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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 33-5-1
TITLE:             Neighbours On The Danube
BY:                Charles Andras
DATE:              1967-12-13
COUNTRY:           Hungary
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  
THEMATIC SUBJECTS: Hungary--1966-1975, Hungary--Foreign Relations--Austria, Political Systems

--- Begin ---

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

December 1967

NEIGHBORS ON THE DANUBE
New Variations on the Old Theme of Regional Cooperation

by
Charles Andras
 
I. INTRODUCTION	1

II. FEDERALISM, OLD AND NEW	3

A. Past Failures
B. The Comeback of an Idea

III. FEDERALISM -IN HUNGARY	30

A. From Kossuth to Bartok
B. World War II and After

IV. HUNGARIAN COMMUNISM AND FEDERALISM	41

A. For and Against Trianon
B. The Concept of Imre Nagy
C. 1956-1964: From Socialist Solidarity to Danubian
Community
D. Austria Enters the Scene

V. DANUBIAN RENAISSANCE IN HUNGARY?	62

A. The Kadar Project
B. The Hungarian Press on Danubian Cooperation
C. Past History Remembered

VI. THE AUSTRIAN ANSWER	83

A. Austria's Mission in East Europe
B. Klaus in Budapest

VII. THE REST OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD	106

A. Yugoslavia
B. Czechoslovakia
C. Rumania and Bulgaria: The Danubian-Balkan States

VIII. A SUMMING UP	122

NEIGHBORS ON THE DANUBE

New Variations on the Old Theme of Regional Cooperation

I. INTRODUCTION

The title of this paper is taken from the Vienna Festival
of May-June 1967 which opened under the motto Nachbarn an der
Donau - Neighbors on the Danube. The festival program featured
theater, opera, and orchestra ensembles from ???
countries: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Austria.
No comparable cultural event had taken place on Vienna since
the year 1892 when, in an entirely different political setting,
a theater fiesta was organized with the participation of the
Czech, Hungarian and Austrian National Theaters as well as the
Opera of Cracow. The motto of the year 1967 was both a report
on the present and a program for the future. It wanted to
convey to the public an idea of the new relationship developing
among the Danubian peoples and to open new perspectives for
future developments. In the words of Festwochenintendant
Ulrich Baumgartner:

Neighborhood in the Danubian area will now
become a new adventure for the present generation...
It is not surprising that when dealing with this
subject, everybody first turns his thoughts to the
past. But we should be more intensively concerned
with the present and the future... We are at the
very beginning.... We know very little about each
other...[1]



Although the press widely differed on the cultural value
of this undertaking, its symbolic meaning was not contested.
All in all, 1500 artists, actors, and musicians came to Vienna
from different Danubian countries, more than one million
people applauded them and perceived something of the new trends
and currents in the Danubian area--the broadening economic,
cultural and human relations on both sides of the East-West
border, the more and more frequent official contacts among
Danubian statesmen, politicians, etc. This year of 1967 has taken
Austrian Chancellor Klaus to three East European-Danubian
countries on official visits. In May he went to Budapest (as
the first Western head of government to visit Hungary since
World War II); in July, he negotiated in Bucharest and in
October he visited Sofia. In the meantime he spent his vacation
on the Danube, sailing down the river to its Delta, There is
a similar official visitors' traffic in the opposite direction,
with Hungarians, Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, etc. coming to Vienna,
to Austrian industrial centers and negotiating about the
possibilities of widening contacts.

----------------------------------------------
(1) Baumgartner, Ulrica; "Nachbarn an der Donau", Die Furche
(Vienna), 3 June 1967.

[page 2]

Intensification of present cooperation and planning for
the future has inevitably turned the spotlight on the past, on
historical forms of Danubian relations, on auestions of
federalism, economic or political integration projects and
their value under moder circumstances. Already in the late
1960's international symposia, scientific conferences had
been organization this subject in East and West; books,
academic journals, likewise in East and West, began to
analyse the old and new possibilities of Danubian coexistence,
for a long time an issue almost forgotten in the West and
taboo under Communism. Its renaissance was an unavoidable,
almost automatic, reaction to the day-to-day developments
in political, economic and cultural life. But it was not
self-evident that it should be precisely a Communist leader
who should raise again publicly the problem of the Danubian
interdependence of peoples, of their common Danubian destiny.
This Communist leader was Janos Kadar in Hungary, the same
Janos Kadar who assumed political and moral responsibility
for the execution of Imre Nagy, another protagonist of closer
cooperation among Danubian peoples. This was how Kadar
first reintroduced the subject--at the Congress of the
Hungarian Communist Youth Association (KISz) in December 1964:

...The people in the Danubian basin live in a
community of fate; we will either get on together
or perish together. There is no other road for
the peoples in the Danubian area. We live under

different social systems; we should adhere to the
principle of peaceful coexistence. If, on the
other hand we live under a Socialist social system,
we should join forces in foreign politics and
economic cooperation, in accordance with the
Socialist principles and should accelerate the
development of all of us to the good and happiness of all
the peoples living in these parts. This is our
policy.[2]

Kadar's hint at broader Danubian cooperation, vague as it
was, was followed by a series of statements by other leading
personalities of the Hungarian regime, and by an increasing .
number of press articles outlining the concept in greater
detail. The most positive foreign reaction came from Austria,
and a considerable part of present-day comings and goings
between Vienna and Budapest is, directly or indirectly, related
to the reanimation of the idea of Danubian interdependence, the
community of fate of the Danubian peoples. Since the
emotionally loaded concept of community of fate can only be realized in
very concrete forms of practical cooperation, notions like
"expanding East-West contacts," "intensifying relations,"
"federalism," "confederation," "integration," 'small state
solidarity," etc. are widely discussed in these two. countries.

-----------------------------
(2) Népszabadság (Budapest), 13 December 1964.

[page3]

The purpose of the present paper to look behind the
facade of this discussion, to investigate the components
which contributed to the "renaissance" of federalism in
general and of the Danubian issue in particular; to
establish what is meant, in practical terms, by the Budapest
project and what is its role in East-West contacts.

II. FEDERALISM, OLD AND-NEW

To begin with, it is worth quoting in full a definition
of federalism made by the famous Hungarian statesman, Oszkár
Jaszi:

Federation is a rare and new phenomenon. In
its purest form, it had been realized only in
Switzerland and the United States. Federation was
born from the spirit of democracy... Alliances
are plans and forms of collaboration of the old
sovereignties; the federations sacrifice an
essential part of the old sovereignties and create new
sovereignty above the old ones. This highest
sovereignty does not originate in the former

practitioners of the old sovereignty but it comes from
below, from the will of free individuals...

The preconditions of a sincere and serious
federation are not only of a political and economic,
but also of a spiritual and intellectual nature.
Only those people can federate who have already
been imbued with the idea of democratic equality,
who also do not consider the State an end in itself
but a means of the free people to realize their
superior moral and cultural aims... It can be
said without exaggeration that federation is the
practical form of Christianity.

A further spiritual precondition of
federation is that only such peoples can progress on
this road who can agree on values they want to
realize, i.e., peoples whose culture is closely
related, and the state of whose popular culture is
identical within certain limits..[3]

-----------------------------
(3) Jaszi, Oszkar, "Miert nem sikerult a dunavóflgyi
konfederaciot megalkotni," Latbhatar (Munich), January 1953.


[page4]

Federation projects, integration efforts have a long
history in the Danubian region. [4]

Federalism, an effort to unite different peoples and
or states under a common rule (with varying degrees of
internal self-government for the member-states), developed
parallel with the 19th century national liberation movements.
Due to the sharpening nationality issue, federalism became
an active question among the oppressed peoples under the
Habsburg Empire, and later among the nations who had gained
their independence from the Habsburg Empire.

Several events of historical importance have over the
years stimulated the concept of federalism and helped to
produce various federation or integration projects. Such
events were: the national awakening movements in the first
part of the 19th century and the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich
of 1867; World War I, the Russian Revolution and the collapse
of the Habsburg Empire; the economic crises of the 1930's
and the German penetration in the Danubian area; the outbreak
of World War II, the intrusion of Soviet imperialism in
East-Central Europe; and in the latest phase of events, the
"liberalization" in East Europe, the reemergence of nationalism
and the success of Western integration,, The many federation

projects born or revived under the impact of these various
developments show certain distinct characteristics according
to the period of history in which they were formulated:

1. From the 1840's to 1918. These projects were largely
efforts either to organize the people concerned for
the maintenance of the existing empires or for their
disruption in order to establish the independence of a single nation
or a federal system among several nations.

2. The interwar period. This period saw the emergence
of two regional pact systems, the Little" Entente and the Balkan
Pact. Here, the succession states, realizing their individual
weakness, produced some vague plans of closer economic
cooperation, implying the possibility of a later political union

developing into a true federation or confederation. These
attempts failed partly because of Danubian rivalries, lack of
foresight on the side of the Western powers, and because of
German obstruction.

------------------------------
(4) The Danube region is defined here as comprising the
riparian countries of the Danube river (except the German
Federal Republic and the Soviet Union), a region in the
history of which three great powers played a prominent
roles Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg
Monarchy.

[page5]

3. From the outbreak of World War II. Impressed by the
weakness of divided Danubian Europe, which was also a major
cause of World War II, Danubian political leaders at home as
well as in emigration, made renewed attempts to find a common
federalist basis for the reorganization of the Danubian
region or parts of it. The lack of Western imagination and
firmness, but mainly the emergence of Soviet imperialism
swept away the new or revived projects.

A. Past Failures

The federation schemes and projects drawn up under the
impact of so many events, of historical, political, social,
psychological factors, make out a long and varied list. A
single book written on the subject lists 48 major projects
without claiming completeness.[5] There were federation
projects which tried to encompass the whole Central European
area between the Baltic and the Mediterranean (projects
mainly of Polish origin, identified with the person of Prince
Adam Jerzy Czarteryski, or the different versions of
"Intermarium"). Others envisaged the organization of a more
restricted region, e.g., the Balkans (Balkan Federation,
Balkan Communist Federation, Tito-Dimitrov plan) or
concentrated on Central Europe or Danubian Europe (especially the
proposals of the Rumanian Nicolae Balcescu and the Hungarian
Lajos Kossuth in the 19th century, and the 1942 federation
project of Milan Hod[z]a, prime minister of the first
Czechoslovak Republic). Several schemes wanted to maintain the
Habsburg Empire but aimed at its internal reorganization and
modernization (such as the plans of the Austro-Socialist Dr.
Karl Renner and of the Hungarian bourgeois radical Oszkár
Jászi who later switched to his Eastern Switzerland project).
The federation plans also widely differed as to their
organizational approach to the problem of closer cooperation. Quite
a few of them wanted to begin with the union of two peoples
or states as a nucleus of a broader federation to be built
up in several steps. (Kossuth wanted to start from a
Hungarian-Rumanian cooperation, Eduard Benes from a
CzechoslovakPolish union, and the Tito-Dimitrov plan was to be developed
from a Yugoslav-Bulgarian basis). Some projects set out for
the immediate establishment of a very high form of
cooperation, others wanted to begin by ever closer economic relations
and then to proceed towards higher stages, ending in a
federation or confederation. (For example, the French Tardieu plan.,
the Hod[z]a plan, as well as Hungarian Danubian projects in the
interwar period, all intended to start from an economic union.)
Irrespective of their great diversity, all the projects had .
to share the same negative fate. Very few reached the stage
of serious negotiations, and even these had to be abandoned,
mostly under the pressure of outside powers.

----------------------------
(5) Wierer. Rudolf, Foederalismus im Donauraum, (Verlag
Boehlaus, Nachf., Graz/Koeln),'I960.

[page6]

The most recent and, perhaps, the most outstanding case
of such an outside pressure against a federation was the
Soviet action against the Tito-Dimitrov plan of a
Balkan-Danubian cooperation. The idea had been developed since
1944, but the concrete plan was abandoned four years later just
as it seemed about to be born. The Moscow meeting which
revealed the Soviet disagreement with the project has been
extensively described by two Yugoslavs, Vladimir Dedjjer and
Milovan Djilas.[6] As they reported, Stalin objected to any
wide project of federation in East Europe, but he supported
"small federations" between two countries which had, in his
view, some "historic basis," such as a union of Rumania and
Hungary, of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (later to be joined by
Albania), or Czechoslovakia and Poland. Stalin's attitude
clearly indicated that he was not prepared to tolerate any
supranational organization which could escape Soviet control.

B. The Comeback of an Idea

The Tito-Dimitrov interlude in the history of federalism
led a German expert to the following conclusion:

[With the Tito-Dimitrov plan] all inclination
toward federalism disappeared from the ranks of
the Communists' literature in the satellite
countries... It should be remembered that it is
state sovereignty which is emphasized by the
jurisprudence of the Communist state, and that it
disapproves of all supranational structures.[7]

This statement, however, was not entirely substantiated
by later developments. Undoubtedly, the phase of Stalinist
history in the Soviet bloc was in no way favoring diversity,
local or regional patterns of development. The unfolding
integration process (with Soviet occupation forces, political
police, economic dependence, overall Communist Party-control as
the chief integrating factors) was paving the way for Soviet
monolithism which could in no way be compared with a free,
voluntary association of small, democratic states. Federalism
had never been openly repudiated under Stalinism, but it was
not a suitable subject of public discussion, not even in its
historical perspectives.

---------------------------
6) Dedijer, Vladimir, Tito Speaks (Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
London), 1953.
Djilas, Milovan, Conversations with Stalin,(Harcourt, Brace
& World, New York), 1962.

7) Wierer, Op.cit., p. 186.

[page7]

However, the death of Stalin and the loosening up of
Soviet control in East Europe led in a very short time to
the reopening of the issue. Many factors promoted,
directly or indirectly, this evolution. In the following
an attempt will be made to list the most important:

1. Overall efforts: of the post-Stalinist Soviet
leadership to build a new, more stable basis for the
Soviet-East European relationship.

2. Internal debates on nationalism in the Danubian
countries, partly tied to the new Soviet effort to re evaluate
the role of the nation.

3. General economic, cultural and people-to-people
contacts.

4. Relaxation of tension, policy of coexistence, Soviet
concentration on European affairs.

5. The activities of the Danube Commission.
These factors are worth some individual attention.

1. Overalls-effort of, the post-Stalinist Soviet
leadership to "build a new, more stable basis for the
Soviet-East European relationship: Acting under the impact of the
Polish and Hungarian events of 1956, of the Sino-Soviet
dispute, polycentrism, Albanian and Rumanian dissent, and the
needs of economic integration, the Soviet Union began to work
on a new construction which

would allow a certain degree of domesticism but still
guarantee Soviet control of the socialist states;

would promote the Soviet grand design--a world-wide
political and economic superstructure, with the
Soviet Union at its center (as a substitute for
Stalinist monolithism).

