MDA. If needed, he can require the FD to continue defending its position, even if this means it becomes decisively engaged or encircled.

The number of consecutive positions in the security zone depends on the nature of the terrain, defensibility, and the depth of the zone. The first position is selected based on defensible terrain, and is at a distance where artillery fires can support the battle from temporary firing positions. It is oriented so that platoon and company strongpoints can overwatch and interlock fires in the event of a withdrawal. Further positions can be prepared depending on the depth of the security zone. All positions are selected at a distance from each other which will permit continuous fires on the enemy throughout the depth of the SZ.

If the battle in the SZ falters or is not successful in thwarting the enemy attack, the FD occupies a forward position as a last measure before passing through the MDA and returning to its parent second-echelon regiment. This position simulates the MDA and is well prepared and supplied with engineer obstacles. The OPFOR expects the FD to take some losses and would not be at full strength as it passes through. The FD moves off the main avenue of approach and takes up forward positions on a less threatened axis of advance while combat elements from the depth of the defense will occupy positions along the most threatened axis.

Attack Helicopters

Helicopters have become increasingly important during both offensive and defensive operations. Combat helicopters provide fire support to tank and motorized rifle units and also support reconnaissance and heliborne operations.

Attack helicopters, such as the Mi-24/HIND F (called Sokol or "Falcon the at NTC), and artillery fires are synchronized with the motorized rifle or tank troops during their rearward movement from initial and subsequent positions in the SZ. The OPFOR aviation company (C/159 AVN) has two Sokol helicopters that fight from aerial battle positions and work in close coordination with maneuver units to ensure that their movement is covered while they are moving above ground and most vulnerable. They will also be used extensively during the counter reconnaissance battle and to reinforce threatened strongpoints.

Reconnaissance

On the NTC battlefield, regimental reconnaissance for a security zone battle will consist of up to 4 x BMPs, 4 x BRDMs, 2 x ground surveillance radar teams, an engineer reconnaissance vehicle, and 3 x BRDM-2RKh that will provide consistent, timely and accurate reporting of the BLUEFOR progress during the battle. The situation is primarily developed from these assets. The 511th MI company will also provide the commander with intercept, direction finding and jamming support to hinder and confuse the enemy and establish

conditions for delivering accurate fire support.

The OPFOR commander will continue to receive reports from the regimental and divisional reconnaissance elements that are in sector conducting reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance missions and providing spot reports as the fight develops. This will allow the commander time to implement his plan the chief of artillery time to adjust fire plans, and engineers time to construct and fortify positions and plan for and emplace scatterable minefields.

Engineers

Countermobility is key to support the maneuver elements and develop suitable fire sacks, since strongpoints will be positioned across wide frontages. Combat elements deployed in the SZ will maneuver in and between fixed and specially constructed field fortifications. These will contain company and platoon strongpoints and alternate fighting positions. Obstacles are emplaced in front of and in gaps between these strongpoints. Engineers design their obstacles so that as the enemy attempts to bypass one obstacle, he will encounter another and make his flanks vulnerable to direct fire. The OPFOR will also utilize ambushes in conjunction with the obstacle plan. The 58th Combat Engineer Company meets these challenges and is critical in the OPFORs ability to establish a successful security zone.

Each obstacle that the 58th Combat Engineer Company places on the battlefield is well thought out and has a distinct purpose. Disrupting obstacles will disrupt enemy formations while turning obstacles turn the enemy from avenues of approach or key terrain and into fire sacks. Fixing obstacles fix and expose the enemy's flanks and make him vulnerable to flank shots as he navigates through the obstacle, and blocking obstacles stop the enemy. For more information on engineer preparation of obstacles at the NTC refer to the January 1995 Red Thrnst Star article co-authored by CPT Masterson and 2LT Faber.

Fire Support

As most are aware, indirect fires at the NTC are computer-generated. In the security zone, fire support missions will be fired by the MRB's organic 120-mm mortar battery, one or two artillery battalions directly reinforcing to the MRB, and other supporting artillery units. This normally will equate to elements of the RAG and DAG. At NTC, it is common for the RAG to consist of 1 x 2S1 and 2 x 2S3 battalions, while the DAG invariably has 1 x 2S5 and 1 x BM-21 battalions.

With these indirect fire assets, the FD engages the advancing enemy at long range. As he closes, the OPFOR engages with direct fire systems. The object is to strip away his reconnaissance, force him to deploy prematurely, and to make him think he is attacking the MDA. The OPFOR plans to attrit the attacking force by 50% before it comes into direct fire range.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the fight in the SZ is a consolidated and coordinated effort. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 11th ACR provide rotational units with an adversary that is always up to the test. The SZ battle requires significant coordination between all the battlefield operating systems to provide a dynamic and fluid battlefield.

Graphics from an actual Security Zone battle at NTC.

The 7th Antitank Battalion:
OPFORS Antitank Reserve

BY CPT J. MATTHEW LISSNER
COMMANDER, ANTITANK COMPANY
2ND SQUADRON,
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Each Krasnovian motorized rifle regiment (MRR) has an antitank battalion. This battalion consists of nine AT-5/SPANDREL Antitank Guided Missile (ATGM) vehicles and six MT-12 antitank guns. The NTC OPFOR currently fields only nine AT-5s and four MT-12s. Antitank assets can be employed at battalion and regimental levels on the NTC battlefield. The 7th Antitank Battalion (ATB) has the capability to destroy entire task forces when employed doctrinally with precision.

The AT-5 ATGMs are replicated by M220A2 TOW systems mounted on visually modified (VISMOD) M966 High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMWWVs). The HMWWVs replicate BRDM-2s. Each vehicle carries fifteen missiles (simulating five on the launcher and ten reloads) with a minimum range of 100 meters and a maximum range of 4000 meters. The tracking time is approximately fifteen seconds at maximum range. This time coupled with reloading means a realistic rate fire of about two to three rounds per minute. The 7th ATB also has the ability to field up to four real BRDMs with TOW systems mounted. However, the maintenance and logistical problems associated with the real BRDMs limit their use.

The MT-12 antitank gun is replicated by a VISMOD trailer chassis, protective plates, and a gun tube. The MT-12s are towed by M1038 HMWWVs which replicate the MT-LB. The MT-12 has a maximum range of 2000 meters. The maximum rate of fire is ten rounds per minute. The MT-12 can be used as a field gun if the trails are dug in, with a maximum range of 18,000 to 21,000 meters: however, the NTC OPFOR does not use the MT-12s in the indirect mode. The OPFOR also has ability to field up to six real MT-LBs and six MT-12s. Again, the associated maintenance, logistical, and personnel problems prevent their use on the NTC battlefield. Each real MT-LB/MT- 12 requires a ten-man crew. The 7th ATB does not have the personnel necessary to crew the real MT-LB,/MT-12s.

The antitank reserve will normally have one to two mobile obstacle detachments (MODs) under its control. Doctrinally, a MOD may include both minelaying and ditching assets, but the OPFOR only replicates the minelaying assets at the NTC. The MODs GMZ minelayer is replicated by a VISMOD M113 towing a 3/4-ton trailer. The VISMOD has a M2 machine gun for self defense. The trailer contains 620 antitank mines. The crew of the MOD can emplace a minefield of three rows with five meters between mines and twenty to forty meters between rows. This creates a minefield approximately 1000 meters long and between forty and eighty meters in depth. The crew has individual weapons and Dragons to replicate the RPG-16.

The primary mission of the 7th ATB is to provide accurate, long range antitank fires to destroy enemy tanks, armored antitank vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, engineer assets, and armored personnel carriers. Occasionally, attack helicopters become priority targets. This mission can he further broken down to offensive and defensive missions.