Economic integration, in the framework of Comecon, has
been one of the chief practical methods selected to further
this cause. Its ideological groundwork is laid down in Soviet
books and articles on problems of transition from socialism
to communism; from "confederate" middle forms of economies to
a "unified production organism"; from the increasing economic
integration to the closest political cooperation; and also in
writings on the diminishing importance of the old concept of
the nation under the new conditions of economic integration.
The emerging new ideological line is supported by quotations
from Lenin, or descriptions of how he handled practical problems
of federation.

[page8]

The East European reflection of this new Soviet
thinking on federation, integration and nationality is already
considerable. From the increasing number of writings on
this subject, one Czechoslovak and one Hungarian article
will be reviewed here as typical of the new currents of
thought and their application to local circumstances.



The first, written by a Czechoslovak Communist expert
on nationality questions, Karel Pomaizl, makes the following
main points:

. The final aim of socialism is not only the
rapprochement of nations but their fusion.

. Thus, separate national existence is not a natural
phenomenon under socialism; it has to give way to
higher forms of community life.

. Since federation is a transitory stage toward complete
unity, socialism must hasten an ever tighter
federal bond, having always in mind the final aim
of a world economy.

. Lenin was not a federalist by conviction; he supported
federalism only for tactical reasons, as a transitory
stage of development. Lenin stood for a world state,
built on the principle of democratic centralism.

Pomaizl argues strongly against the evidently widespread
notion that since socialism makes nations really free, the
nations concerned should enjoy that freedom and the further
stages of advancement toward a supranational concept can be
put off indefinitely:

One of the most important processes of the
rapprochement of nations under socialism...will be
the process of step-by-step integration of the
socialist countries, beginning with the development
and intensification of their economic cooperation,
with the strengthening of their political,
ideological and cultural links. This process will gradually
wipe out the importance and significance of state
borders between the socialist countries and,
ultimately, will lead to their removal in the future.

-----------------------------
(8) For the evolution of the Soviet thinking on federalism,
see: Meissner, Boris, "Sowjetische Hegemonie und
osteuropaeische Foederation," in Ziebura, Gilbert (ed.)
Nationale Souverenitaet Oder ubernationale Integration?
(Berlin), 1966, pp. 72-73. The Hungarian Communist
historian, Aladar Mod, published a long and partly
critical article on the new Marxist (primarily Soviet)
literature dealing with the concept of nation. See: Mod, Aladar,
"A nemzetfogalom vitaja a mai marxista irodalomban", Valosag
(Budapest), No. 6, 1967.

[page9]

In the perspective of communism, rapprochement,
association, and unification of the nations will
lead to their mutual merger. Such a future will "be
prepared by a longstanding gradual development,
going beyond the frames of the nation and the state;
by the development of an international culture, the
founding of a steadily increasing number of
international organizations of a political, economic,
cultural nature; by the migratory movement of the
population in steadily growing proportions (limited until
now to the state borders, but considerably important
in the Soviet Union) which will lead to changes in
the national composition of the individual districts,
to the gradual liquidation of eternal "national
seats," national territories; to the need of a common
language of communication; to the transition from
uni-lingualism to bi-lingualism; to benevolent
assimilation processes (for the time being affecting
individuals only); to the transition from one nation to
the other as a consequence of the migration from one
national territory to another one; of mixed marriages,
etc.

Looking at the things from such a perspective, Pomaizl comes
to the conclusion that, actually, self-determination is not
of the essence of socialism; in fact, it becomes an obstacle
on its road. Thus, all politico-juridical measures aiming
at the realization of self-determination have only an interim,
temporary, or preparatory character. Steps or
processes which are of a truly socialist character involve
steps towards international integration, like unification of
nations in a single socialist state, and unification of
socialist states in a higher structure. "But even more far-seeing
are the cases of benevolent assimilation, migratory moves and
national mingling of the population." Everything which helps
the gradual and benevolent merger of the nations, must be
considered as an integral part of the mission of socialism. It
is, therefore, erroneous to think, repeats Pomaizl, that the creation
of separated nations would be a "natural," automatic,
irreversible consequence of self-determination. It is true under
capitalism only. If self-determination is realized by the working
class, separation is neither necessary nor typical. Even
federalism is not the ultimate answer, says Pomaizl. Just
because federalism has been taken as the constitutional
framework to solve the national question in the Soviet Union, many
people take federalism "as the general, the most suitable,
binding the only constitutional method to resolve the
nationality question." This is not the case. Lenin supported
federalism as a matter of tactics, as a transitory form towards the
"complete unity of the toilers of the different nations." His
ideal was the "democratically centralized state" with
occasional territorial autonomy, which is not identical with national
autonomy. Generalizations that national autonomy and
federation are the only way for a multinational Socialist State are,

[page10]

according to Pomaizl, openly criticized in the Soviet Union.
The maintenance of the national principle was correct in the
past but it would be a wrong attitude in the light of future
perspectives. The building of greater economic units, the
increasing migration of the population, etc., will, says
Pomaizl, gradually weaken the national principle and the
economic one will more and more assert itself.[9]

The Hungarian article, mentioned above, is a case study
of the 1919 Communist revolution in Hungary. In the view of
the author, Laszlo Kovago, the Hungarian Soviet Republic was
the first state in South-East Europe to develop a consistently
anti-national policy:

The chain of national selfishness was cut off
for the first time in the Lanubian Basin... A
regime was established which proclaimed that it
wanted to set up a federal republic, a federation
of the councils, in cooperation with the
neighboring peoples...

Kovago continues his argument by saying that, in spite
of the rich federalist traditions of Danubian and Balkan
Europe, the trend at that time was to create small, bourgeois
states, and this trend prevailed against the idea of setting
up a federation of small nations. Instead of federalism,
these states embraced the slogan of national self-determination,
a slogan also proclaimed by the Bolshevik Party, and each one
defined it according to its selfish, purposes. Being convinced
that the revolution would gradually spread in Europe, the
leaders of the Hungarian Soviet Republic considered Hungary as
the first link in the chain reaction the specific task of
which was to assure the victory of socialism in Central Europe.
Accordingly, argues Kovago, the Bela Kun regime developed
a program which called on the victorious proletariat to organize
itself into nations, to unite the various victorious national
Soviet Republics into a federal state and, after such an interim
solution, to realize the world unity of the toilers. The
Hungarian contribution to this development, The International
Republic of Soviets (Kun), was supposed to include, in addition
to Great-Hungary, German-Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the
West-European territories "up to the French border." Even though
the Hungarian Communist federal state existed only on paper,
in March 1919 negotiations started "by radio" between the
Hungarian Soviet Republic, Ukraine, and the Russian Federal
Republic with the aim that they "should constitute a unified
territory." Lenin approved of the project.

Kovago goes on to relate how, with the collapse of the
regime of Bela Kun, the various federal projects failed, too,

------------------------------
(9) Pomaizl, Karel, "Narodnostna otazka za socializmu," Nova
Mysl (Prague), 10 May 1967.


[page11]

In his opinion, the greatest mistake the Hungarian Communist
leaders committed was that, failing to follow the example of
Lenin, they had reduced the slogan of national
self-determination into proletarian self-determination. Consequently, they
lost a great part of the popular support. The national and
federal policy of the 1919 revolution should be submitted to
careful study, Kovago feels, since "these questions are not
closed, the revolutionary socialist movement is constantly
confronted nowadays with the task how to resolve ever newer
national problems..." And one should always remember the
important lesson:

Hungarian Communists, leftist and centrist
Social Democrats had not joined forces in order to
set up a lonely socialist state, isolated in a
circle of capitalist countries, but [their aim was]
to create a Soviet Hungary surrounded by socialist
countries and united with them in a federal state...[10]

2. Internal debates on nationalism in the Danubian
countries, these partly tied to the new Soviet effort to reevaluate
the role of the nation; Such debates spring mainly from
specific domestic needs of the regimes to combat different forms
of "populism," "narodnikism," "chauvinism," as has been the
case in Hungary since the revolution of 1956, and in Czechoslovakia
parallel with growing tensions between Czechs and Slovaks, etc.
The nationalism debate led to the reopening of the books of
national history, to a critical study of past behaviors, with
a great concentration on the problems of the Habsburg Monarchy.
This trend coincided with events like: the 50th anniversary
of the outbreak of World War I, the 100th anniversary of the
Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich, and generally speaking, with the
renewed Western interest in the fate of the "multinational"
Danubian Monarchy,, Various issues relating to these events have
been discussed in academic journals, scientific and popular
books, at various national and international symposia, congresses
and conferences. In East Europe at least three major
conferences have been devoted to the Habsburg Monarchy: 1955 (Prague),
1958 (Budapest), 1964 (Budapest). The last one was, actually,
a preparatory meeting for the international congress of
historians which took place in Vienna in 1965. The Vienna Congress
devoted much time to questions of the Monarchy. It was well
attended by East European historians, as was also the
conference held at the University of Indiana which dealt with "the
nationality question in the Habsburg Monarchy". In the meantime,
many other meetings and roundtables have also been held in
different parts of Danubian Europe, turning towards the common past.

--------------------
(10) Kovago, Laszlo, "Allamszovetsegi tervek a Tanacskoztarsasag
idejen," Tortenelmi Szemle (Budapest), No. 3-4, 1966.

[page12]

In these talks and corresponding publications, new and
sometimes rather strange lines have evolved between
representatives of "satisfied" and "dissatisfied11 nations, then
and now, between "nationalists" and "internationalists,"
between protagonists of state sovereignty and federalism,
between pro-Habsburg, anti-Habsburg and neutralist
inclinations.[11] Altogether, this new wave of literature on the

----------------------------
(11) In Hungary, for instance, different views are manifest
concerning the merits of the Monarchy. As a prominent
Marxist historian put it in one of his reports on
historical research conducted in Hungary: "Even today, there
are differences of opinion among Hungarian historians
as to the appraisal of the Ausgleich of 1867 and of the
Austro-Hungarian dualism. Some of them take the
Ausgleich for a predominantly negative, detrimental
phenomenon and they point to the mutilation of the Hungarian
state independence and the conservativism of the regime.
Others, while stressing the historical inevitability
[of the Ausgleich], direct their main criticism against
the anti-democratism, against the serious shortcomings
in the state and social system of the former Monarchy
(including the unsolved social and nationality problems).
But [the same people] also refer to the possibility of
progressive political and cultural relations within the
frame of peoples living together; to the role of the
cultural radiation of Vienna; to the different
economy-promoting factors. Thus. they see the effects of the
Ausgleich and the subordination to the Monarchy in a more
varied and complex manner." See Ranki, Gyorgy, "Die
Porschungsarbeit der ungarischen Historiker auf dem

Gebiet der neueren Geschichte Ungarns im 19.-20.
Jahrhundert," Osterreichische Osthefte (Vienna), September 1966.

A strongly pro-regime historian, Ervin Pamlenyi, suggested
that the correct Marxist line should reject the Hungarian
pro-Habsburg views "born on the soil of the
counter-revolutionary (Horthy) regime" as well as the
"feudalistbourgeois nationalist" opinion that the dualist Monarchy
was the only source of all the evils in Hungary. See:
Pamlenyi, Ervin, "Schoenbrunn, a lemeno nap fenyeben,"
Magyar Nemzet, 16 September 1962, and many similar
statements in academic journals and the daily press.

At one point, some Soviet historians had begun to worry
because of certain efforts "to idealize Austro-Hungary"
as a prototype for the integration of Europe. Later,
such worries were expressed in East Europe, too. Sees
Wiener Quellenhefte zur Ostkunde/Kultur, No. 1, 1965.

[page13]

subject played a considerable role in arousing the
intellectual world along the banks of the Danube; it stimulated
discussions on the validity of past experiences for
present and future planning. But while it forged new
friendships and contacts, it also revived old controversies,
albeit with new sic cents, among the East European peoples.

The stimulating role of the various discussions that
took place can be well illustrated by the Danubian roundtable
conference of the Vienna Europahaus in July 1966. The
conference was attended by Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Yugoslav and
Austrian historians who in general, did not satisfy
themselves with routine answers to the problems but asked new
questions and urged further discussions. The Hungarian Peter
Hanak, speaking of the Ausgleich of 1867 closed his
contribution with the following words:

If we look beyond the temporal and spatial
borders of the submerged Monarchy, we run against
an old, and at the same time new, problems did
1918 resolve [all] the problems? And, after all,
was there any good solution at all for this
backward part of Europe colonized by so many peoples
in the time of the national metamorphosis 
Historians [sympathetic to] the national trends between
the two World Wars, and some adherents of the
nationalist neo-renaissance of our epoch will
certainly answer it positively. But history itself,
the history of the last 50 years has no such
unequivocal and reassuring answer to these old, and
at the same time new, problems of the Danubian
area...[12]

In the same discussion, Dr. Jaroslav Sidak, professor at the
University of Zagreb, warned that, while one should not
bemoan the disappearance of the Monarchy, the following question
should be asked of the futures

...what can we do today? ...what can all the
small nations and states do here today in order to
be able to coexist decently? A coexistence which
is a necessity of life for all of us: this is the
problem which stands before us... [13]

------------------------------
(12) Hanak, Peter, "Der Osterreichisch- Ungarische Ausgleich
1867, aussen-, innen-und wirtschaftspolitisch gesehen,"
in: Varga, Josef (ed.), Donauraum - gestern, heute,
morgen (Europa Verlag, Wien/Frankfurt/Zurich), 1967, p. 127.

(13) "Die Neugestaltung des Donauraumes nach dem ersten
Weltkrieg" (Forum discussion), in: Varga, Josef (ed.), op.
cit., p. 170,

[page14]

Of course, the various discussions have seen a great
deal of controversy. But even these should not be considered
as merely negative phenomena. They revealed the existence
of sensitive historical issues cutting deeply into
present-day political life, and they inspired much new thinking and
rethinking about building a common future in the Danubian
basin. Hungarian historians were involved in two well-known
controversies, one with the Rumanians, and the other with
the Slovaks. In the first case, the interpretation of the
events of 1848 and 1918 was the source of the conflict. At
the Budapest Habsburg conference of 1964, some Hungarian
historians claimed that the creation of the national states
after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy was not a
historical necessity and that a federation of states should have
arisen instead. This view, represented mainly by Erik Molnar,
was sharply repudiated by the Rumanians. Their spokesmen
also propounded the thesis that under the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, the national minorities had been subjected to
double oppression: national and social. In the course of
the debate, some of the Hungarian historians apparently
dissociated themselves from the Molnar thesis. Later, Miron
Constantinescu, leader of the Rumanian delegation, subjected
Lenin's appeal to the workers and people of the
Austro-Hungarian. Monarchy to a detailed study and concluded that this
appeal did not call for a federation but, on the
contrary, supported the idea of national states.[14]

Next, at the Vienna Congress of historians, the Rumanian
Victor Cherestesiu condemned the leadership of the Hungarian
revolution of 1848-1849 as reactionary in its peasant policy,
thus questioning the progressive value of this great event.

The Rumanians, however, were not alone in their
non-conformist views. At about the same time, two Slovak publicists,
Daniel Rapant and Vladimir Minac, took more or less the same

-------------------------------
(14) "Die Donaumonarchie im heutigen Geschichtsbild der
Nach-folgestaaten," Wiener Quellenhefte zur Ostkunde/Kultur,
No. 4, 1963/1964.

Esti Hirlap (Budapest), 6 May 1964.

Gonda, Imre, "Problems of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
(1900-1918)," Magyar Tudomany (Budapest), No. 10, 1964,
in English ins RFE Hungarian Press Survey, No. 1543,
19 November 1964.

Constantinescu, M., "V.I. Lenin's Appeal to the Workers
and Peoples of Austria-Hungary," Studii (Bucharest), No. 1,
1966, in English ins RFE Rumanian Press Survey, No. 660,
12 October 1966.

[page15]

stand: they refused to accept Marx and Engel's authority
on the Hungarian revolution, and insisted on the allegedly
anti-progressive character of the Hungarian attitude at
this time.[15] Both the Rumanian and the Slovak theses
were essentially an open challenge to the Marxist school of
thought in Hungary which, built by the late Jozsef Revai,
had made the Hungarian revolution of 1848-1849 as the pivot
of the progressive movement in the Danubian basin. The
uncomfortable duty to answer the Rumanian and Slovak critics
fell on Erzsebet Andics, a former "Muscovite" and member of
the Revai school of historians. When speaking of nationalism,
she argued, the Marxists must keep to the golden rule of
"let's first put our own house in order." She then added
"...the fight against the remnants of nationalism is our
common duty...only collectively and in unison can we
accomplish it successfully..." As to the essence of the debate,
she maintained the position of the Hungarian school and
hinted, especially in the case of Slovaks, at some possible
ulterior motive in trying to discredit the Hungarian
revolution of 1848-1849.[16]

Another Hungarian response concentrated on Minac's
article. After attacking the Slovak theses, the Hungarian
author suggested: "We should not debate but work. We have
to work on our common, brotherly future...." He invoked the
help of "the greatest Hungarian socialist poet," Attila
Jozsef, quoting his famous words on the common fate in the
Danubian valley:

...It is a great enough struggle to admit the
past. The soft waves of the Danube, our past,
present and future, embrace one another.

The struggle fought by our ancestors will be
turned into peace by memory. We have to settle
our common affairs. This is our task and it is
not a small one...![17]

-----------------------------
(15) Rapant, Daniel, "Stur a sturovciv sluzbe naroda a
pokroku," Slovenska Literatura, No. 5, 1965.

Minac, Vladimir, "Tu zije narod," Kulturny Zivot, 15, 22,
29 October 1965.

16) Andics, Erzsebet, "Revizio ala kell vennunk Marx es Engels
nezeteit az 1848-49-es forradalomrol?" Valosag
No. 4, 1966.

17) Somogyi, Sandor, "Rendezni vegre kozos dolgainkat...,"
Kritika (Budapest), June 1966.


[page16]

Words like these could not stop the historians. Especially
on Slovak side, further attempts were made to revise the
already traditional Marxist views on Hungary of 1848-1849.
What Marx and Engels had to say on the subject, the articles
pronounced, was based on scanty information, and came to
be accepted as gospel only because of Revai's baleful
influence.[18]

All these debates were by no means academic exercises.
For if it can be proven that the Hungarian attitude in
1848-49 was wrong, then history can rehabilitate the Slovak
and several other Slav leaders who, ultimately, took a
pro-Habsburg course in the revolutionary events. At the same
time, the Hungarians would be deprived of the most precious
part of their "progressive" history. An article which was
intended as a summing up of the debate and was published
by both the Slovak and Czech journals of history, clearly saw
the importance of the issue at stake. Miss Andics' criticism,
wrote the author of this article, struck at the endeavors of
Czechoslovak Marxist historiography to review the events of
1848-49 and to reexamine the "foreign" Marxist
interpretation of the role the Slav people played in those events.
Under the specific conditions of the Monarchy, the article
went on, national liberation had become a cardinal part of
the fight for general progress; thus, if somebody disregarded
it, he could not fight for progress. The article also
accepted the Rumanian concept of the double oppression of
the national minorities under the Habsburg yoke and came to
the following conclusion about the much criticized
standpoint of "Austro-Slavism":

...It contained significant democratic
postulates, especially as to the basic questions of
contacts between the nations. The efforts of the
Slav politicians to transform the Austrian state
into a federation on a national basis, though
directed against German-Hungarian supremacy, did
not intend to replace it by a Slav one... "

Unfortunately, the Hungarians, "from the very beginning," 
had refused to consider such a solution, the article added.[19]

That the Hungarians were upset, even incensed, at the
course the debate had taken was shown by the fact that no
less a figure than Istvan Szirmai, Politburo member in charge
of culture, defended the Hungarian historians during his
speech at the Hungarian Party congress in November-December 1966.

-----------------------------
(18) E.g., compare: Mesaros, Julius, "Sucasny stav badania
Sturovskej problematiky, " Historicity Casopis (Bratislava),
No. 2, 1966.

(19) Novotny, Jan, "K soucasne polemice nasich a madarskych
historika o marxisticke hodnoceni revoluce 1848-49,"
Historicky cagopis, Ibid., No. 2, 1967.

[page17]

3. General cultural, economic and people-to-people
contacts; These contacts were a reflection of the receding
of the cold war and the advent of peaceful coexistence. On
the Western side of the East-West borderline, Austria has
become, from Danubian point of view, the most important
contact partner. Any contact between the Danubian countries
without Austria is missing the mark of completeness; it
remains one-sided, "socialist," "Communist," "East European,"
or even "Balkan." It is Austrian participation which lifts
the Danubian peoples from their East European isolation,
creates, rightly or wrongly, the impression of the
normalization of the situation, and awakes in the peoples concerned
a real feeling of "togetherness." Austrian presence is, of
course, not only Danubian in its context. It is also a
window to the West, in the broader sense of the world.

This development of contacts has not been all smooth
sailing. From time to time, it has had serious setbacks,
relapses and even stagnations caused by political events,
ideological considerations, psychological factors, etc. For
example, for a. period of time most of the East European
contacts stopped with Titoist Yugoslavia. The aftermath of
the Hungarian revolution of 1956 interrupted Hungarian
contacts with all her Danubian neighbors. Later, however, the
new Hungarian regime made great efforts to bring back things
to "normalcy," to tie in Hungary more securely to the great
East European socialist community. Thus, she intensified
all kinds of socialist contacts, and on all levels. But her
rapprochement with Austria and Yugoslavia has developed much
more successfully than with some of her Eastern neighbors.
Internal "bloc problems," traditional attitudes, the
Transylvanian question, with all its implications have contributed


to her strained relations with Rumania. Hungarian contacts
with Czechoslovakia have developed more successfully, but
without any degree of warmth. Austria, on the other hand,
could establish very good relations with Yugoslavia, Rumania
and Hungary and is satisfied with her contacts with Bulgaria;
but rapprochement with Czechoslovakia, on the official level,
is still far from normal. It still seems that in certain
parts of the Danubian area national minority questions
play an important role. For example, the status of the
Hungarian minorities in Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia
is a pretty good yardstick by which to measure the nature of
the inter-state relations between the countries concerned.
The same is true for the Austro-Yugoslav relations.

Most of the international contacts in the area are
regulated by state treaties, agreements or protocols amounting to
an extensive and intricate network. Part of this network is
purely East European, going back to the Stalinist,
Khrushchevite years, and it comprises mostly bilateral, but partly
also multilateral (Comecon) ties between the East European
countries themselves as well as between them and the Soviet
Union. But an important part of the network are also the
[page18]

agreements concluded between Austria and the East European
countries. All of these ties are bilateral, and most of
them regulate economic relations. Surprising as it is,
only one cultural agreement has been concluded until now
between Austria and an East European country, and this one
with Poland, a non-Danubian country. The larger part of
her extensive and ever growing cultural contacts has. been
developed on a day-to-day, semi-official, or private basis,
in the form of verbal agreements.

One thing, however, should be made clear in this
context: few of these ties--in the early stages of Austria's
contact-making--have been made with a specifically stated
"Danubian" concept in mind, and they have certainly nothing
directly to do with federalism. They were," however,
means for bringing together isolated intellectual communities.
They opened the vistas of broader cooperation in the
cultural and economic spheres, resuscitated the sense of
interdependence among immediate neighbors, and initiated a
discussion on suitable forms of cooperation.

This has been especially true in economic relations.
In the Eastern half of the Danubian region, the organization
of Comecon was responsible for setting off a debate on the
question of modern economic integration, a debate
intensified by the steadily growing successes of the parallel
Western organization, the Common Market. The "new" Leninist
interpretation of supra-nationalism could not put off East
European dissatisfaction with the present forms of
cooperation, and the search for more democratic, effective and
"domestic" solutions. Here again, the presence of Austria
has enlivened the debate. A member of the Danubian club by
historic and geographic definition, but with a different
social and economic system from her Eastern neighbors, she
offered them close economic cooperation but at the same time
has repeatedly expressed her intention to become associated
in some form with the Common Market. The Austrian program
has added new fuel to the integration debate in East Europe
(as it did within Austria, too) and to the reflections on
the realistic possibilities of closer economic ties between
the Danubian countries, with all past, present and future
aspects of the issue.

It is hardly surprising that one of the earliest
statements on the necessity of a broad discussion on the "various
aspects on integration" came from Yugoslavia. As early as
the summer of 1957, an editorial in the Belgrade Review of
International Affairs stated the following:




We live in an age in which the achievements of
technical and scientific civilization, together
with the free action of economic laws confront the
states with the necessity of ever more intensive
integration. And integration is being spontaneously

[page19]

realized in various forms in economy, culture
and politics...

In this movement toward integration a
particular place is occupied by Europe which has
always played a significant role in the world.
In these days of great historical events, Europe's
international role, economic importance and its
position in present day developments is of special
interest.

In view of the economic, political and
cultural trends towards integration, and of the
achievements already made in this field in Europe, the
editors of the Review of International Affairs
consider that the discussion of various aspects of
integration could be useful, not only because it
would reveal different and conflicting views of
the matter, but also because it would indicate
the common interests which now induce the European
nations to establish ever closer relations with one
another.[20]

It is clear now how this Yugoslav call was answered and
carried on.

4. Relaxation of international tension: The cultural,
economic and political contacts, mentioned above, could hardly
have expanded to such an extent without a relaxation of
tension between the two military blocs in East and West and
the cautious diplomatic efforts to implement the policy of
peaceful coexistence. It was in this general framework that
the Soviet Union, trying also to profit from Gaullism, has
slowly groped toward a new policy of Europe. This policy
seems to be aimed at the dismantling of NATO, reducing
American influence on the continent to a bare minimum, and
adjusting to certain requirements of the world Communist movement.

Officially the Soviet thesis runs;

No true relaxation of tension and peaceful coexistence
is possible without "European security".
"European security," which involves also the solution
of the German problem, can be realized only by
Europeans and not at once, but in many stages, beginning
with closer cooperation on a regional basis.

------------------------------
(20) Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), 1-16 August
1957.

[page20]

The European regions, like the Balkans, Danubian
basin, Central Europe and Northern Europe, comprise
mainly small states, often with different social
and political systems. Regional cooperation leads,
then, to the increasing role of the European small
states and to broadening contacts between states
with different systems.

The Karlovy Vary conference of the European Communist Parties
in April 1967 was, for example, an important step in
formulating this European policy. In general, one can say that
Communist sympathies for the European aspects of Gaullism
as well as Soviet concentration on European politics have,
directly or indirectly, helped the awakening of the spirit
of regionalism, the upgrading of the role of the small
countries, and the ensuing discussions about their future
chances. Even a country like Czechoslovakia which considers
herself a strong industrial power in her own right, and in
her official propaganda demonstrates comparatively little
enthusiasm for any form of regionalism, began to conduct
discussions on various issues connected with. it. During the
latter part of 1966, for instance, the leading Czechoslovak
journal of international affairs, Mezinarodni Bolitika,
opened a debate on the role of the small countries, a debate
which involved problems of coexistence and cooperation not
frequently mentioned before. The opening article was written
by Antonin Snejdarek, Director of the Czechoslovak Institute
for International Politics and Economics, and, afterwards,
contributions from the readers on the same subject were
published in a special column.

Due to the development of Soviet nuclear armaments,
wrote Snejdarek, a "strange," "formerly non-existent" balance
of power has been established between the USSR and the USA
which proved the practical possibilities of peaceful
coexistence. Unfortunately, the "unsolved" German question could
upset this balance in any moment. But, both the balance of
power, on the one hand, and the German danger on the other,
offered new possibilities of political action to the small
states belonging to one bloc or the other. It is the primary
interest of these states that the danger of war should be
removed from Europe. But what can, or should, they do?
Snejdarek's argument rested on the following points:

First, that it is not, said Snejdarek, in the power of
small states to dissolve the blocs, nor can they voluntarily
resign from bloc membership. "The blocs did not come into
being from the volition of the small states, and these small
states do not play a decisive role in their life. At the
same time, the small states, rightly or not, Hook for certain
protection in the blocs."

[page21]

It is, however, in the power of the small states to
exert a positive influence on the relaxation of tension by:

. actions within their own bloc trying to convince
the "leading organs" to carry out measures aiming
at lessening of tension

. establishing normal and friendly contacts with the
states belonging to the other bloc, especially with
the neighboring states situated in the belt
separating the two blocs

. expanding human contacts between the people of the
two blocs with the main purpose to isolate those
forces which are working against a European system
of security

. expanding scientific, economic and cultural contacts
to spread the idea of European togetherness.