Missions of the antitank reserve in the offense include:

• Cover or screen the flanks of the attacking MRR, or a motorized rifle battalion (MRB) on advance guard or forward detachment missions.

• Destroy enemy counterattacks.

• Cover or screen the committal of the second echelon.

• Consolidate on preplanned firing lines to retain key or decisive terrain.

• Engage armored and antitank targets on the forward edge of the enemy defense as part of the preparatory fires.

Missions of the antitank reserve in the defense include:

• Reinforce security zone forces to assist in delaying and disrupting the enemy.

• Reinforce the defense of the first echelon along critical or most likely enemy axes.

• Destroy or halt any enemy that penetrates the defense.

• Block boundaries, flanks, or gaps in the defense.

• Cover the deployment lines of counterattacks and reserve elements.

The present combat structure of the 7th ATB includes a headquarters section with two comnmand and control BRDM-2s. The three antitank companies (ATCs) have one C2 BRDM-2 and three AT-5 mounted BRDM-2s each. Two of the three ATCs have two MT-12s each, with the third ATC fielding two MT-12s sometime in the summer of 1995.

The C2 BRDM-2s are fitted with M2 and M60 machine guns

to replicate 14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machine guns respectively.

The OPFOR frequently conducts air assault missions. When authorized, the 7th ATB can support the mission with three dismounted AT-5 ATGMs. One squad leader and three gunners are attached to the augmentee infantry company which conducts the mission. This task organization provides the infantry with long-range antitank fires to assist in securing key terrain, It also provides long-range overwatch for friendly forces as they pass forward of the infantry position.

Typical combat power authorization of antitank assets for missions at the NTC are:

• MRB Forward Detachment

• MRB Advance Guard

• MRB Defense

• MRB Security Zone

• MRB Defense

• MRR Attack

• MRR Meeting Battle

It is important to note that the 7th ATB rarely employs the MT12s on offensive missions, although authorized, due to limited number of vehicles and personnel requirements. This is especially true on regimental missions. There will be a restructuring of the ATB in the near future which will allow greater use of the MT-12s in the offense,

Offensive missions require planning throughout the depth of the zone including the objective and beyond. Once the ATC/ATB commander receives the mission, he begins his own terrain analysis and continues with troop-leading procedures. Antitank firing lines placed on graphics are refined through terrain analysis. These (firing lines support the movement of the MRB/MRR while in prebattle formation by protecting the most exposed flank. The firing lines further support the MRB/MRR as it deploys into battle formation.

PHOTO BY SFC ED CAUM
An AT-5 crew awaits an enemy attack from a flanking position.

The regimental commander may push an ATC down to an MRB for independent missions. However, he retains the ability to exercise command and control of that antitank subunit. When a MRB deploys in an advance guard formation, the ATC will normally

PHOTO BY SFC ED CAUM
A real BMP from the forward security element moves to engage the enemy.

follow behind the forward security element (FSE). This allows the FSE to develop the situation and secure good terrain while the ATC provides flank security for the MRB main body. The ATC will follow the first echelon when the MRB does not deploy in advance guard formation.

Security requires the ATC to follow the same axis as the MRB. However, the ATC commander will normally keep his unit on a separate or parallel route. This is because the BRDM-2s are more mobile than the BMPs and create less of a signature. Parallel routes also enhance the ATC's ability to get out on the flank and into good ground to fight from. Safety is also a consideration, especially in limited visibility and high dust areas. The ATC commander will try to prevent the BRDMs from intermingling with the BMPs.

Careful attention must be paid to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield provided by the Chief of Reconnaissance and the ATC commander himself. Thought must be given to anticipated close air support (CAS) targets. FASCAM targets, choke points, and areas covered by combat observation and laser teams (COLTs). The loss of an entire ATC due to CAS, indirect fires, or a FASCAM minefield can he disastrous for the MRB or regiment.

The ATC commander will normally deploy all three AT-5s on line with one to four hundred meters between each system. When terrain and mission dictate, the ATC commander may opt to deploy two systems forward and leave one to cover the flank or rear of the ATC. If the ATC is providing flank security, the ATC commander may bound the unit as a whole or by individual vehicles.

Several options are available to the regimental commander for employment of the ATB during a regimental meeting battle or attack. He may choose to employ one ATC forward with the advance guard or forward detachment and keep two ATCs back with the main body. If the regiment is employing a forward detachment, the regimental commander may consider it important enough for two ATCs to deploy with the FD. The preferred method is to allow the ATB to fight as a whole. This enables nine systems directly behind the lead element to provide flank security for the regiment and quickly mass fires on counterattacking forces.

The ATB commander must ensure the safety of the ATCs. A technique used by the OPFOR at the NTC is to weave the ATCs in a column. One vehicle from each ATC alternates position in the column approximately fifty to 100 meters apart. This technique is fairly simple to command and control with practice. It prevents an entire ATC from being destroyed all at once by CAS, indirect fires, or FASCAM. This prevents having to re-task organize in the middle of the mission prior to direct fire contact. It also enables the ATB to mass fires by deploying on line quicker without having to wait for the trail element to catch up.

One ATC is directed as the supporting effort. It's task is normally to secure good terrain which will allow it to fight for an extended period of time and attrit or fix the enemy's advance guard company team in a meeting battle. In a deliberate attack, it's task is to destroy the company team at the point of penetration.

The second ATC, also directed as a supporting effort, will provide flank security for the regimental main body. It's task is to destroy or fix repositioners in a meeting battle. In a deliberate attack, its task is to allow the main body freedom of maneuver through the point of penetration.

The third ATC, directed as the main effort, provides flank security for the second echelon and remaining forces of the first echelon in a meeting battle. It's task is to destroy the enemy's reserve and defeat any counterattack force once on the objective during an attack.

Typically, each ATC will be attrited throughout the course of the battle. Detailed rehearsals, adjacent unit coordination, and back briefs ensure that each vehicle commander knows what his mission is and when to transition into the next phase of the fight. Careful monitoring of the ATB and regimental nets provide critical and timely information necessary for vehicle commanders to make the right decisions in the absence of orders.

MT-12s are not often used in the offense, as stated earlier. When they are, certain considerations must be kept in mind. The MT-12s should move on trails and avoid cross-country movement whenever possible. Although the MT-12 is a rapid-fire weapon, it takes a good crew several minutes to employ it once a fighting position is decided on.

When the MT-12 is employed it can be devastating. It is difficult to detect because of its small signature. It has a high probability of kill and its sixty-round unit of fire and rapid fire rate make it very effective between 1000-2000 meters. The crew are vulnerable to small-arms fire, and must take care in choice of firing lines. Another problem is in the communication area. The crew has a PRC-77 strapped to the gunners seat. The antenna must he taken down/installed each time the gun moves.

Ideally, the AT-5s and MT-12s form an 'L' shape with the MT-12s on the wide, shallow axis usually on broken ground with keyhole shots. The AT-5s will set

along the short deep axis utilizing their maximum standoff range. This allows the ATGMs to halt or destroy enemy armor from the front while the MT-12s destroy the enemy from the flank. Depending on terrain, the MT-12s may orient 180 degrees opposite from above to protect the ATGMs from envelopment in more open terrain.

Additionally, the ATGMs and AT guns may not fight in conjunction with one another. The MT-12s may set a firing line to prevent a counterattack from a separate avenue of approach.

A critical asset not discussed yet is the employment of the MOD. A limitation that must be considered is the lack of mobility associated with the VISMOD M113 and trailer. The MOD, or MODs if allocated, must stay on improved trails or they will fall

PHOTO BY SFC ED CAUM
An MT-12 secures a fighting position.

behind on the march or in prebattle formations. Another consideration is that the MOD is vulnerable to small-arms fire. The crew of the MOD must always be on the lookout for dismounted infantry and avoid contact whenever possible.