Step by step, the small European states would be able
to achieve the dismantling of the blocs ("whose existence
must be considered temporary") and to build up a permanent
system of security.

Snejdarek stressed: "The small European states, even
if they would be united, could not remove the danger from
Europe and carry out the system of collective security..."
However, "...with their behavior and peace actions, they
can,, to a large extent, prepare the agreement of the great
powers without which the [realization of] European
security is inconceivable."[21]

In the discussion following the publication of Snejdarek's
article, the participants expressed full agreement with the
basic idea that common actions by the small states could
lead to heartening changes in European politics. The
cooperation of the Nordic states was taken as a good case in point.
But one contributor seemed to be taking issue with Snejdarek's
view that voluntary resignation of small states from bloc
membership was not really possible and that it was not in
their power to dissolve the blocs. He wrote:

...One should not think immediately of
dissolving the blocs, but, for instance, of such
possibilities as influencing the formulation of their policy,
supporting different disintegration trends within
the bloc, accepting or not accepting different
demands of the leading bloc powers, etc...

------------------------------
(21) Snejdarek, Antonin, "Male zeme a evropska "bezpecnost,"
Mezinarodni politika (Prague), November 1966.

[page 22]

To clarify what he had in mind, the writer quoted the
attitude of Denmark and Norway within NATO. (But he did
not imply that his concept would be limited only to one
bloc.) One of the great difficulties was, he said, that
the cooperation of the small countries is of an accidental
character. Missing is an institutional set-up which would
link the small countries, not in the form of another
international organization but, perhaps, in the form of a standing
conference of their foreign ministers. "The 4 October 1966
conference of the foreign ministers of the Nine [European
small countries]...could be considered as a kind of impetus
in this direction..." [22]

Another reader, writing from Sofia, wished to emphasize
the interdependence and the community of interest of the
small nations. They could counterbalance their relative
weakness by wise choices and by maintaining relations and
contacts with a great number of other states. Thus, the
very high number of the small states is a fact which works
in their interest. They should use all the possibilities
available to promote their initiatives and influence. At
the same time, they should seek the support and alliance
of those big states the policy of which is in line with the
said trends, otherwise the small states could not assure the
victory of their cause. "[Such] possibilities are greater
under the present circumstances than ever before in this
century," wrote the contributor from Sofia.[23]

It is very interesting to note that, even a few years
ago, a man like Snejdarek was very suspicious of ideas for
regional association, not to mention federalism. He
presented all federalism plans as "new channels built and
maintained by German imperialism to penetrate Central and East
Europe." The same line was taken up also by other writers
and historians, e.g., the Slovaks Edo Fris and Svetozar Stur.[24]

------------------------------
22) Plumlovsky, J.J., "Mohou male zeme skutecne hrat nejakou
roli?" Ibid., January 1967.

23) Kostov, Vladimir, "Ucinna vzajemna souvislost," Ibid.,
July 1967.

24) For more details, see, for instance: Snejdarek, Antonin,
"Unor 1948," Ibid., February 1960; Snejdarek, A.,
"Kriseni strasaka Panslavizmu-soucast studene valky
imperalismu proti SSSR a lidovim demokracim," Historicky
Casopis, No. 2-3, 1960; Fris, Edo, "Ludacky separatismus
v planoch zapadonemeckeho revansizmu," in: Holotik,
Ludovit (ed.), Nemecka otazka a Ceskoslovensko (1938-1961),
(Vydavatelstvo Slovenkej akademie vied, Bratislava),1962;
Stur, Svetozar, "Ludacka emigracia v sluzbach Zapadonemeckeho
revansizmu," Slovansky Prehled (Prague), No. 6, 1961.

[page23]

It was the official line in the early 1960's to try to crush
the awakening spirit of federalism in Czechoslovakia. Today,
however, in spite of Prague's continuing reservations, even
about regional cooperation, the aggressive anti-federalist tone
of earlier statements has been dropped.

5. The Danube Commission; While most of the East-West
contacts in the Danube region are being conducted on a
strictly bilateral basis, there is one center where Danubian
contact and cooperation is multilateral,, This is the Danube
Commission, the only international agency specializing in
Danubian navigation problems with the participation of all
the riparian states from East and West. The circumstance
just mentioned explains the fact that the organization, though
technical in character, plays a significant political role
in the life of the Danubian area. To quote a Czechoslovak
source:

The Danube Commission has become an important
center of close cooperation of all the riparian
states, on the forum of which every Danubian state
can lout forward its wishes. ...The administration
of the Danubian navigation demonstrates that
differences in the socio-economic systems can be
no obstacle to the development of good and friendly
cooperation, if only [the states] observe the basic
rules of international law: respect for sovereignty,
supreme equality, mutual economic benefits, no
interference in the internal affairs of the states,
etc... The commission has turned into a forum of
cooperation between representatives of socialist and
capitalist states."[25]

But enthusiastic commentaries such as this should not
make one forget the stormy childhood of the commission. It
was born in Belgrade in 1948 on the ruins of a pre-war
international commission, and its membership was limited, under
Soviet pressure, to the riparian states, thus excluding three
Western countries with traditional interest in the navigation
of the Danube: the United States, Great Britain and Prance.
The Belgrade convention was signed by the Soviet Union, the
Ukraine (whose representation was later taken over by the
Soviet Union), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and
Bulgaria. The two remaining riparian states, Austria and the
Federal Republic of Germany, got an observer's status in 1957.

------------------------------
(25) Cuth, Juraj, "Medzinarodna rieka Dunaj," Mezinarodni '
politika, November 1960.

[page 24]

Austria gained full membership in December 1959, but the
GFR request for membership was twice refused (February 1966,
April 1967).[26]

Press reports at the time of these refusals speculated
that it was mainly the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia who blocked
the West German requests. Some new West German hopes were
raised after Foreign Minister Brandt's visit to Rumania in
August 1967. As the minister revealed in his press conference
in Mamaia, the Rumanians had promised to sponsor the renewed
request of entry of the German Federal Republic to the Danube
Commission. There heve been some indications that the Yugo-
slavs may also change their negative attitude on this question.[27]

Due to the predominant Soviet position in East Europe
and to the predominantly East European membership, the Danube
Commission fell under Soviet control and, especially in the
first phase of its history, was hardly more than an instrument
of Soviet foreign policy. At the very beginning, most of the
Commissions' time was taken up by the Yugoslav problem, with
navigation projects relegated in the background. From 1953 on,
however:

The Danube Commission was used as a test case
for several innovations of Soviet foreign policy:
1) the attempt to appease and renew relations with
Yugoslavia; 2) the switch from bilateral relations
within the Soviet bloc, especially in technical
areas; and 3) the restoration of closer
non-political relations with the West.[28]

------------------------------
(26) The Danube is 2842 km. long, but the most "international"
river of the world, since it passes, or flows through, the
territory of eight states and even more peoples. Out of
her full length, 2379 km. is navigable with the following
participation of the riparian states:
GFR	153 km	Yugoslavia	588 km
Austria	347 "	Rumania	1075 "
CSSR	187 "	Bulgaria	470 "
Hungary	433 "	USSR	54 "

"Duna, Dunaj, Danube," Magyarorszag (Budapest), 2 July 1967.

(27) RFE Situation Report, 9 August 1967, "Germany and East
Europe," The Economist (London), 12 August 1967.

(28) Cattell, David T., "The politics of the Danube Commission
under Soviet control," The American Slavic and East
European Review (New York), October 1960.

[page 25]

The seat of the Commission was the Yugoslavs' request
moved from Galati (Rumania) to Budapest and, after Stalin's
death, multilateral technical cooperation began to develop.
The commission concentrated on three tasks:

. improvement of navigation on the Danube;

. utilization of the enormous hydro-power potential of
the river; and

. building of a European waterway system.

All the while, goods traffic increased considerably.
It more than doubled in the first ten years, and has
grownat an even quicker pace ever since.[29] Most of the
increase was attributed to the growing riverside industries
and their transport needs. Among them the two most important
are: the State-owned VOEST Iron and Steel Works in Linz,
Austria, and the Steel Works in Dunaujvaros (former
Sztalin-varos) in Hungary. While the relations of the Hungarian. Steel
town are mainly bilateral (Hungarian-Soviet), the Austrian
VOEST has developed truly Danubian contacts and occupies the
position of an industrial stronghold in Austrian East-West
relations.[30]

The planning, building, and construction activity along

the Danube river has produced a long list of the most various
projects. If they do not originate directly from the
Commission, they are connected with it in one way or the other.
The most important are:

a) The Iron Gates hydro-electric project connected with
measures to facilitate and improve navigation. It is a
bilateral Yugoslav-Rumanian undertaking, with multi-lateral
interest. The planning work started in 1956, and the first
documents were signed in May 1963. The basis of the project
is the 110 km long Iron Gate gorge of the Danube which has a
very great hydro-power potential, but, at the same time,
constitutes a dangerous "bottle neck" in the navigation of the
Danube. The power plant (to be built on both sides of the
river) will have a capacity of 2,040 MW and it will generate
10,000 GWh (10 billion 400 million kWh) of electricity a year.
As to the navigational part of the project;

It will increase the gorge capacity from about 12,000,000
to over 45,OOO,OOO tons of shipping;


------------------------------
(29) Between 1957 and 1967 it grew from 9.7 m to 25 m tons
over the past ten years. (The Financial Times, London,
18 October 1967.)

(30) For details see; "Danube Traffic Doubled," -The Times (London),
13 October 1960.

[page26]

. The number of hours necessary to pass through the
Iron Gates will be reduced from 120 to 32;

. Sailing costs will be reduced by 65-70 percent.[31]

Construction work on the project started in 1964, and it
is supposed to last 7 to 8 years at a total cost of $400
million. Referring to the multilateral, or even international
importance of the navigational part of the scheme, the two
builders, Rumania and Yugoslavia, asked for a $95 million
contribution from the other riparian countries. The request
was put on the agenda of the 1965 session of the Danube
Commission and resulted in a stormy debate, in which most of
the participants refused to accept the Rumanian-Yugoslav
requests. The Austrians, as their spokesman explained,
built three power dams on their section of the river, in
connection with which navigation was also improved, but they
did not ask anyone to share the costs. The Soviet Union
estimated that the navigation improvement costs would not
be higher than #55 million, which led to a new argument on
whether this amount should be divided between the seven
riparian countries (Yugoslavia and Rumania included) or only
between the five. No agreement was reached and the case is
now before the arbitration court of the Danube Commission
in Budapest.[32]

b) The Rhine-Main-Danube (HMD) Canal, called also
Europa-Kanal, which is to connect the Danube with the Atlantic
Ocean, assuring the Danubian Basin a direct access to the great
seas. According to the plan the Canal would be completed
around 1989 at an overall cost of one billion dollars, out of
which 0.7 billion has already been spent on construction work.
Recently, however, some doubts havebeen expressed as to the
ultimate value of such a Canal; the project is in the hands
of a study group organized by the ECE to pass the final word
on it. The German Federal Republic, Austria, Czechoslovakia
and Hungary take an active part in the work of the study
group.[33] Czechoslovakia and Hungary are, of course, the two
socialist countries which would be the most directly affected

------------------------------
(31) For some additional details, see the main sourse used here;
Stojanovic, Bogoljub, "The Iron Gate Hydro-power System,"

Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), 20 April 1963.

32) Binder, David, in New York Times, 18 August 1965, and The
Economist, 26 August 1967. The latter, reporting on the
latest stage of the debate, added: "The chief beneficiary
[of the Iron Gates project] looks like being the Soviet Union
which sends much of its trade to Eastern and Central Europe
by this route."

33) Boessenecker, Herman, "Welche Bedeutung wird der
Europa-Kanal haben?" Die Welt (Hamburg), 25 August 1967.

[page27]

by the Europa-Kanal. Hungary hopes will assure Budapest
a "central position" on the Danube as one of the three future
trans-shipment harbors (Frankfurt am Main, Regensburg,
Budapest).

c) The Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal, to be built mainly by
Czechoslovakia and Poland, between 1971 and 1978. Some
sources see in it a rival project to the Europa-Kanal. It
would connect the waterways of the Danube, Elbe, Oder and
Vistula, thereby providing the Czechoslovak industry with
cheap water transportation facilities.

This Canal is a 70 years old dream. After World War II
the idea was discussed for the first time in the framework
of the Czechoslovak-Polish economic convention of 1947.[34]
It was revived once again in 1960. This time, however,
concrete planning had also begun which led to a final project
approved by the Czechoslovak State Technical Commission in
April 1967. The building expenses of the Canal would run
to 11 milliard Czechoslovak crowns, and in order to realize
the plan, Czechoslovakia would need the support of her
neighbors, including Austria since the first step of the building
would be a dam to be constructed between Vienna and
Bratislava by Austria and Czechoslovakia.[35]

It seems, however, that Czechoslovakia has encountered
serious difficulties in her negotiations concerning the
financing of the project. Polish-Czechoslovak differences
of priorities and financing were reported already in 1960,[36]
and Austrian-Czechoslovak discussions on the same subject
were suspended in 1963.[37] The issue was brought up again
after the approval of the final Czechoslovak project. One
newspaper article reported that the great industrial
enterprises, in a need of cheap transportation, were showing
serious interest in it since it would cut their transportation
costs by 30-40 percent. But the money needed is still not
available, according to the Czechoslovak Minister of Forestry
and Water Economy, Josef Smrkovsky, who aired the suggestion
that the enterprises interested in its construction should
participate in the financing of the project.[38]

------------------------------
(34) Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Soviet Bloc (Frederick A.
Praeger, New York),1962, p. 57.

(35) The Financial Times, 18 October 1967°

(36) "Der Bau des Donau-Oder-Kanals," Per Donauraum (Salzburg),
1960, p. 238.

(37) RFE Special, Vienna, 28 August 1967.

(38) "Priplav Dunaj-Odra-Labe, ano ci ne?" Prace (Prague),
23 June 1967.

[page28]

As far as Austria is concerned, new negotiations
opened in Vienna in September 1967 and it looks as if the
city of Vienna itself will show an especially lively
interest in the project. The Austrian Communist newspaper,
Volksstimme, directly accused the government of shelving
the issue, allegedly because the Canal would not fit in
the Common Market concept of the official Austrian policy.
And yet, added Volksstimme, Austria--and mainly the
industries of Vienna, Lower and Upper Austria--would badly
need such a North-South transportation link connecting them
with the Soviet waterways system.[39]

While there is no word yet on the outcome of the recent
Austro-Czechoslovak negotiations, it was reported that the
Czechoslovak project "has now, according to TASS, gained
the support of the other Comecon countries."[40]

------------------------------


(39) Kirszen. Kurt, "Von der Donau zur Ostsee," Volksstimme
(Vienna), 9 September 1967. Further articles on the
same subject: Volksstimme, 22 September 1967;
Arbeiterzeitung (ViennaTJ 14 and 22 September 1967; Salzburger
Nachrichten, 19 September 1967.

(40) The Financial Times, 15 October 1967. This Western
source, in addition, reported the following on the
project:

The project is for a system of canals 270 miles long
which would connect four important Central European
waterways: the Danube, the Elbe, the Oder and the
Vistula. The possibility of bringing iron ore to Ostrava,
the heart of the Czech steel industry, and of carrying
its products by water is the main but not the only
benefit expected by Czechoslovakia from this large work which
is hoped to be complete in 13 years from now at a cost of
1200m.

A chain of pumping stations would be constructed to pump
Danube water into the Czech rivers and channels.
Hydroelectric power stations,' totalling 6,000 MW, would also
be built to provided power for these pumps...

However important the project may be for the Czechs, they
could hardly attempt its realization without support from
their neighbors. If these are now willing to give a hand,

it is because the benefits of the project are bound to
spread over a much wider area.

In addition to Poland and East Germany the entire catchment
area of the Danube is likely to benefit...

(continued at bottom of next page...)

[page29]

d) In the frame of the "comple utilization" program
of the Danube, a special Committee of the Comecon prepared
a detailed long range program of power plant construction
on the Danube, covering the years up to 1980. According
to this program, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will take care
in common of the Danube section between Bratislava and
Mohacs since Hungary alone would be unable to build the
plants projected." Thus, it will be done as a common
Hungarian-Czechoslovak investment. The most significant is the project
for a hydroelectric power plant to be built at
Nagymaros-Gabcikovo. At a capacity of 900 MW, it will produce 3.7
billion kWh per year. Most of the preparatory work is done by
the Water Power Planning Institute in Bratislava, and the
actual construction will start in 1968 or 1969.
Czechoslovakia and Hungary will share the expenses equally.[41]

e) Yugoslavia is working on a Danube-Tisza-Danube
Canal project. The canal will be 275 km long, considerably
shortening the Danubian stretch between the
Hungarian-Yugoslav, and the Yugoslav-Rumanianborder. The financial problems
are still unsolved, and Yugoslavia is looking for Western
support or Soviet help.

* * *

After reviewing some of the most important ideological,
political, cultural, and technical factors responsible for
the awakening of the regionalist concept or spirit, let
us turn now directly to Hungary. She produced the lirst
Communist leadership which, in the post-Stalinist era, openly
embraced the idea of Danubian interdependence, a Danubian
community of fate. What is Hungary's federalist or regionalist
tradition, what was the pre-Kadarist Communist attitude on it
and how is it handled in present-day Hungary?

------------------------------
The first step toward the realization of this grand plan
would be the raising of the Danube's level between
Vienna and Bratislava by a dam to be constructed jointly
by Austria and Czechoslovakia. One of the arguments
against it stems from fears that it would destroy the
biological self-purifying capacity of the river, that the
living organisms which clean the river could not stand
the cold water of the deep basins...

Another problem the pumping of water from the Danube into
the Oder and Elbe systems does not seem to present any
great difficulties...

(41) Sources used: Ceteka report, 15 October 1963;
Horvath, Mihaly, "A Duna jovoje," Figyelo (Budapest),
20 January 1965;

Binder. David, "Power project on the Danube," New York
Times, 18 March 1966.

[page 30]

III. FEDERALISM IN HUNGARY

The Hungarians are mostly known as a people with strong
nationalistic leanings; their interest in various
supranational, federalistic, or regional movements is less
generally understood. Usually, it has been the many mistakes

committed in the name of nationalism which elicited Hungarian
interest in federal forms of national coexistence. The
concrete projects proposed by them have been late in the day;
they have also been complicated and often suspected of trying
to cover up revisionistic purposes; sometimes they have been
dismissed as simply unrealistic. But they are all interesting
as efforts to look for new solutions to the old problem of
national rivalries on the Danube,

A. From Kossuth to Bartok

It was Lajos Kossuth, the leader of the 1848-1849
Hungarian revolution, a revolution unable to solve the
nationality problem, who in his exile years turned out the most
frequently cited Hungarian plan of Danubian confederation.
Kossuth's plan called for a confederation of Great Hungary,
Rumania and Serbia, without clear ideas about the future of
Bohemia, Poland and German-Austria.

Arthur A. Kann is right in saying that "this chapter of
[Kossuth's]... intellectual development did not become part of
the Magyar national legend, let alone the Magyar political
program."42 Nevertheless, it still exerted a great influence
mainly on intellectual circles, liberals as well as Marxists,
who later became involved in "Danubian affairs." One of them
was Oszkar Jaszi, a bourgeois radical, who, as Minister of
Nationalities in the Karolyi government of 1918-1919, and much
closer to real power than the emigre Kossuth, tried to
implement at least some aspects of his project. Jaszi wanted to
create an "Eastern Switzerland," a federal state of the
Danubian peoples. But, while Kossuth's plan was directed
against Austria (she would have been excluded from the
federation) Karolyi's minister was first for the maintenance of the
Empire with a modernized internal structure. In one of his
last writings, he gave an enlightening account of the origins
of the program and the composition of the group of
intellectuals who supported him. One fraction came from among the
"independents" who cherished Kossuth's ideas; there were some
socialists, too. But the really important ideological focus
was the young generation of the Sociological Society, the
organizers of the Galilei circle who became, however,
gradually immersed in Marxist problems and lost, step by step, their
close contact with Hungarian issues. In Jaszi's view, a

----------------------------------------
(42) Kann, Arthur A. , The Habsburg Empire (Frederick A. Praeger,
New York), 1957, pp. 130-131.

[page 31]

group of the early village explorers partly originating
from the nationally mixed territories) "contributed also
to the perception of the true reality." But, added Jaszi,
most important was the role played by Endre Ady, who
expressed in the language of poetry the community of fate of
the Danubian peoples. "The ardent fervor of [Ady's] poetry
was the main source of power for all of us, all the time,"
confessed Jaszi.[43] Already on 3 November 1918, members of
this intelligentsia signed a manifesto calling for the
organization of a federation of free nations which would
replace the dissolving Monarchy. The list of signatures
comprised many prominent names from the Hungarian world
of cultures Endre Ady, Bela Bartok, Marcell Benedek, Elek
Bolgeir, Istvan Csok, Milan Fust, Lajos Kassak, Zoltan Kodaly,

Dezso Kosztolanyi, Gyorgy Lukacs, Jozsef Rippl-Ronai, Bela
Uitz, Jeno Varga, Rusztem Vambery, etc.[44]

The 1918-1919 leftist intellectual attempt to modernize
Hungary (and the Monarchy) from within was, in practice,
just as big a failure as that made by Kossuth from the
outside. The nationalities chose the way of independence, and
Hungary, too, reduced to one-third on her former size, could
not but follow the same way. The very collapse of the system
and the strongly independent mood of the non-Hungarian
peoples formerly embraced by that system was a deep shock to
Hungarians of all generations, a shock from which most could
not recover. Their reactions to it, however, varied a good
deal and, roughly speaking, three trends and groups emerged
in Hungary in the inter-war period:

a) Those who simply wanted to recreate the old
Hungarian empire without paying much attention to internal reforms.
They refused another "marriage" with the Habsburgs and
wanted national independence, but on an old, "integral"
Hungarian basis.

b) Hungarians who hoped to recreate the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, perhaps in a somewhat modernized form. To this
group belonged many members of the aristocracy, but also some
representatives of the bourgeoisie. Toward the end of World
War II, one of their organizations entered the underground
coalition in which Communists also participated,,

c) Quite a few members of the new intelligentsia, many
representatives of the younger generation, were influenced
partly by the spirit of Kossuth, partly by the teachings of

----------------------------------------
(43) Jaszi, Oszkar, "Miert nem sikerult a dunavolgyi federaciot
megalkotni," Lairohatar. January 1953.

(44) Gal, Istvan,"Bartok Bela es a Kelet-Kozep-Europa-kutatas
kezdetei," Helikon (Budapest), No. 1, 1967.

[page 32]

Oskar Jaszi. They preached a Danubian community of fate and
believed that, cooperation being essential for survival in
the Danubian basin, the Danubian people would, sooner or
later, join in a democratic federation or confederation.
Mostly intellectuals of leftist inclinations, they made their
presence felt in a great number of cultural organizations
and movements. They established excellent contacts with
Hungarian minority groups in uhe neighboring countries.

This new interest in federal, supra-national solutions
of the Danubian question developed several new federalist,
regional cooperation projects, running from one extreme to
the other.

The concept of a Turanian-Slavic peasant state was
certainly one of the extreme proposals, but it was also
characteristic of the desperate eagerness of the youth to act.
The concept was born at one of the discussion evenings of
the Miklos Bartha Society Hungarian reform-moverrent. This

concept held that, in Hungary, power should be handed over
to the peasantry, the only segment of the population still
preserving the Turanian (ancient Hungarian) virtues. Since
the peasant way of life and morality are essentially the
same everywhere in Eastern Europe, such a peasant Hungary

could much more easily reach an understanding with the
surrounding Rumanian, Serb, etc. peasant nations, and this would
ease the solution of the entire Hungarian problem.

The concept provoked hostile comments. One of critics
was Gyula Szekfu, later a proto.gonist of Hungarian-Soviet
cooperation. For him the Turanian-Hungarian peasant
state-"project" was unacceptable for several reasons:

Turanism, as an expression of Turanian-Hungarian
continuity, was a national illusion, typical for
the 19th century Hungarian thinking, From scientific
point of view, it was a gross fallacy.

If there was any resemblance between the Hungarian
and East European peasantry, it stemmed only from the
backward status of their agriculture as compared to
Central and Western Europe. Not an Eastern, but only
a Western orientation could bring improvement.[45]

Elemer Hantos, professor of economics and an expert in
state administration, represented a more sober approach to

the Danubian problem. In his articles which appeared between

----------------------------------------
(45) Szekfu, Gyula, "A turani-szlav parasztallam," Magyar
Szemle (Budapest), January 1929.

[page 33]

1923 and the early 1930's, mainly in Hungarian and German
papers, and in his books published in the same period, he
proposed a Danubian cooperation on an economic basis, that
an economic, customs, transport and monetary alliance should
be established. The point of departure, or his minimum
program would have been an economic union between Austria
and Hungary, extended step by step to Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, eventually also to Poland' and Bulgaria.
He firmly opposed the participation of Germany under any
form,[46] Hantos'sexample was followed by politicians, writers,
publicists, historians, all of them presenting ideas on
Danubian cooperation. Some felt such a cooperation should
include everything Danubian from Vienna to Constantinople.
Federalists like Pal Auer, after World War II Hungarian
Minister to Paris, worked on projects of economic
cooperation and tried to initiate negotiations with the neighboring
countries, concentrating their efforts on Czechoslovakia.,
Austria, and Hungary. The already prominent literary figure,
Leszlo Nemeth, a leader of the populist writers, looked at
Danubian cooperation from a different angle. He would have
excluded Austria from the new Central or Danubian Europe on
the premise that Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Rumanians and
Southern Slavs create their own Kulturkreis. Nemeth felt
Hungarian history should not be viewed from Vienna.[47]

When he started his journal Tanu, Nemeth opened a
column entitled "Central Europe" and urged the Danubian
people, "our brethren," to get acquainted with each other.
As Nemeth saw it, this Central Europe ("or more correctly,
Danubian Europe") consisted of two parts: the Western belt
(with the people of the former tripartite kingdom of Bohemia,
Poland and Hungary) and the Eastern (comprising Rumania,
Serbia, Bulgaria, and, "perhaps" Greece.)[48]

Kodaly and Bartok, with their emphasis on populism, on
the common cultural traditions of the Danubian peoples, made
an immense contribution to the idea of cooperation in the
Danubian Valley. Hungarian comparative literary history
more and more concentrated on the study of relations in
East-Central Europe. The efforts of the various scholars working
in this field were readily recognized by observers from the
neighboring countries. For example, a Slovak literary
historian recalled that the idea of democratic cooperation in

----------------------------------------
(46) Kuehl, Joachim, Foederationsplaene in Donauraum und in
Ostmitteleuropa (R. Oldenbourg, Muenchen)1958, pp. 55-56.
Wierer, Rudolf, op.cit., pp. 175-176.

(47) Kuehl, Joachim, op.cit., pp. 114-116.

(48) Gal, Istvan, op.cit.

[page 34]

literature was first expressed in Hungary by the later
professor Sandor Eckhardt, and that this idea fell on a
good ground:

Certainly, it was fed also by
Extra-literary considerations, like a nostalgia for the
old Monarchy, the stress on the primacy of the
Hungarian literature, but, generally speaking,
the more sober voices prevailed, and they put
the emphasis not so much on political discord but
on literary problems. In this period of time
several writers and papers (Laszlo Nemeth in
"Tanu," and journals like "Szazadunk,"
"Szocializ-mus," "Szep Szo," "Korunk," etc.) concerned
themselves with the problems of the neighboring
literatures. Outstanding among them was the progressive
journal "Apollo" (1935-1939), edited by Istvan
Gal with his collaborator experts on Slav and
other neighboring (Rumanian) literatures. They
investigated the ties with Hungarian literature,
and made an attempt to bring the whole problem
into a Central or East European synthesis, and to
overcome the reactionary Hungaro-centric approach
to the whole question...[49]

The journal Apollo had indeed grown into a
representative Hungarian forum devoted to cultural cooperation in the
Danubian area. Gal, describing the origin of his paper,
pointed out that it was Laszlo Nemeth who in 1932 first
considered the idea of starting such a publication under the
title of "Central Europe." Later, however, for internal
Hungarian reasons, he thought it more important to publish a
monthly with a populist program (this was Valarz). The
Danubian journal could be realized only towards the end of
1934 under the title of Apollo, and it was Nemeth himself
who suggested Gal as editor. " They chose the name of Bela
Bartok as their program. As the first issue said, "Apollo's
ideal Central Europe is identical with the East European
concept of Bela Bartok." Thomas Mann, after his January 1935
visit to Budapest, expressed a very positive view on the new
Hungarian undertaking. He wrote: "Young Hungarian students
of liberal arts started a journal which is exploring the
outlines of a Central European humanism.  Apollo's
contributors were recruited to a large extent from among the young

----------------------------------------
(49) Chmel, Rudolf, "Irodalomtorteneti integraciok," Helikon,
No. 1, 1967.