Careful planning and use of IPB are necessary for successful MOD employment. The primary mission of the MOD is to build and support an AT-5/MT-12 engagement area. The engineer crews must be part of the mission planning, rehearsals, and backbriefs. Attention must be paid to possible follow-on unit routes through the zone of attack. Dissemination of planned and emplaced minefields must be accurate and timely for all elements within the regiment.

Deployment of the MOD is often left to the last minute. This may often be under direct and indirect fires. Each ATC and MOD carries at least one smoke pot to assist the MOD in emplacing its minefield. When placed on the proper axis, the MOD's minefield, backed up by ATGMs and AT guns, will severely disrupt the enemy's mass and momentum.

Due to limited support assets the ATB cannot resupply itself. When Class V becomes critical, the ATC must internally redistribute missiles (ATWESS) of get resupplied from BMP-2s that are nearby on a firing line, or passed enroute. The rules of engagement (ROE) allow for one minute to reload each round without firing. A real antitank battalion would have its own service support vehicles to conduct Class V resupply.

The ATB is used by itself as an antitank reserve or in conjunction with a combined arms reserve (CAR) in the defense. On independent MRB missions the typical AT allocation is 3 AT-5s and 2 MT-12s. When fighting against an entire brigade, the allocation may be as much as 6 AT-5s and 4 MT-12s.

The antitank support plan is much greater in detail in the defense than in the offense. The ATC or ATB(-) fire plan must be tied to the MRB fire plan. Direct and extensive coordination must be made between the ATB commander and the MRB commander.

Occasionally, the MT-12s will be attached to an augmentee infantry company to support its engagement area. In this situation, the AT guns fight as an economy of force where the MRB commander is accepting risk. There is little or no plan to reposition the guns. It is critical that the AT gun section leader plan the employment of the guns.

The ATC commander will discuss planned firing lines. routes, MOD locations, and priority of engineer assets with the MRB commander. The antitank systems are usually last on the engineer priority of effort. This makes it critical for the ATC commander to choose wadis and broken ground carefully. These positions must provide cover and concealment, and allow the AT systems to have unobstructed fires into the kill sack. When engineer assets become available, the dug-in positions will be along the enemy's most likely avenues of approach. Hasty positions, wadis, and natural berms are normally along least likely avenues of approach.

Rehearsals are the key to success in the defense. The ATC commander selects firing lines, routes, and MOD locations to support the MRB fire plan. Each system is responsible for preparing a range card, marking its engagement area, preparing Class V stockpiles, and rehearsing timelines from the hide position to each firing line. The ATC commander, in conjunction with the MOD platoon leader, marks and rehearses movement and

employment times for each planned minefield.

The ATC commander provides a sector sketch, updated graphics including firing lines, MOD minefield grids, grids to prestocks, and employment times to the MRB commander and regimental staff at a coordination meeting. This ensures synchronization of the AT assets to support the defense at the decisive time and place.

The AT systems normally laager in a hide position that protects them from observation and indirect fires. This hide is positioned behind the rearmost echelon of the defense. Timely deployment of the antitank assets is critical to mission success. The unit will remain in its hide until the enemy's main body has been committed or a battle position has been attrited below thirty percent. Committal of the antitank reserve is held under regimental control. However, the ATC commander must carefully monitor the battle and be able to recommend deployment of his unit.

Upon commitment, the ATC commander must ensure that his unit is not caught out in the open to be engaged by enemy CAS. He must also be prepared to bypass enemy FASCAM and avoid indirect fires. Proper planning and rehearsals eliminate the need to FRAGO an new movement plan. Once deployed, the AT systems are expected to destroy three to four combat vehicles each. This is a very realistic number which has been achieved many times on the NTC battlefield.

Individual vehicles will employ smoke grenades or smoke pots to help screen their movement when necessary. The use of smoke must be carefully planned to avoid masking friendly fires within the position. When the ATC reaches its intended firing line, the commander gives specific fire commands to ensure rounds are not wasted on single enemy vehicles. The intent is to destroy the enemy at maximum range.

Nighttime and limited visibility defenses present small problems for the antitank weapon systems. Hand-held illumination, indirect fire illumination, natural moonlight, night-vision goggles, and thermal sights (on the AT-5s) all support the defensive fight at night. Spotlights from tanks and BRDMs also assist in illuminating targets at night. AT-5s can temporarily move to the forward edge of the defense to identify and engage enemy targets during limited visibility. The antitank systems positioned forward will move back to their hide at first light or another predetermined time.

The OPFOR's 7th ATB consistently destroys up to one-half of each enemy task force it faces. Stand-off range, detailed planning, extensive rehearsals. and violent execution ensure this standard continues to be met.

Threat Update: 2S6 Tunguska
Self-Propelled Air Defense System

BY SPC JEFFREY S. BOOTH
S-2 SECTION
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

The 2S6 was first seen in public at the Moscow Air Show in August 1992. The 2S6 is the replacement system for the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun that was fielded over twenty years ago. The armored chassis is the same as that of the SA-15 Tor self-propelled surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. The 2S6 has a four-man crew and is equipped with tracking and surveillance radar. Having four 30-mm rapid-fire cannons and eight SA-19 SAMs make it the most heavily armed vehicle of its kind in the world. At a price of $8 to $10 million, the 2S6 gives buyers an advanced air defense system that is unparalleled by any system produced in the West. Recently India has been a primary buyer of the 2S6 to replace its aging ZSU23-4.

Automotive

The chassis of tile 2S6 is a relative of the GM-539 (MT-T) family. The chassis is fully tracked, which allows the 2S6 to move rapidly with other modern combat vehicles like the BMP-2 and T-80. This chassis is also used with the SA-11 and SA-15 air defense systems that allows for similar parts to be used in each vehicle. The 2S6 is a thin-skinned armored vehicle and is not amphibious. The armored body is most likely constructed of welded armor plates that should provide protection from shrapnel and small arms fire.

The suspension of the 2S6 is built with stability as its highest priority The system on the 2S6 is similar in design to that of the BMD and 2S9. The driver of the

2S6 can adjust the height of the vehicle from the inside. An auxiliary power unit allows this to happen by giving hydraulic pressure to each of the running gears hydraulic cylinders. The front or back or each side can be raised from 100 to 400 mm. While moving, the suspension can provide stability for the 30-mm guns on rough terrain, and for firing the SA-19s, the vehicle can be lowered to the ground to provide stability. The benefits that this suspension system gives to the stability of the vehicle are: greater crew comfort, less shock to the electronics systems, and the fire control computer and stabilizer do less work during firing solutions.

Information on the engine and transmission of the 2S6 is scarce. The system is most likely equipped with a V-12 high-speed diesel engine taken from the T-72. This engine would allow

PHOTO BY SFC ED CAUM
OPFOR VISMOD 2S6.

the 2S6 to achieve a 20 horsepower per ton power to weight ratio, achieve a road speed of 60km/h and travel up to 500 km without refueling. The transmission on the 2S6 is probably automatic. The system also has a 50 to 60 kilowatt auxiliary power unit for use when the engine is off which allows the system to diminish its audio and thermal signature when the machine is in the defense.

Armament

The 2S6 is unmatched in the area of long-range target engagements. This is the result of the missile and gun combination. While on the move, the 2S6 can engage targets out to 4,000 meters with the two, twin-barreled 30-mm cannons (2A38M) which is the same caliber as on the BMP-2, BMP-3, and Mi-24/HIND E. The 30-mm cannons fire at a cyclic rate of 4,000 to 5,000 rounds per minute; however, only 2,000 rounds are available onboard in eight ammunition containers stored in the turret. A resupply truck that carries another 4,000 rounds in quick-load containers.