[page 35]

Hungarian intellectuals grown up in he successor states".[50]

Even a literary figure like Dezso Szabo, so often
quoted as one of the pioneers of the modern "Hungaro-centrist"
ideology in Hungary, went through different federalist
phases, and his many writings on the Danubian subject
disclose a fairly complete scheme of broader cooperation. Since
the Hungarians and other Danubian nations, said Szabo, live
squeezed in a belt between "the German appetite and the
Russian enigma," they have to find their own way of close
cooperation. But nobody should think of recreating the old
Habsburg Monarchy in whatever form, because the Monarchy was
an anachronism, existing against the will of the people living
in it. Actually, what Szabo suggested was the setting up of
an international organization, a kind of informative
parliament of East Europe, where the expert delegates of the
integrated peoples could freely discuss the political, economic,
cultural prerequisites and forms of a possible later
"confederate cooperation." He was not thinking of any Swiss or
American example but only of a loose confederation with close
coordination of military, foreign, economic, cultural
activities. However, the member states were not supposed to
give up their own army, their own foreign ministry, or their
respective economic and cultural agencies and institutions.
This cooperation would encompass all the small nations living
between Germany and the Soviet- Union. Szabo's scheme was
praised by some students of the problem as one of the most
realistic approaches to the Danubian issue. "It differs
essentially," wrote one expert, "from the Kossuth and former
Jaszi conceptions. In its aims and methods, it stands much
closer to the endeavors represented today by de Gaulle and
his [project] of the Europe des patries."[51]

----------------------------------------
(50) Gal, Istvan, op.cit. Gal also mentioned that Bartok
strongly urged the establishment of an. East European
Institute, and made a formal motion to this effect at the
Prague Congress of the Comite International de Cooperation
Culturelle in 1931. Karoly Olt, who later became a
prominent Communist, put forward a similar proposal in the
East European Seminar of the Hungarian Evangelical
Christian Student Federation.

(51) Gombos, Gyula; Szabo Dezso (Aurora Konyvek, Munich) 1966.,
See the sub-chap-ter "The Future of the Small Nations of
East Europe," pp. 397-406, expounding in greater detail
Szabo's views on the subject.


[page 36]

Meanwhile, in neighboring Czechoslovakia, Hungarian
university students had set up an organization called Sarlo
(Sickel). They enjoyed strong intellectual support from
Hungary and drafted a kind of populist program with strong
leftist tendencies. Zsigmond Moricz, a distinguished writer
in Hungary, called them "the realistic sons of fathers living
in a dream world." In the center of Sarlo's interest
stood the "people," the only hope of a Hungarian future; its
members despised the "worn out" and "compromised" bourgeois
class. But what is more important in this context, these
young students and intellectuals also professed the idea of
a democratic East European confederation as the only solution
for the Danubian peoples, and mainly for the Hungarian people,
now dispersed in four different states. As the leader of
the organization, Edgar Balogh, saw it:

The small nations of East Europe cannot develop
against each other. The economic interests of the
toiling masses are everywhere the same. The true 
mission of the Hungarians is to knit into a
synthesis...the small nations necessarily segregated from
each other after the war. This mission does not
spring from something like a racial biological
[spirit], not from a special endeaver do dominate,
but from the historical and geographical situation
of the Hungarian nation... [This nation] is
occupying the center of the Danubian basin, and by its
parts separated as minorities among other nations,
it is reaching also into the history of the
neighboring succession states... Other peoples might
expect only social and economic progress from an
East European federation. We Hungarians, however,
could expect the full legal development of our
minorities forced to live in other states...[52]

Very soon, however, frictions developed among the leaders
of the Sarlo. A small group, led by Balogh himself, joined
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia without realizing that
their ideas about Danubian cooperation would bring them into
a headlong clash with the Party bureaucracy. This fight was
partly recalled by Balogh in his "memoirs" published a couple
of years ago in Hungary. It was only under pressure that they
accepted the thesis that instead of aiming at a federal
cooperation to solve the nationality problem, the real solution
would be the "solidarity of the Danubian proletariat, in a
common front against the imperialist" and against the East

----------------------------------------
(52) As quoted by Turczel, Lajor, "A csehszlovakiai magyar
ifjusagi mozgalmak tortenetebol," Irodalmi Szemle
(Bratis-lava), No. 6, 1967. The article calls the concept
"historically unrealistic" and "a utopia from the historical
point of view."

[page 37]

European national bourgeoisies" who were, of course, "in the
service of Western imperialists."

The slogan is no more federation of the East
European nations, but on the contrary, [relying]
on the force of the proletariat equally threatened
in the East European states, we take a stand
against the "Danubian confederation project of the
imperialists..."[53]

The essence of the Sarlo crisis was more adequately
explained by a former close friend of Balogh, but one who
did not follow him all the way to the Communist Party.
According to this source the program of the Sarlo was built
on Jaszi's "vision" of an East European confederation. The
Communist movement at that time, however, built it
organizational set-up according to the given framework of states.
Apart from preaching proletarian internationalism, the Party
did not even hint at more concrete—Danubian or East
European---collaboration. Under such circumstances, this source
continues, the Sarlo program on Danubian and East European
cooperation "bewildered the official and semi-official
Communist ideologues. As soon as the minority of the Sarlo joined
the Communist Party, all specific aspects of their programm
had to disappear." It was only by accepting the rules of the
game that the former Sarlo members could and did become
Party functionaries or rather professional revolutionaries.
Source also added: "At that time, we, as very young people,
could not grasp completely the Communist aversion to Damibian
cooperation. We could not see behind it the far-seeing
planning for power based on the principle of divide at impera."[54]

About the same time that the Sarlo broke up, or became
submerged in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, another
young intellectual movement called Erdelyi Fiatalok was
born and grew up in Transylvania, Rumania. It stood in close
cooperation with "reform-movements" in Hungary (e.g., with
the Milos Bartha Society) and was inspired by the idea of
East European cooperation. Edgar Balogh, expelled from
Czechoslovakia because of unsettled problems of citizenship,
"emigrated" to Transylvania, and identified himself with the
program of "Erdelyi Fiatalok. Leading writers,- like Aron Tamasi,
also belonged to it. In October 1937, they convened a Youth
Parliament in Marosvasarhely (Tirgu Mures) which went down in
Hungarian intellectual history as the Vasarhelyi Talalkozo
(Encounter in Vasarhely). Aron Tamasi was elected chairman
and the formal discussions took place from 2 to 4 October 1937.
The encounter was attended mostly by representatives of the

----------------------------------------
(53) Balogh, Edgar, Het proba (Szepirodalmi Konyvkiado, Budapest),
1965, p. 195.

(54) Letter by Rezso Peery, Stuttgart, dated 17 July 1967, to
the writer of this paper.

[page 38]

younger generations of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania,
including workers. A worker delegate, Bela Jozsa, leading
member of the underground Communist Party in Transylvania,
was later arrested and allegedly tortured to death by
Hungarian military authorities.

Several other delegates, like Sandor Kacso, Gyarfas
Kurko, Istvan Nagy, Ferenc Szemler, and, of course, Edgar
Balogh (for a while imprisoned for "Titoism" in Rumania),
and Aron Tamasi played a prominent role after World War II
in Hungarian cultural life in Hungary or in Rumania.

The "Parliament" reviewed the state of affairs in the
immediate Hungarian-Rumanian, as well as in the larger
Danubian-East European setting. Its Manifesto (called "profession,"
"hitvallas") was drafted and read by Tamasi. It stressed the
unity with the workers' class, populism, the necessity of
Hungarian-Rumanian cooperation (because "it is our conviction
that a superior, common mission is waiting for the Hungarian
and Rumanian peoples in the Danubian basin!"). Finally, the
manifesto, which was also accepted by the delegates of the
Communist underground, pledged itself to "the spirit of
Christian morality and democracy."[55]

B. World War II and After

The Hungarian federation projects, born in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia or Rumania, remained, of course, sheer paper
work, nothing of them was ever implemented. They did fulfill,
however, an important mission: they influenced the Hungarian
intellectual world and created a public opinion sympathetic
to the idea of Danubian cooperation. When such projects were
aired in the international diplomacy during World War II,
they could count on a receptive audience, especially in
liberal, left-of-center and socialist circles in Hungary. In the
new era after the war, many of these people found themselves
in influential posts in Hungarian political life, in the
Foreign Ministry, in the diplomatic service, press, etc. With
their assistance, a Danubian cooperation plan was drawn up
to be used as the basis of the new Hungarian foreign policy.
According to Stephen D. Kertesz, now a professor of the Notre
Dame University, but then a high official of the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry, the Hungarian intentions were- revealed in
at least three official notes:

1) In a note addressed to the three major powers on 14
August 1945, the Hungarian peace aims were presented. They

----------------------------------------
(55) Full text in: Tamasi, Aron, Virrasztas (Revai, Budapest),
1943, pp. 304-311.

[page 39]
 
advocated:

a close economic cooperation among the
Danubian nations, and increased industrialization of
Hungary to be carried out in the course of
economic reconstruction in the Danubian region.
Moreover, it proposed the establishment of an
Inter Danubian cultural commission for the promotion of
friendly cooperation among the Danubian peoples.
As for the territorial settlement to be undertaken
by the peace conference, the Hungarian government
suggested that if boundaries lost their significance,
the ideal state of affairs would be in the process
of appearing. Failing this the process of
international cooperation would best be served if the
boundaries were determined in conformity with the
freely expressed wishes of the population concerned.
This would bring about the political stability
necessary for economic cooperation. Finally, the
note emphasized the necessity of providing for the
protection of the national minorities by means of
some international machinery of the United Nations.

Although ideas concerning political
integration of the Danubian nations were more or less

hidden between the lines, the Communist Party
subsequently objected to the general principles
expressed in the note. Rakosi pointed out that
projects for a full-fledged cooperation of the
Danubian nations were premature. These countries, he
argued, must first become truly democratic, and
afterwards, they would cooperate automatically.
Simultaneously with Communist objections, Pushkin
[the Soviet political adviser at Budapest (ed.)] presented
strong Soviet criticism,, The Western powers did
not react at all.

2) Another note, of 12 November 1945, dealt with the
problem of Danubian navigations

In this connection, the note suggested
numerous improvements in the Danubian Convention. The
second part of the note was devoted to the
Carpathian Basin Waterways and suggested a solution
which would have resulted in a development similar
to the T.V.A. This insisted on the maintenance of
the international character of the Danube. It
urged the revival and strengthening of international
control over the river with continued participation
of non-Riparian States in an effectively functioning
commission, and advocated freedom of navigation in
the Danubian Valley.

[page 40]

3) In a third note, of 1 February 1946, addressed also
to the three major powers, the problem of Danubian cooperation
was raised once again by the Hungarian government. Arguing
against an "isolated solution" of the Hungarian problem, the
note said:

A proper solution would rather consider the
common interests of all Danubian peoples in the
course of an institutional reorganization of the
Danubian Basin.

Geographic factors, the note went on, effects of intermarriage,
and especially the cooperation preceding the epoch of
exaggerated nationalism had produced forms of life which bore a
certain resemblance to each other.

...The small states are, in fact, separated
from each other only by difference of language and
an exaggerated and improper interpretation of their
historical tradition, and the chauvinist propaganda
to which the former gave rise. Large sections of
the population, above all the working classes, and
the peasants who struggle against the same social
evils, have no difficulty in understanding each
other. The first step toward the furthering of
mutual prosperity though peaceful cooperation
would be an honest and institutional attempt to
uproot the nationalism which, for the last century,
has been fostering the growth of differences.

As practical first steps, the note suggested 1) the
harmonization of questions of territory and nationality; 2) economic
and cultural cooperation, and 3) the elimination of all
factors of discord between the Danubian countries.

But the account of Kertesz closes with a note of
melancholy:  

[At the peace conference of Paris] Hungarian 
and other proposals for the reorganization of the
Danubian States on a cooperative basis were not
even considered. Some Western delegations thought
that all integrations in the Soviet sphere of
influence were undesirable, because these eventually
would serve Moscow's interests.[56]

----------------------------------------
(56) Kertesz, Stephen D., Diplomacy in a Whirlpool (University
of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind.), 1953. See esp.
pp. 171, 172, 177, 185. Emphasis added.
[page 41]

Perhaps the last organized attempt, before the Communist
take-over in Hungary, to discuss openly the possibilities of
a closer Danubian cooperation was the conference of the
Socialist Parties of the Danube Valley "and Poland," organized
by the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party. Although not an
exclusively Hungarian event, it should be mentioned here
because of the active Hungarian participation in it. The
conference took place in Budapest between 17 and 19 May 1947
with Socialist representatives from Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. It was preceded by a
preliminary discussion in Prague in December 1946. The
organizer of the Budapest meeting, Dr. Gyorgy Kemeny, then Secretary
of State, defined its purpose as being to find out how Hungary
and the neighboring countries could develop their economic
policy in accordance with each other. They discussed problems
like a unified financial and price policy and emphasized the
readiness of the Socialist Parties for a democratic
cooperation. But it was also pointed out that the participants had
no intention of creating a new "international"; they wanted
only a loose organization to clarify problems, exchange
information and define common actions. In this organization
each Socialist Party was supposed to delegate one political,
one cultural and one economic expert. The Socialists made
it also clear that the Danubian countries, in their view, fs
could not subsist without cooperation with the Soviet Union.[57]

IV. HUNGARIAN COMMUNISM AND FEDERALISM

In 1945-46, as has been described, the increasingly
aggressive Communist Party opposed the Hungarian Foreign Ministry's
endeavor to take up the subject of Danubian cooperation, and
the only alternative the Party could offer at that moment was
the notion that, with increasing democratization, the
differences between the Danubian nations would disappear and the
desired cooperation would then develop automatically. Thus,
there was no need for any organizational set-up. This stand

corresponded to the official Soviet attitude on the subject.
But as Party records show, some leading members of the
Hungarian Communist Party had held some other ideas on the subject,,
Personal inclinations, traditional influences, tactical
considerations, occasional realizations of the "Hungarian problem,"
the general mood of the population and, perhaps most important,
the example of the non-Communist left, forced the Communist
Party, or several of its top people in different phases of
development to present a variety of views and attitudes on the
subject of Danubian cooperation. These ideas were often very
diffuse and varied, their only common denominator being the

----------------------------------------
(57) "Dunavolgvi szocialdemokrata konferencia," Nepszava
(Budapest;, 7 May 1947; Deutsch, Julius, "Die
Organisierung des Donauraumes," Die Zukunft (Vienna), No. 6,
Mid-June 1947.