The long range punch of the 2S6 is made up of eight SA-19/GRENDEL (9M311) SAMs in two four- missile canisters. Mounted to the outside of the 30-mm cannon, the canisters can elevate vertically in sections of two, independent of each other. The slant range of the missile is eight kilometers. The SA-19s are assessed to be two-stage with Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight (SACLOS) or Automatic Command to Line of Sight (ACLOS) guidance and a proximity fuse in the HE Frag warhead. Dual command guidance capability would be ideal for these missiles. Good weather allows the missile to be guided to the target using a gunners optical sight (for SACLOS), while in the ACLOS mode, a fire direction radar is used. Theoretically the SA-19 should provide a true fire and forget capability when using the ACLOS method of guidance, allowing the 2S6 to find a target, shoot, and then find another. The resupply vehicle carries another 16 SA-19 missiles for reloading.

Electronics

The electronics package that is on the 256 is what really makes it a better product than the ZSU23-4. The HOT SHOT radar system is made up of two components. On the back of the turret is a Target Acquisition Radar (TAR) allowing the 2S6 to engage targets out to eighteen kilometers. On the front of the turret is a Target Trackinig Radar

(TTR) which provides tracking information and command guidance to the missiles and guns out to 10 km. A routine engagement sequence would have the TAR find an incoming aircraft, then give the data to the TTR for engagement as the target comes into range. The TAR could then look for other targets. The 2S6 is also assumed to be able to receive digital target tracking information from other early warniing systems such as the PPRU (DOG EAR) of divisional and higher air defense command and control systems. In theory, the 2S6 could even receive data from other 2S6s, which would allow the 2S6 to keep the TAR on board shutdown to avoid detection, and engage targets using remote radar.

NTC Rep1ication

Within the OPFOR the 2S6 can be found in its own battery in the regimental air defense battalion. The 2S6 battery is composed of a battery headquarters, transportation section, and three air defense missile and artillery platoons. Each platoon has two 30-mm 2S6s, totaling six; however, the NTC OPFOR currently only has four. The 2S6 is a visually modified M551 Sheridan: it has MILES gun capability, but is currently unable to replicate the SA-19 or provide a radar signature.

As a regimental air defense weapon, the 2S6 often is required to fulfill a variety of missions within the OPFOR such as protecting march columns and attack formations, or special missions, such as air defense ambushes and roving units. In the defense of units making tactical marches, pairs of 2S6s are located 1,000 to 2.000 meters from each other to ensure mutual support. Individual guns maintain at least fifty meters between themselves and other vehicles to ensure an unobstructed field of fire to engage how-flying aircraft.

Air defense ambushes usually consist of one or more 2S6s or SA-16/18 SAMs. The 2S6, with its high rate of fire and mobility, is especially suited for both

ambushes and roving units. OPFOR air defense ambushes engage only these targets that approach on the designated route or in self-defense. The units reposition themselves immediately after engagement or on discovery by the enemy.

Roving air defense elements function much like the ambushes. However there is one difference: an ambushing uniit lies in wait for approaching enemy aircraft, while a roving unit moves to the most likely areas of enemy air attack. The rovinig unit occupies positions according to a prearranged schedule or on order of the air defense commander.

A pair of 2S6s may support a motorized rifle battalion attacking in the first echelon. In the combat order, the regimental commander tasks a pair of 2S6s to support a particular battalion for a particular period. This period can precede the attack and begin before a battalion moves into an assembly area. The 2S6 pair may join the maneuver battalion after it is already in the assembly area, though the OPFOR prefers to have both subunits arrive at the assembly area at the same time. In either case, the air defenise section or platoon leader reports to the maneuver battalion commander and establishes direct communications.

In the defense, the 2S6 can deploy in pairs or individually. The pairs of guns are again 1,000 to 2,000 meters apart. Positions for the 2S6s are usually well within the a battalion's defensive area. This protects them from enemy observation and direct ground fire and allows better protection for the entire battalion. Air observation posts are in the battalion rear area and at the battalion command observation post (COP). The 2S6 platoon command post is usually near the battalion COP.

Summary

The most evident trend in former Soviet and Russian tactical air defense development is the

increase in the size of the engagement envelope and weapons lethality. The air defense forces continually receive new weapons systems and modify previously fielded systems. The recently fielded weapons systems have redundant missile guidance features that provide an enhanced ability to conduct successful engagements in a sophisticated countermeasures environment.

The 2S6 is a small part of the OPPOR's attempt to make its air defense systems second to none. This weapon is a serious concern to Western air forces, and is for sale worldwide. The specific purpose of the 2S6 is to counter the AH-64 Apache, A-10 Warthog and other western combat aircraft. Keep in mind the AH-64 and A-10 armor were designed to defeat only 23-mm or smaller ammunition. By incorporating advanced electronic features into its systems, the 2S6 provides the regimental commander with an effective, long-range weapon system to counter the air threat.

PHOTO BY EARL ALBRIGHT
An OPFOR VISMOD 2S6.

Antitank Reserves, Mobile Obstacle
Detachments, and Remote Mining in
Combat (Part II)

BY MR. CHARLES J. DICK
DIRECTOR, CONFLICT STUDIES
RESEARCH CENTER
ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY SANDHURST,
CAMBERLEY, UK

Editors Note: This continues an article which began in PB-30-94-4 (January 1995).

The Context

To be victorious, the defender must reduce the vulnerability of his forces, preserve his freedom of action and wrest the initiative from the attacker by establishing fire superiority and aggressively exploiting every defensive success. In modern conditions, these simple precepts will he difficult to translate into practice.

The forces available are likely to be less than optimum for the frontages allotted to them and this factor, combined with the inherent difficulty in establishing defense when already under attack, and in the inevitably fluid conditions of future battles and operations. have made it necessary to find new approaches to ensurinig the stability of the defense (especially in the iniitial period of war).

The attacker will be endeavorinig to break up the cohesion of the defense and achieve an unstoppable momentum which will enable him to destroy the defense in detail. To this end he will combine concentrations of fire and maneuver forces with vertical

envelopment to create breaches and execute rapid and possibly frequent shifts in axis to bypass centers of resistance. To meet the contemporary threat, it is no longer adequate for the defender to rely, as in the past, on the stubborn holding of lines in a relatively shallow tactical zone of defense combined with counterattacks to destroy enemy groupings that succeed in wedging into the defense.

Penetrations of greater depth than hitherto considered tolerable will now have to be accepted as the norm. The center of gravity in battle is shifting from the old line of contact into the tactical and operational depth, the dynamics and intensity of combat are increasing, and decisions will usually have to be made in conditions of information shortage. The defender will have to rely much more on maneuver, particularly at formation level, to wear the enemy down and prevent him from gaining momentum. Primarily, this will be the maneuver of massed fire and obstacles both into the enemy's depth and from one axis to another, and this will be supported and exploited by the maneuver of mechanized and airmobile forces.

The defense will need to be deeply echeloned, often with the main weight of formations, especially at the operational level, being initially held in the depth. Forces deployed in a now deeper tactical zone of defense will probably establish a system of centers of resistanice (comprising battalion areas organized for all-round defense) and mobile anititank strongpoints (comprising up to a motorized rifle and a tank company, a battery each of 152-mm howitzers and antitank weapons, a flamethrower company and smoke generation means). These will endeavor to canalize the enemy into tactical and operational fire pockets (Russ: ognevoy meshok) in which the enemy will be halted and then destroyed by massed fire and then counterattacks by strong second echelons and reserves.