[page 42]

fact that the Party recognized the existence of the issue.
On the other hand, it is surprising if not startling, that
the Party, claiming to be a "Hungarian" organization, should
have so very little to say on this central question of
Hungarian existence. This was perhaps especially surprising
during the 1920's when there was still much Communist
freedom of discussion on similar subjects, and even the
Comintern was supporting federalism in the Balkans. For such
reasons, it will not be possible to do more than but to list
some of the seemingly characteristic Communist statements
pertinent to the Danubian subject.

A. For and Against Trianon

Bela Kun started as a "federalist." He was for the
establishment of a Central European "federation" which, in
his view, would solve the nationality problems of the former
Monarchy and, at the same time, would serve as a transitory
stage toward a world revolution.. After the collapse of the
Kun regime this federalist aspect of his experiment disappeared
and the Balkans became the scene of Communist federalist
endeavors. With the blessing of the Comintern, a Balkan
Communist Federation was set up in Sofia, under the leadership of
Dimitrov, without including Hungary. Later negotiations- were
conducted between Kun and the federation about the Hungarian
Party's joining, but Kun's condition was that the Federation
change its name into Danubian-Balkan, Hungary being a Danubian
rather than a Balkan country.[58]

Kun's proposal was not accepted; in the meantime Moscow
lost interest in the federation and the whole project faded
out. The Hungarian Party, with its leadership dispersed
abroad , and its very weak illegal organizations living a
miserable life in the underground at home partly adapted the
anti-Trianon slogans of the nationalists, with the addition
that only the proletariat would be able to lead this fight to
success and assemble all the Hungarians in one single state.
"The road toward squashing the Trianon Treaty...leads through
the class warfare against the Hungarian ruling classes...,"

said, for instance, the "action program" of the "Socialist
Workers' Party of Hungary" (Magyarorszagi Szocialista

----------------------------------------
(58) Information on Kun's attitude from Mr. Sandorn
Korosi-Krizsan, who was for several months a functionary of
the Balkan Communist Federation Bureau under Dimitrov.

[page 43]

Munkaspart), the front organization of the illegal Communist
Party of Hungary.[59] The same views were professed in the
early 193O's with emphasis on the international character
of the fight against Trianon:

...Yes, indeed, we Hungarian Communists fight
against Trianon, but the fight against Trianon is
only possible if we attack the united front of the
Hungarian, Rumanian, Czech, Yugoslav, and French
capitalists and if we overthrow the national and
international institutions of exploitation and
oppression. He who wants to tear Trianon to
pieces has to overthrow capitalism. Only Soviet
Hungary can unite into a single proletarian state
the Hungarian toilers with the fraternal help of
the successor states and of the proletariat of the
whole world.[60]

With the emergence of the Fascist-Nazi threat, the
Comintern began to change its lines it abandoned the hazy
federation projects in the Balkans and evoked defense of the
status quo and of national independence, as well as
cooperation not on a regional but on a popular front basis.
In the Hungarian case, the change coincided with the
disappearance of Bela Kun in Moscow, the reorganization of the
Party, and the new tensions created by the territorial shifts
in favor of Hungary beginning in 1939. Territorial changes
and new national tensions complicated Communist cooperation in
East Europe. Thus, at the beginning of World War II, the
Communist Party of Hungary was instructed by the Comintern to
advocate self-determination, including the right of separation,
for the Ukrainians, Rumanians, and Slovaks newly incorporated
and "nationally oppressed" in Hungary. In the Comintern's
view, this was the precondition of the common fight of
Hungarians and of the neighboring peoples against their ruling
circles, against capitalism, for a free and peaceful
cooperation in the solution of the nationality question in the

----------------------------------------
(59) This passage was, by the way, omitted from a 1955
publication of Party documents but was reinserted in a 1964
edition of the same documents. Compares 1) Balla
Aladarne, et. al. (ed.), Dokumentumok a magyar parttortenet
tamulmenyozasahoz, Vol. 3 (Szikra, Budapest), 1954 , p.
118 and 2) Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kozponti
Bizottsaganak Parttorteneti Intezete, Dokumentunok a
magyar forradalmi munkasmozgaiom tortenetebol, Vol. 1,
(Kossuth, Budapest) 1964,p. 254.

(60) Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kozponti Bizottsaganak
Parttorteneti Intezete, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp. 188-189.

[page 44]

Danubian Basin.[61]  Two years later, the "Reconstruction
Program for a Reborn Hungary" issued by the illegal Communist
Party contained a paragraph about Danubian and Balkan
cooperation. It should not be overlooked that this program
was prepared in Hungary by Gyula Kallai and Laszlo Rajk, two
home Communists,, Paragraph 16 of this document said:

As to foreign policy, the [Hungarian]
People's Republic wants to live in the closest
economic, social and cultural cooperation with the
Soviet Union and all the neighboring states. Its
aim is the realization of a single democratic
people's family of the peoples of the Danube Basin
and of the Balkan in harmony with the Soviet Union,
Meanwhile, we will settle the disputed territorial
questions, the designation of state borders by
peaceful means and on the basis of fullest respect
for and granting of nationality rights and of
reciprocity.[62]

This essentially home-made Communist program was
published on 2 October 1942 in the middle of the war when
Hungarian intellectual circles were busy studying various
Danubian projects, old and new, and clearly revealed an
inclination toward a regional solution. The new Party document
written by two people in close contact with these intellectual
circles in Budapest, was a cautious reaction to the
"federalist" atmosphere. Very soon, however, the Hungarian
preoccupation with Kossuth and federation began to disturb the
Communist Party or at least its leadership in Moscow. Kossuth
was completely acceptable to them as the leader of the
Hungarian Revolution and also as a later protagonist of Danubian
cooperation, but not of a cooperation based exclusively on
the solidarity of the small nations. Jozsef Revai, one of the
chief spokesmen of the Hungarian Communist Muscovite group,
expressed the Party worries of 1944 in the following words:

...In Hungary, Kossuth's Danubian
confederation plan has been selling well in the last years
and especially in the last months. But reviving
the idea of a Danubian confederation, they
arbitrarily misinterpret it as if it would correspond
to the wish-dreams and needs of the Hungarian
ruling classes. They concluded from it that the
Danubian valley belongs to the Danubian Peoples';

----------------------------------------
(61) Resolution of the CC of the Communist International
concerning the Situation in Hungary and the Tasks of the
Communist Party of Hungary, 5 September 1940. Published in
Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 232-242.

(62) Ibid. PP. 533-557.

[page 44]

that all great powers must be excluded from this
region. Under an anti-German surface an
anti-Soviet tendency is hiding.

The Danubian peoples must unite not only against
imperialist Germany, but also against the Soviet Union: it was
this reactionary foreign political concept they wanted to
sanction with the authority of Kossuth. It is mainly the
Hungarian democratic parties which have been trading with
this reactionary contraband, nor was there any reaction to
it from that wing of the Hungarian reaction which, realizing
the defeat of Hitlerite Germany, was striving to exchange
the practice of community of "faith" with German imperialism
for the theory of the "solidarity of the small nations".

What Revai had to say on Danubian federation in 1944 was
effectively implemented one or two years later when the
Communist Party of Hungary successfully sabotaged all Hungarian
efforts to establish closer ties with the Danubian neighbors.
Publicly, however, the Party was more "Danubian" than ever
before. It was in these immediate post-war years that
Czechoslovakia threatened to expell all Hungarians from the
country, when, on the contrary, Petru Groza offered closer
collaboration, and when, from the Yugoslav side, Tito made similar
approaches on a broader basis. The question was taken up by
Rakosi at the Third Party Congress on 19 September 1946. In
his report to the Congress, he said:

...The peoples living in the Danubian Valley
are dependent on each other and if we wish that the
Basin of the Danube should indeed belong to the
democratic Danubian peoples and not become the
fighting field of remote imperialists, then we have
to remove carefully all such obstacles which hinder
the democratic rallying of the peoples. But the
curtailment of the democratic rights of the
Hungarians remaining across the border would naturally
render more difficult the so much needed rallying
of the peoples dependent on each other.

Prime Minister Groza raised the idea of the
customs union of the Danubian peoples. We are
unconditional partisans of the friendly, democratic
coexistence of the Danubian peoples and we consider
a democratic Danubian federation not only possible,
but also desirable. (-Applause) Even in this field
we wish to continue the national Kossuth tradition.
After the catastrophe of the 1848-1849 revolution
Kossuth raised the question of the Danubian
confederation:.. The Danubian democratic states constituted
the basis of his concept. The realization of his
concept was precluded because most of the Danubian
peoples had not really been democratic until the

[page 45]

crushing of German fascism. Now, however, the
precondition is available and opens the
possibility that the alliance of the Danubian peoples
be realized. The realization of such a
democratic alliance, in this connection the reducing
of the custom barriers, naturally could ease
considerably the bitterness our people perceive now
in connection with the peace in preparation."[63]

The statement found only a faint and distorted echo in
the resolution of the same congress which, in its section on
foreign policy, urged Hungary to enter sincerely and
resolutely the road of political and economic cooperation with the
peoples of the Danube Valley, first among them with the
Soviet Union.[64]

This program was slightly modified two years later in
the declaration published by the Communist Party after its
merger with the Socialists. The "Danubian" adjective was
dropped and Czechoslovakia separated from the other peoples
democracies. The basis of all Hungarian foreign policy, this
document said, consisted in the alliance with the Soviet Union;
in close cooperation and friendship with the peoples
democracies: with Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, and Bulgaria; in
agreement and cooperation with the popular democratic
Czechoslovakia on the basis of the settlement of the situation of
the Hungarians in Slovakia corresponding to the principles of
the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy.[65]

B. The Concept of Imre Nagy

With this statement of 1948, the question of closer
cooperation among the Danubian states, even if under the
watchful control of the Soviet Union, disappeared from official

Hungarian life, from official Party statements, for several
years to come. There was, however, a Communist who as an
individual, continued to profess relatively bold views on
Danubian coexistence and cooperation. This was Imre Nagy.    

Nagy was deeply influenced by Kossuth's ideas and tried
to interpret them as faithfully as his Communist indoctrination

----------------------------------------
(63) Rakosi, Matyas, Valogatott beszedek es cikkek (Szikra,
Budapest) 1955, pp. 95-96.

(64) Manifesto and resolution of the Third Congress of the
Hungarian Communist Party, in: A Magyar Szocialista
Munkaspart Parttorteneti Intezete, A magyar munkasmozgalom
(Kossuth, Budapest ) 1960-1961, p. 254.

(65) Ibid., p. 334.

[page 46]

and the political reality allowed him to. In an article
which appeared in the Hungarian economic journal Kozgazdasag,
and which dealt with agricultural problems in the Danubian
Valley, Nagy came to the conclusion that more or less all
the Danubian countries faced similar agricultural problems.
Because of their geographical proximity, these countries were
also dependent on each other, thus their close economic
cooperation, mainly in agricultural production and marketing,
was not only potentially useful but necessary. Alone, they could
hardly hold their ground in competition with the more
developed Western agriculture.

Referring to regional cooperation, Nagy wrote:

...The idea is not new. In the plans of
Danubian confederation of Kossuth, the outline of a
Danubian cooperation was already unfolded, in
conformity with the then existing conditions. The
plan, however, remained a plan, because the
preconditions for its realization were missing. But
these preconditions do exist today. The triumph
of the People's Democracies, the leading role of
the working class in the directing of the economic
and political life of the countries along the
Danube, renders possible the first step towards the
realization of this concept. ...The theoretical
and practical elaboration of a closer cooperation
of the Danubian countries in agriculture would be
the task of a future agricultural scientific
Institute of the Danubian Valley. I had this in mind
when, in summer 1945, as Minister of Agriculture,
I started to work out the plans for such an
Institute. For different reasons it could not be carried
out at that time. Yet such a scientific institute
is necessary. But it can work successfully only
if we create the preconditions of its independent
and truly scientific work.

Nagy closed his article by expressing conviction that such an
Hungarian initiative would find the necessary support in the
neighboring countries.[66]

Years later, this kind of article by Nagy was held :
against him as evidence of his incipient treachery. He was
blamed for speaking about a Danubian confederation in 1947,
only two years after the liberation, without mentioning the
Soviet Union. He was also criticized for suggesting a

-----------------------------
(66) Nagy, Imre, "Dunavolgyi agrarproblemak," Kozgazdasag
(Budapest), 30 March 1 947, reprinted in: Nagy, Imre, Egy
evtized, Vol. 1 (Szikra 'Budapest), 1954, pp. 367-371.

[page 47]

confederation consisting of the small People's Democracies
without the participation of the Soviet Union, and, in
general, for the view that they could maintain their
economic independence only when such a confederation would be
organized.[67]

Nagy's was the clearest formulation ever made by a
leading Hungarian Communist about Danubian cooperation. Not
even his later writings on Communism or, for that matter,
his public role in the Revolution of 1956 would go beyond
these lines put on paper in 1947. He did return several
times to the issue, and he did so especially in his
"dissertation" written in the summer of 1955° Reviewing past
Hungarian history, he felt that "the ruling classes in Hungary
did not follow the ideals of Kossuth in the sphere of
international relations" and the realization of his ideals had
been left to the Communists. He urged the establishment of
"an independent Hungarian foreign policy," and the taking of
a clear stand "in regard to various important international
problems."[68]

But the policy pursued by the Hungarian Communists under
Rakosi led to the deterioration of relations with
Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Nagy, as he later
disclosed, made personal steps to reestablish friendly
relationships with the neighboring People's Democracies. He felt
that during his premiership (1953-1955) relations with
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic improved
substantially, On relations with the Danubian countries he tells
the following:

I personally took the first steps to
reestablish the friendly relations that we had formerly
had with the Rumanian People's Republic, which were
of mutual advantage... 	In personal conversations
with Comrade Gheorghiu Dej and later in my letter,
I made suggestions for the liquidation of this
unfortunate situation,, There were also substantial
initial steps in the area of repairing our relations
with Yugoslavia, liquidating the serious errors
of the past and renewing our previous friendly
relations. I had a part in these, and this was
recognized in responsible Yugoslav circles.[69]

----------------------------------------
(67) See Kassai, Geza, Magyar tortenelmi sorsfordulok es a
nemzetisegi kerdes Kossuth, Budapest),1959, p. 53.