Any penetrations in unacceptable directions will be stopped by concentrated air, missile and artillery strikes combined with the skillful use of remote mininig and of POZs and PTRs. The latter organizations play a key role in reinforcing hard pressed defenders, replacinig damaged units, plugging gaps and meeting changes in axis. As one author points out, "it is difficult to overestimate the role of the POZ and remote mining during the course of the battle.¹

Tactical Deployment of the POZ

The Russians always placed great reliance on the use of minefields to maintain the stability of the defense and shape the battlefield. Thus, in the textbook Balaton defensive operation in March 1945, 3rd Ukrainian Front created a density of 2700 antitank and 2500 anitipersonnel mines per kilometer. This density greatly inhibited the maneuver of 6th SS Panzer Army and inflicted heavy casualties (20-30% of German tank losses were due to mines). Many, perhaps most of these mines were laid by POZs during the course of the operation, whenever and wherever the enemy showed signs of being able to penetrate

defensive belts and generate momentum.

The latter fact brings out an important point about the Russian approach to mine warfare. Formal, protective minefields are important, but they are expensive in resources and they can be detected in advance so that the enemy can thus make timely preparations to breach them, It is often more efficacious to lay a minefield at the last minute, during the course of the battle. This is a more economical use of mines, an especially important factor during fluid operations. More importantly, it fulfils the vital requirement to achieve surprise. An attacker who stumbles onto an unexpected minefield just as he believes he is gaining tempo will either have to drive through and accept serious losses and disorganization or he will have to waste precious time in organizinig a breaching action.

The Russians believe that time is a critical element in warfare, and winninig some of this precious commodity is often crucial to a defender endeavoring to maintain or restore the stability of his

defense and mount counter-moves. These considerations help to explain the great importance attached to the POZ during the defense and to the surprise nature

of its actions. Emphasis is laid on a covert approach to areas to be mined (e.g., by using bad visibility and folds in the terrain) and to using the peculiarities of the ground to conceal the characteristics and extent of obstacles that are created. False obstacles, too, are recommended to confuse the enemy and slow his reactions through the creation of uncertainty. Dummy (extremely shallow) antitank ditches can be dug to fool aerial reconnaissance and the existence of minefields can be simulated through deceptive ploughing or digging and the apparently careless leaving of mine packaging, marker strikes and signs, et cetera.²

In defense, the POZ may well be used to install protective minefields and other obstacles before the enemy attacks. Its main role however is to create obstacles during the course of the battle. It will be given the locations of several possible minefields and demolitions on likely enemy armored axes and, ideally, all these will be reconnected and marked so that whichever ones are actually needed will be emplaced with minimal expenditure of time. They will usually be sited in gaps between strongpoints and battalion defensive areas and in the depth.

Until it is called into action, the POZ and its resupply point will lurk in a well camouflaged hide from which it can rapidly execute its most likely tasks. Normally, this will be done close to the PTR so that coordination can be organised between the commanders of the two. Regimental special reserves will generally wait behind the defended areas of first-echelon battalions and divisional ones behind the first-echelon regiments. When the POZ and

PTR are committed, it will be important to ensure that they enjoy air defense cover lest their vital contributions to the stability of the defense be lost through enemy air action.

In positional defense, the POZ and PTR should be committed before the enemy has succeeded in creating a penetration. Their actions should restore stability to a crumbling defense and not wait on the enemy's breakthrough. They are thus usually committed early, in the case of regimental reserves, for instance, before the enemy has finished fighting through the first echelon of a forward battalion. Ideally, successful counter-penetration is merely a prelude to a counterattack to destroy the forces wedged into the defense. This is illustrated in the previous diagram (figure l), taken froni Lt. Gen. V.G. Reznichenko's Tactics (Voyenizdat 1987).

This will rarely be possible at regimental level, however. As a superiority of 5-6:1 is required to guarantee tactical success (though a lower rate is acceptable if the enemy is surprised and disorganised), even a second echelon of, say, a motorized rifle battalion and a tank battalion, less a company, would hardly eliminate a penetration of much greater strength than the equivalent of one to two companies, depending on circumstances. It is thus more likely than not that the role of the second echelon of a regiment will be limited to counter-penetration when necessary, and it will only transition to the offensive as part of a higher level counterattack.

If the enemy blow is strong, it will necessitate the committal of the divisional POZ and PTR as well as regimental ones. These will go into action before the enemy has completed the penetration of a first-echelon battalion. In a favorable situation, this will be enough to halt the enemy, thus preserving the second echelon of the forward battalion to add weight to a divisional counterattack. Otherwise,they too, or at least elements of them, will have to join the counter-penetration effort. As at the level of regiment, division will only counterattack if all but certain of success, and this inplies a 3-6:1 advantage, the precise ratio depending on the enemy's situation. If the necessary strength is lacking, then aggressive counter-m oves will have to be left to the operational commanders, perhaps after the deployment of an army POZ and PTR.³

Maneuver defence is increasingly findinig favor with Russian military thinkers. Its theory has not been worked out in the same degree of detail as the positional, however, so it is less easy to be prescriptive about the employment of POZs and antitank reserves. Increased preparedness to yield ground, coupled with the inevitability of deeper and more rapid penetration, thanks to lower force densities and wider intervals between units, will mean greater emphasis on counter-penetration, but not to halt the enemy and set him for a counterattack designed to destroy him.

Rather such moves will be designed to stabilize the situation, prevent the enemy from gaining an unstoppable momentum and cover the orderly withdrawal of units and subunits to the next delaying line. Counterattacks will be more frequent and mounted at lower levels, but they will not seek to achieve decisive results. Their purpose will be to damage the enemy and slow his advance by forcing him to deploy and by inducing caution, and to help elements engaged to break away and to cover their withdrawal.⁴ Plainly in conducting maneuver defense, the actions of POZs and PTRs combined with those of mobile antitank strongpoints, airmobile delaying detachments and groups, and army aviation, together with the maneuver of long-range fire and aerial- and artillery-delivered minefields, will be critical in maintaining the stability of the defense.

The tactical employment and methods of operation of all these resources are best illuminated through the exercise examples used by the Russians to instruct their officers.

Example 1."Actions of a POZ", by Col. L. Silenko, Voyennyy vestnik (VV) 3/79:

Anticipating the arrival of the attacking enemy to his front between 1700 and 1800 (i.e., in 7-8 hours time), the combined-- arms commander ordered Sr. Lt. Mutovkin, commanding the POZ of two PMR platoons and an engineer squad, to plan a controlled antitank minefield on Line 1 (from the Lake to Redkaya wood) and a mixed minefield on Line 2, together with demolitions along the road, to deny the gap between two leading companies. However, the executive order was not issued until 1540, the mission to be completed by 1730.

Sr. Lt. Mutovkin carried out his reconnaissance and marking of routes and minefields and replenishment points, and organised cooperation with the antitank reserve between the warning and executive orders. Ideally, he would have liked to have tackled the tasks successively for ease of command and control. He realized, however, that the time available would be barely adequate, so he used his initiative and deployed a platoon to each task, with the attached squad being used for demolitions and cratering.

This mission was completed in good time and minefield records were submitted to the regimental and higher engineer chiefs.

Comments:

• Presumably the combined arms commander delayed the implementation of his obstacle plan to the last minute to achieve surprise. Planning to exploit a gap in the defense, the enemy would run into a mixed minefield and antitank reserve. Too early a deployment might merely have resulted in the enemy switching his main effort to the Lugovoye-Drotovo axis.

• The size of the POZ, indicating that formation assets were used to reinforce the regimental minelaying platoon, would suggest that this was seen as an important axis.

• Thie main attack was anticipated along the junction between two first-echelon motorized rifle battalions. It was apparently hoped that this avenue could be blocked by the POZs and PTRs surprise deployment while the enemy was negotiating the River Potya. Note that this reinforcement of the antitank defense was planned within the formation of the first echelon, with a secondary, depth position. Apparently, the combined-arms commander hoped, by unexpectedly increasing his antitank density on the Stasovo

axis, to halt the enemy offensive in its tracks, before the stability of the first echelon could be threatened.

• The use of a controlled minefield in depth, in an area through which the first echelon or PTR might have to withdraw, is worthy of note.

Example 2. "In a Special Tactical Problem", by Sr. Lt. V. Lozko, VV 7/81:

The exercise concerned a PMR platoon-sized POZ (with two engineer squads attached) working by night. As usual, it was working in cooperation with a PTR.

The combat engineers prepared luminous stakes and datum points and MBFs (metallic, spray protected engineer lanterns with various filters) to mark cross-country routes, warn of dangers and help orientation on unfamiliar terrain.

The POZs first mission was to lay a minefield on Line 1 to help the antitank reserve haltan enemy night counterattack on the right flank. However, the eneny arrived sooner than expected. The POZ commander decided to delay the enemy's approach by using one vehicle to scatter mines on the surface of the road approaching the position, using smoke to cover its withdrawal. Meanwhile, the rest of the POZ hastily mined a probable avenue of tank approach on a broad front.

Problems also arose during the second mission laying the Line 2 minefield and blowing the nearby culvert. While laying a triple row of mines, one towing vehicle bogged down. As the enemy could appear at any minute, the commander ordered the other two vehicles to speed up their work by scattering mines on the surface. Then, one vehicle was sent to recover its bogged colleague.

Comments:

• From the map, it would appear that both missions were protective of the flanks of forces that were about to transition to the attack after the repulse of enemy aggressive moves.

• The extensive use of different night route markers is noteworthy.

• The belated, as it happened, order to establish the first minefield may have stemmed from the desire to surprise the enemy. If so, the plan almost backfired. In anticipation of possible problems, however, the POZ had been given smoke generation support.

Example 3. (next page) "How Should a POZ Operate", by Col. A. Limo, VV 10/76:

Some officers argue that the POZ should be seen as a separate tactical subunit capable of operating independently. They cite wartime examples of minefields being laid away from the main forces on separate axes and being defended for some time by the POZ itself. The author, however, points out that minefields are most effective when covered by fire, and that therefore the POZ should work with the antitank reserve to form a tactical entity. He points out that RPG gunners and ATGM crews take on tanks more confidently with mines in front of them. He goes on to lament the often poor coordination between POZs and antitank reserves.

Two exercises are described. In the first, the POZ operated independently at first, laying four mixed minefields on three axes and securing them until the arrival of motorized rifle troops. Thereafter, the POZ was used to help consolidation on a captured line. One axis was covered by a minefield laid under cover of motorized rifle troops' protection. The second was created in close cooperation with the antitank reserve. The POZ, it is pointed out, is used not merely to cover occupied positions, but those which would be occupied later in the battle.

It was pointed out that resupply could come in the form of armed mines or delivered still in their factory packing. In the latter case, unpacking and arming the mines doubled the time required to lay the minefield.

In the second exercise, the POZ started work, not on the third line nearest to the enemy, but on the first. Having laid minefields 1 and 2 in the depth, the POZ replenishied and waited in dead ground, "in ambush". When enemy tanks were two kilometers distant, the POZ moved swiftly to the third line and laid a three-row minefield under cover of a smokescreen. Similarly, the fourth minefield was laid under cover of smoke laid by a specially attached vehicle (a TDA-M, perhaps?), the smoke screen covering a larger area than the minefield for deception. The enemy lost over half his tanks to the minefield and the antitank reserve and gave up the attack.

The author commends the sudden and swift laying of minefields under cover of smoke, though conceding that it is risky. He also points out that when laying out of sight of the enemy, for instance in folds in the terrain or on reserve slopes, the quantity of mines used should he greater than when laying in view of the enemy. In the latter case, mines must be more widely spaced to increase the width of the field.

The author also contends that the POZ and antitank reserve should be amalgamated to form a combined unit to ease command and control and improve coordination.

The editors of Voyennyy vestnik note that the author's views are controversial, but interesting.

Comments:

• The layout of the defense is interesting. Weak forward positions are well protected by antitank obstacles (minefields, antitank ditches and dragons teeth). This is an obvious effort to canalize the attack into a strong, partially reverse slope defense by an ATGM and a gun battery of the antitank reserve, which is in turn deployed in some depth with some weapons in defilade. The enemy was to be lured into a fire pocket created by two motorized rifle companies and the PTR.

• There is considerable stress on the surprise use of minefields, both through laying them in reverse slope positions and through laying at the last minute under the enemy guns. The very strong POZ (three platoons of minelayers) helped to make this possible.

• Presumably, the spacing of mines recommended is one every four meters when the field cannot be observed prior to laying, and one every 5.5 when laying under ememy observation, when speed becomes all important.

• The deployment of antitank weapons is not in orderly lines, but (presumably) making the best use of cover,and is it designed to produce a layered defense and to achieve surprise.

• The minelaying that was executed at the last minute was described as being done when the enemy was only two kilometers distant. When the article was written (1976), this was extreme range for tank fire. Now, when tanks are said to deliver effective fire from 2500-3000m from the halt and 1800-2lOOm on the move, the creation of the surprise minefields would probably start earlier, even if smoke cover was available.

Example No 4. "The Maneuver of Fire and Obstacles" by Col. N. Zykin and Lt. Col. S. Korotkov, VV 12/1992, pp. 27-29:

The authors stress the need for intimate cooperation with motorized rifle and tank subunits in the proposed deployment area. Nothing could be worse than to

find that the infantry or armor have withdrawn, leaving the PTR or POZ without flank protection or adequate cover to the front to give them time to deploy. Just as bad would be a late committal which would result in a collapse of the defense before the special reserves can stabilize the situation. Air defense and, where necessary, smoke cover must also be organised to ensure that the mission is successfully executed.

In the example given of a regimental tactical exercise, attack helicopters were used to delay the enemy as they penetrated through the gap between first-echelon battalions and an "armored group" was deployed from the second-echelon tank battalion to cover the flank of the counter-penetration force. There were interlocking fields of fire between the elements of the first and the second echelon and the antitank reserve to ensure the enemy's destruction in the fire pocket thus created.

The PTR moved from a hide immediately to the rear into preprepared fire positions, with the ATGM battery deployment on a frontage of up to two kilometers.

The POZ waited in the immediate rear of the PTRs battle position until it was called forward to lay about a kilometer-long, three-row panel of mines 0.5-1km in front of the antitank weapons. The timing of the minefield emplacement was carefully calculated to ensure the POZ could not be engaged by effective tank fire whilst at work. It's minelaying activity was covered by long-range fire from the ATGMs.

Comments:

• Every effort was made to surprise the enemy in a fire pocket by not creating the base of the pocket until the last minute. Both PTR and POZ were kept in a hide to the rear of the PTRs deployment line until the enemy was penetrating the forward positions. Then the former deployed to cover the latter as it laid the minefield, towards the end within the extreme range of enemy tank guns.

• That this counter-penetration option between strongpoints was anticipated is shown by the fact that ATGMs occupied preprepared fire positions.

• The obstacle was positioned at a good range for the ATGMs to engage halted tanks, but, at a range of 500 to 1000 meters, tanks would not find dug in BRDMs an easy target. The halted and disorganised attackers would also be so deep in the fire pocket they could be engaged from flank and rear as well as in front, and their left flank would be open to a counterattack by the second-echelon tank battalion.

Editors Note: This article will continue in the next issue.

Endnotes:

1. Colonels V.I. Aksyuta and A.Sh. Shakirov, "Features of Engineer Support for Combat Actions in Maneuver Defense," Vopeonopa mysl' (VM) 9/1991, pp 37-39. These paragraphs also lean heavily on Maj. Gen. A. V. Zlobin and Lt. Gen A.N. Chernikov, "Activeness in Operational Defense - Theory and Practice," VM 3/1992. pp. 19-25; Col. M.P.Yarovoy, "Problems in Building Up Efforts in a Higher Formation's First Defensive Operation," VM 4/1993, pp. 26-34; Col. A.A. Korabelnikov, "Divisional Antitank Planning in Maneuver Defense," VM 1/1993, pp. 31-35 and Maj. Gen. I.N. Vorob'yev, "Questions of Theory and Practice of Maneuver Defense," VM 9/1990, pp. 34-40 and "Tactics of Long Range Battle," VM 11/1992, pp. 39-44

2. Col. E.S. Kolibernov, "Engineer Support of Combat"(Voyenizdat, 1988), p. 127

3. Maj. Gen. A.S. Kulikov and A.D. Nefedov, "Positional and Maneuver Operations - Role and Place in Defensive Operations," VM3/1990, pp. 23-31. The subject is explored in detail in C.J. Dick, "Counter Blows in Russian Military Thinking" (CSRC Research paper No. AA23 December 1992).

4. Col. V.A. Runov, "Experience in Preparing Counterattacks in Arab-Israeli Wars of 1956-73," VM 3/1993, pp. 69-74.

Lessons Learned at the National Training Center

Engineer Preparation of the Offense on the Opposing Force Battlefield

BY CPT DAVID A.
MASTERSON &
2LT CHRISTOPHER T. FABER
58TH ENGINEER COMPANY,
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

The roles of the Krasnovian engineers in support of the OPFOR at the NTC are very diverse, Whether they are acting as an engineer reconnaissance patrol (ERP) moving deep into enemy held territory to identifiy the Blue force engineer effort, or a movement support detachment (MSD) or mobile obstacle detachment (MOD) aiding in the mobility and countermobility efforts of the regiment respectively, engineers are used aggressively to defeat the rotational unit.

The use of these assets during a typical rotation will serve as the focus of this article. Of particular interest is the integration of these assets within the combined-arms team of the OPFOR Examination of the use of the ERP in regimental sized engagements, the use of the MSD with advance guard and forward detachment missions, and the role of the MOD in flank protection activities will allow the reader to understand the typical engineer offensive missions as replicated by the 58th Combat Enigineer Company.

Reconnaissance

The ERP is comprised of one visually modified (VISMOD) HMMWV BRDM and its three-man crew. Their doctrinal mission is to perform route reconnaissance for the regiment's main avenue of march. However, the ERP can

also serve as a scout asset depending on how extensively the enemy defense is built. In either case, the ERP is seldom used during battalion-sized advance guard or forward detachment missions, or during motorized rifle battalion (MRB) defenses. It is usually employed as a regimental reconnaissance asset during regimental attacks.

The ERP crew is operationally attached to the scout platoon of one of the 11th ACR's squadrons. It is employed with regimental reconnaissance to be able to identify early on the emplacement of obstacle belts. The data that it collects, in conjunction with that from the other scouts, is sent back to the regimental tactical operations center. The chief of engineer services and chief of reconnaissance review the data gathered and make their recommendations to the regimental commander on the best avenue of approach.

On the NTC battlefield, the ERP can only identity conventionally built obstacles. The simulated artillery-laid minefields are controlled to have only a four-hour duration, which means they are often employed during the course of battle, not earlier. The regimental engineer, together with the chief of reconnaissance, template these minefields in their planning. The ERP may be placed in a high probability area for these minefields to gain early warning for the attacking regiment. In this sense the ERP may be far away from the main obstacle belt, and used as a pure scout asset with a focus on FASCAM-type obstacles.

The ERP can and has breached or marked by-passes of conventional minefields and wire obstacles against an unwary Blue force. These type of breaches or marked bypasses allow the approaching attack force to reduce the time spent at obstacles. The ERPs generally find an easy bypass, mark it with engineer tape, report it to higher and continue throughout the depth of an obstacle belt. Should an obstacle he totally free from observation, the MSD may be sent earlier with a combat reconnaissance patrol to clear the lane after the ERP has initially breached the site. These types of configurations are very rare and used on special occasions.

Movement Support Detachment

The MSD is comprised of one VISMOD M113 armored personnel carrier, which serves as a BMP with sapper squad, and two blade assets. Krasnovian organization calls for any combination of: BAT-2, a tracked earthmover; MT-55, a bridge-launching tracked vehicle; MTK-2, a tracked line charge vehicle; IMR, a tracked earth mover; and a BTR sapper squad vehicle. The OPFOR regiment replicates the MSD by providing the sapper squad (BMP) and the two blade assets. Occasionally a launched bridge will be included, but that is on a case by case basis.

The 58th Combat Engineer Company uses M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers (ACEs) and Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV) to replicate the blade assets. The AVLB with bridge can be used to simulate any of the bridging assets of the krasnovian MSD. The only armed vehicle is the command and control vehicle, which contains the sapper squad.

The MSD's primary role is to ensure the mobility corridors of the regiment are cleared. The MSD is usually sent with the forward security element (FSE) of the advance guard of the regiment. During regimental sized operations, when two MSDs are formed from divisional and regimental engineer assets, the additional MSD usually travels with the MRB in the main effort of the main body. While on many occasions the MSD does indeed breach obstacle networks, it is and remains the responsibility of the mine plow tanks in the forward security element to make the initial breach. The MSDs will improve upon the lanes created by the plow tanks, make additional lanes, and mark the lanes for the main body and follow-on forces. A single clearing asset can create a breach big enough for an entire MRB.

There are two basic types of missions at the MRB level for the MSD to support: an advance guard, primarily oriented at destroying an enemy, or the forward detachment, primarily designed to control terrain. Each of these missions may require the MSD to be employed to use its breaching capability.

The advance guard mission finds the MSD attached to the FSE or combat reconnaissance

patrol (CRP). The MSD will trail the combat formation in either formation to their objective. These objectives range front breaching a prepared identified obstacle belt to artillery-emplaced minefields dropped at a moments notice. In either case, the lead vehicles call for the MSD commander to come forward, once the obstacle is identified.

The FSE commander, while waiting for the assets to improve the breaches, conducts his own breach by the use of his plow tanks. He also lays suppressive fire on any enemy that may have covered the obstacle. The MSD commander improves the lanes, adds additional ones and passes the FSE through. The sapper squad will mark and guide the lanes for the remainder of the MRB to pass. During regimental sized attacks, the MSD is relieved by the CRPs of the follow-on MRBs and moves forward to reestablish communication with the advance guard MRB for follow-on missions.

The only variation on the employment of the MSD is by attaching it to a CRP. The CRP will lead the MSD ahead of the main breach force. The CRP and MSD commanders will find the best mobility corridors for the MRB to follow. The CRP will clear the route, and breach ahead of the MSD. The MSD will usually mark a bypass, wait until the FSE arrives to lay down suppressive fire, and begin their breach to improve any lanes through the obstacle. In this case, the MSD is assuming the role of the ERP, because there was no engineer reconnaissance either surviving or assigned to the scouts for that particular mission. Regardless, the MSD will still wait for the primary breach force to arrive before it begins its improvements.

The second mission the MSD may support is that of the forward

PHOTO BY SFC ED CAUM
A Movement Support Detachment moves out with the cover of a tank platoon.

detachment. The forward detachment does need mobility corridors opened, but also requires some survivability effort. The MSD will be placed in the FSE. It will perform breach functions similar to the advance guard mission, but when the objective is secured, the MSD will use its blade assets to dig one-tier fighting positions for the MRB, the priority of work going from T-80 tanks to the BMPs. The sapper squad will assume a good position and dismount to support the MRB. The MSD will not travel with the CRP on these missions, due to the high probability of losing a blade asset.

On regimental operations, the second MSD that travels with the main effort MRB will duplicate or provide the breaching capabilities to its MRB should a different route of advance be called during the course of battle. On many occasions the second MSD will be used on obstacle belts in depth, while the first MSD guides the regiment through the first belt that it has improved.

Mobile Obstacle Detachment

The MOD replicates the vehicular minelaying capability of the OPFOR. The MOD consists of one VISMOD APC with a loaded M105 trailer full of mines to replicate three GMZ minelaying systems. The trailer holds approximately 620 OPFOR mines, which allows the system to lay approximately three complete minefields.

The employment of the MOD in offensive operations remains the same regardless of the mission or the size units conducting the missions. The MODs are postioned on the flanks of a march formation to be prepared for rapid deployment and normally are near the antitank reserve. The MOD commanders are under operational control of the antitank commander, and integrated into his orders process.

The antitank systems willl usually follow five minutes behind the advance guard or forward detachment MRB in regimental-sized operations. The MODs follow the trail element of the antitank systems and position themselves with the tank killers on the flanks of the attacking element. When employed, the sapper squad inside its track moves to the first row of the possible minefield, dismounts, and then proceeds to replicate the GMZ by hand laying the mines.

PHOTO BY SFC ED CAUM
An Armored Combat Earthmover moves to clear a mobility corridor.

Using information gathered from the scouts, filtered through the regimental chief of engineer services and chief of reconnaissance, the antitank commander works with the MOD commander to template where the likely minefields may be needed to be emplaced. This close effort allows a simple call of initiation to be placed to the MOD commander to allow him to execute a minefield. Of course, minefields not templated are also emplaced and they pose little problem to a well-briefed MOD commander.

The MODs at the NTC are used occasionally, as the success of the maneuver elements usually precludes the threat to the flanks early on. During these operations, the MODs will be used to help secure the objective by placing its mines in a preplanned location to support the maneuver commanders firing lines.

CONCLUSION

The three different offensive engineer elements combined within the scheme of maneuver from the maneuver commander offer to the Krasnovian OPFOR elements an added combat multiplier to greatly reduce the threat of enemy engineers and his combat systems. Used properly, the mobility, survivability and countermobility offered by regimental engineer assets can make the difference in any encounter.

The keys to success at the NTC are the well-integrated orders process, troop leading procedures, and trainiinig of the average engineer soldier. Fortunately, the OPFOR muanenver commander realizes the assets he has available to him, uses them, and exploits the success created by them. The result hs greatly enhanced training for rotational units.

Rounding Out the OPFOR
Fight: Augmentees

BY SFC EDWARD CAUM
NCOIC, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

One of the reasons the OPFOR at the NTC hs so efficient and effective is due to the units that join its ranks every rotation. Augmentee companies of infantry and engineers round out the Krasvovian force, enabling it to portray a motorized rifle regiment with the manpower and support the U.S. Army may face on a future battlefield.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment that has the task of portraying the OPFOR hs based on U.S. Tables of Organization anid Equipment (TO&;E). In order to put the correct number of soldiers on the ground to emulate a complete OPFOR regiment, additional support is needed.

The benefits of bringing this support to Fort Irwin range from allowing more units to rotate through the NTC, to training those units to portray the OPFOR back at home station. Many units who fight on the OPFOR side of the wire feel they receive better trainini while fighting with them than against them.

The OPFOR commanders, staffs and soldiers have repetition on their side when it comes to planning and executing a mission. When an augumentee unit is exposed to this, it can observe first hand how thoroughly an operations order can be put out and executed. This is not always

possible during the course of a rotation on the BLUEFOR side, when the planning process is cut down to hours instead of days. Command and control for the OPFOR is always another big learning point in that in-depth rehearsals and basic soldier skills will get you to your objective even if other elements of a plan fall apart.

The OPFOR depends heavily on its infantry support to man Task Forces Angel, Rampage and Destroyer, taking and holding key pieces of terrain that secure corridors for movement or fix the BLUEFOR to prevent successful reposition, flanking or counterattacks.

Task Force Angel

Angel represents the air assault option of the OPEOR. Helicopter insertion is a vital mission when securing avenues of approach. It involves an amount of risk in that the soldiers are inserted forward of friendly lines with limited support. Without the augmentee support the OPFOR could not field this versatile asset because it does not have sufficient manpower.

Task Force Rampage

Rampage is a company-strength dismounted force that portrays the soldiers that would ride in the BMPs of the OPFOR regiment. Since the OPFOR uses visually modified (VISMOD) M551 Sheridans, there is no compartment for troops to ride within the chassis. In order to put troops on the battlefield to fight dismounted, the OPFOR uses ten VISMOD M113 armored personnel carriers to carry this force.

Task Force Destroyer

Light infantry make up Destroyer, which simulates a dismounted attack fromnotional OPFOR units in contact. The OPFOR uses five-ton trucks to move the dismounts across the battlefield to jump off points. Destroyer is known to conduct forced marches into rugged terrain to avoid detection, seizing objectives and key terrain.

All of these elements may be formed from a variety of units. They can be mechanized or light infantry units. Reserve Component, Marine, or on occasion

allied forces. Each of these infantry combat forces used alone can be lethal, but used together in an orchestrated fashion they help ensure the success of the OPFOR. They prove most effective during OPFOR attacks by drawing the BLUFOR's attention away from other events, shaping the battlefield to the OPFORs advantage.

Engineer Support

In the defense a major combat multiplier is engineer support on the battlefield. The OPFOR often portrays engineer assets pushed down from higher echelons. In their U.S. configuration the 58th Engineers (the 11th ACR organic engineer company) can not even come close to replicating blade time or assets that would be available to an OPFOR regimental commander. Augmentee engineers are crucial in filling this hole (or more correctly, digging a lot of holes!). The engineers supporting the OPFOR bring two platoons of combat engineers, one heavy equipment platoon, a maintenance section, and their organic equipment.

The use of terrain and tying obstacles together under direct fire to build kill sacks are an OPFOR specialty. Engineers find out quickly that a platoon of tanks, well dug-in and firing over properly placed harriers can take down a company or more of enemy armor.

Each uniit which comes out to support the OPFOR goes away with a better understanding of why the Krasnovians are so successful. Information is exchanged both ways and OPFOR soldiers interface directly with units which they may join once they return to the other side of the wire.

PHOTOS BY SFC ED CAUM
The engineer augmentee support unit prepares to move out.

A Task Force Destroyer soldier sets an antitank ambush.

Task Force Angel OIOYCS out to secure a landing zone.

NTC OPFOR Update

Editors Note: This portion of the bulletin is designed to give a brief synopsis of recent changes on the NTC battlefield.

The Krasnovian Army has reorganized its motorized rifle regiments (MRR) from the traditional three motorized rifle battalions (MRB) and one tank battalion, into four MRBs, each with an organic tank company. This reorganization is accomplished by the inactivitation of the tank battalion headquarters and the activitation of the 4th MRB headquarters. The four-MRB concept has resulted in the cross-leveling of combat vehicles in the regiment. The new MRB structure consists of 29 BMPs, 10 T-80 tanks, and 4 BRDM-2 C2 vehicles. The reorganization has no effect on the other regimental subunits such as the antitank and air defense battalions. The new MRR organization is depicted at Figure 1.

A snapshot at the MRB level shows how the 10 tanks and 29 BMPs are broken down into motorized rifle companies and combat reconnaissance patrols. (Figure 2)

The main advantage of reorganizing into four MRBs is the increases in command and control, especially when conducting such missions as a forward detachment in support of a MRR attack. (Figure 3)

>The NTC OPFOR continues to use a mix of visually modified (VISMOD) and non-VISMOD U.S. equipment to replicate the combat vehicles of the MRR. The chart below provides a quick reference to the replicated systems.