(68) Nagy, Imre, On Communism (Frederick A. Praeger, New York),
1957, p. 35.

(69)Ibid., pp. 238-239.

[page 48]

With Rakosi's return to power, however, the situation
deteriorated once again:

...A peculiar People's Democratic
provincialism, an intensified estrangement in those efforts,
that are raising a veritable Chinese Wall, not

only between our homeland and the Western
capitalist countries but between the Hungarian People's
Democracy and other countries in the democratic
and socialist camp, is now developing. We have
come to the point where Party members, even
members of the Central Committee, cannot obtain the
newspapers of sister Parties the statements of
Party and state leaders of the Poeple's
Democratic countries; the speeches or articles of Comrade
Bierut or Siroky; or the resolutions of sister 
parties. The same applies to numerous
manifestations in culture, art and literature, to the
debates in People's Democratic countries, to the
exchange of ideas, etc. Indeed, we have come to
such a point that members of the Central Committee
cannot even obtain certain publications of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, for
example, the agricultural resolution of the Central
Committee of the Polish Party is banned in Hungary,
and so is the evaluation of this resolution by the
official paper of the Party, Trybuna Ludu, and so
is a study concerning relationships of Polish and
Western literature and art, etc. In numerous
areas of Hungarian economic, political and
cultural life there is a hermetic seal isolating the
problems that friendly countries share in the same
areas; this indicates a fear of criticism, and at
the same time--and this is more serious--it furthers
the intensification of nationalism and of attitudes
opposed to the teachings of Lenin on the subject
of proletarian internationalism.[70]

Basically, Nagy wanted to combine Kossuth's Danubian
solidarity spirit with a true internationalism, and it was a
confederation of the free and equal Danubian peoples he would
have liked to see realized. This specific Danubian theme did
not, however, form part of his statements during the revolution,
nor did it form a clear part of any program of the
revolutionary government (the speed of events and the existing danger
were probably the two factors precluding it). The official
government program was neutral status for Hungary, but the
Danubian theme cropped up unofficially at meetings, in radio

----------------------------------------
(70) Ibid., p. 240.

[page 49]

programs and newspaper articles. For example, the student
parliament of the middle schools in Miskolc, in its session
of 26 October 1956, formulated a program, the eighth point
of which said: "Our homeland should become a member of the
Danubian federation as projected by Kossuth."[71]

A few days later, on October 30, 1956, the following
statement was broadcast by the radio station of the workers'
councils of the County Borsod and Szabolcs-Szatmar (most
probably a reply to a broadcast from Banska Bystrica, CSR):

We would like to say a few words about
Danubian confederation. In its demands, the student
parliament of Miskolc suggested that, after the
consolidation of the situation, the Hungarian
government should start negotiations with the
neighboring countries about a Danubian
confederation. We have learned that the Slovak and
Rumanian nations attribute an irredentist and
revisionist character to our proposal. We must point out
once more that the aim of our proposal is the
union of small countries along the Danube, to
enable them to save their independence. At present
such a union is not timely. Yet, if we examine
the question from the point of view of the future,
at a certain stage of their development a union
among the countries in the Danubian Basin can be
effected, provided that spontaneity and economic
and cultural interests are taken into consideration.
We emphasize that the creation of a Danube
confederation was not the chief demand of the student
parliament of Miskolc. Yet, certain circles which
to put an end to the friendship of the Hungarian
people with the neighboring fraternal nations. We
firmly reject the slander that we are nationalists.
We wish to establish equality of rights and the
friendship of truly sincere nations. We do not
wish to change the present frontiers of Hungary 
and condemn the revision of Hungarian frontiers.[72]

The same views had been expressed by the National
Revolutionary Council of County Veszprems

The Hungarian government, it said, should pay
more attention to the fate and situation of
Hungarians living beyond our frontiers as well as to our

----------------------------------------
(71) "A magyar forradalom a hazai radioadasok tukreben," Free
Europe Press (New York)1957, p. 240

(72) As quoted by RFE Research, "An Alternative Foreign Policy
for Hungary?" 29 March 1966, p. 8.

[page 50]

relations with them. The foreign affairs
committee of Parliament should propose the
re-examination of the Warsaw Pact and should raise the idea
of a Danubian confederation.[73]

Finally, a revolutionary daily paper, Magyar Szabadsag,
urging neutrality for Hungary, went on to say:

Friendship and the joining of forces with the
neighboring small nations should form the most
important basic pillar of our independent foreign
policy. Our dependence has prevented us from
joining forces with the neighboring countries,
although it was already Kossuth's idea that the
nations of the Danubian Basin should form a close
alliance. From now one, in conformity with the
glorious heritage of Lajos Kossuth and Mihaly
Karolyi, Hungary has to strive for the
establishment of a confederation of the peoples in the
Danube Basin. This is the most specific demand
of our national foreign policy, because the small
nations living in this part of the world can only
retain a lasting independence and can only
influence the workers all .over the world if they join
forces.[74]

It should not be forgotten, however, that at least one
leading figure among the revolutionaries, Istvan Bibo, had
never demonstrated much enthusiasm for the federalist idea.
It was public knowledge in intellectual circles that "his
aversion for the supra-national Habsburg state made him
suspicious of any supra-national federation of states."[75]

In Bibo' s viesw the only correct approach to the problem
of federation should be to settle first all the outstanding
problems among the nations interested, primarily border
problems. Such a stabilization of the situation would be one of
the most important preconditions of the federation. But a
development in reverse, creating a federation with the hope
that this would solve the problems, would submerge the whole
area in a state of desperate insecurity as was the case
with the Habsburg Monarchy. "Federation is like marriage:
one should not enter it with unsettled problems..."[76]

----------------------------------------
(73) Veszprem Megyei Nepujsag, 30 October 1956.

(74) Magyar Szabadsag, 1 November 1956.

(75) Revai, Andras, "Bibo Istvan politikai filozofiaja,"
Part II, Uj Latohatar (Munich), November-December 1960.

(76) Bibo, Istvan, "A keleteuropai allamok nyomorusaga,"
reprinted in: Bibo, Istvan, Harmadik ut (Magvar Konvves Ceh.
London )1960, p. 154.


[page 51]

But, as can be seen, even Bibo did not preclude the
later possibility of federation, and he certainly did not
do anything in the revolution which would have pointed,
to the contrary. The popular feeling seemed to be
increasingly in favor of a federal solution for the Danube
Valley, and, Judging by his previous statements and writings,
there could be no doubt where Nagy stood on this issue.
It was perhaps the first instance in the checkered history
of Hungarian federalism that some Communist and non-Communist
views on Danubian cooperation found themselves genuinely
close together.

C. 1956-1964: From Socialist Solidarity to Danubian
Community

After the defeat of the Hungarian revolution of 1956,
one of the first concerns of the victorious Communist regime
was to reintegrate Hungary to "the family of the Socialist
states." There was nothing Danubian about this effort. It
was an artificial stimulation of "socialist solidarity" for
Hungary. But it tied in very nicely with the new Soviet
policy of strengthening socialist internationalism as the
ideological and emotional basis of the Comecon integration
process. At the same time, the Hungarian regime began trying
to develop a new image of Communism in Hungary. Bela Kun,
discarded by Rakosi, was rehabilitated and the Party
historians concentrated on the study of 1919. The revolution of
Bela Kun was presented now as a common undertaking of
Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, etc. to build a proletarian
homeland in Central Europe. Fragments of the great socialist
heritage, "wickedly neglected" by the previous regime, were
now discovered in many sectors of Hungarian life. The
impressive list of Hungarian progressive artists and writers
featuring names like Endre Ady, Attila Jozsef, Lajos Kassak,
Miklos Radnoti, Gyula Illyes, etc. was added to by including
names of old and obscure Party journalists, exiled agitators
and quite apolitical painters. But the search for a new
ancestry did not stop at the Hungarian borders. It gradually
included the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring
countries, adding their "socialist traditions" to the common
Hungarian heritage. This offered also a new way to the
solution of the Hungarian minority problem: the Hungarian
minorities as groups with strong socialist traditions should be
accepted as equal members of the socialist family, and play
the role of bridge between socialist Hungary and the
neighboring socialist peoples. Simultaneously, the study of historic
relations between Hungary and her neighbors was intensified
trying to demonstrate Hungary's traditional interest in their
fate, on the one hand, and the "progressive character" of such
contacts, on the other. Parallel with this overall effort,
the Kadar regime opened a propaganda campaign against all
those ideological forces which, in the official view, had
caused the revolution, and could obstruct the new spirit of
socialist internationalism. Party resolutions and extensive

[page 52]

Party theses began to be published on nationalism, populism,
"third road" ideologies, and the regime encouraged public
discussions on these issues along the lines developed in
official documents.

Socialist internationalism as conceived by the Party
could not arouse public interest and mobilize popular
support. But it did focus attention on problems like good
neighborly relations, Hungarian contacts with the peoples
in South East Europe, Danubian cooperation, the situation
of the Hungarian minorities, economic integration, Hungary's
role between East and West, etc. The developing Western
contacts, common undertakings to discuss problems of-common
interest (like the fate of the Monarchy, role of nationalism,
modern integration processes) could not but intensify the
new trend in Hungary. This trend produced an impressive
number of books, studies, articles dealing with the many
aspects of the Danubian past and present,, Only a very small
fraction of them should be dismissed as vulgar Party
propaganda; a much greater part, even if paying lip service to
socialist internationalism, always had something specific
to say. Generally speaking, these fall into four categories:

a)Historical studies, concentrating mainly on the
Habsbuig Monarchy and Hungary's relations with" the neighboring
peoples;

b) Literary essays analyzing the different forms of
literary ties between Hungary and the Danubian region.

c) Writings on the Hungarian minority groups, their
socialist traditions and bridge-building role between Hungary
and her neighbors:

d) Books, articles rewriting Hungarian Party history
with a new accent on Danubian socialist solidarity and
cooperation.

Most of the authors of these new studies had been in the
"Danubian business" for many years, either as leftist
protagonists of the concept of cooperation during the Horthy
regime in Hungary, or working for the same ideals as members
of the Hungarian minority groups in the neighboring countries.
Many leading intellectuals from the minority groups moved to
Hungary after World War II, and because of their experience
and ability (including knowledge of languages) have worked
themselves up into important positions in the academic and
cultural life of the "mother country." They became especially
active in the field of comparative literary history, published
scholarly works on bilateral historic contacts, and helped
to discover Hungarian socialist traditions in Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Sarlo was one of those "progressive
traditions" brought back by them from oblivion. It is not
without interest that Pal Ilku, the Hungarian Minister of

[page 53]

Culture and a candidate member of the Party Politburo, as
a young student in Czechoslovakia, had been an active
collaborator of the Sarlo. It was Edgar Balogh who had
"discovered" him.

The publication of the many books and writings on
Danubian cooperation was accompanied by growing Hungarian
participation in study meetings, conferences, congresses. The
regime favored such gatherings, first, because they offered
some solutions to concrete problems of the day, and,
secondly, because they helped to establish the international
prestige of the Kadar regime. As far as the intellectual
communities are concerned, their first and foremost wish
was to break out from post-revolutionary isolation, and to
discuss common tasks with their equals in the neighboring
countries. They renewed many old ties, made new friends
but, here and there, also enemies. Meanwhile, they realized
the many common questions and the need for a stable solution.

The official policy of the Kadar regime, however, and
its bilateral relations with other states in this period
certainly did not contain or reflect any "specific Danubian
characteristics. The regime stood on the basis of "socialist
solidarity" as far as relations with the socialist world
were concerned and referred to- peaceful coexistence when
talking about contacts to Austria, But for quite some time,
Hungary's immediate neighbors viewed anything coming out of
Budapest with some suspicion. Their reasons for doing this
were varied. The regimes of Czechoslovakia and- Rumania,
with Hungarian minorities deeply perturbed by the events of
1956, were especially careful about establishing new relations

with Hungary. The forced integration process within the
Comecon created new tensions in the
Hungarian-Czechoslovak-Rumanian triangle. After a while, a slow improvement in
Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations was noticeable, but relations
with Rumania, if anything, began to worsen. Thus, the Kadar

regime felt it could cope with such external difficult
ties and the enormous difficulties it faced at home only in
close collaboration with its protector, the Soviet Union.
The steady emergence of the new Rumanian line of relative
independence thus found Hungary in the rather embarrassing role
of being one of the most fervent supporters of Soviet policy,
a fact which, in itself, was bound to estrange her from
Rumaniao Moreover, the Transylvanian question only increased
the tension and added a particular bitterness to it. The
case of Yugoslavia was different. "Titoism's" role in the
Revolution of 1956 and the execution of Imre Nagy in 1958
made the beginnings extremely difficult. Prom 1959 on,
however, a steady improvement was noticeable, but even as late
as 1961 sharp ideological arguments were being exchanged
between Budapest and Belgrade.

[page 54]

D. Austria Enters the Scene

Relations with Austria deserve special attention. The
only capitalist and immediate Western neighbor of Hungary,
she regained her independence in 1955 and it was from this
date that the gradual reconstruction of Austro-Hungarian relations
began. The first attempts toward this took place in the
summer of 1956, right before the outbreak of the revolution.
The revolution itself was followed by a two year crisis in
Austro-Hungarian relations. Austria, who had opened her
frontiers to the Hungarian refugees, was accused by the Kadar
regime of interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary,
of supporting "fascist counter-revolutionaries" to overthrow
the Hungarian People's Republic, etc.

The turning-point came, however, in September-1959 with
the appointment of a new Hungarian minister to Vienna who
arrived there with a four-point program aiming at a) general
improvement of the relations, b) invitations of Austrian
personalities to Hungary, c) development of economic contacts,
and d) animation of cultural cooperation.77 Traffic between
Austria and Hungary suddenly increased: factory workers paid
visits to each other, Austrian trade union delegations
traveled to Hungary and Hungarian delegations returned the
Austrian visits, and sports' contacts also developed. In the
meantime, Kadar and the then Premier, Ferenc Munnich, repeatedly
expressed their wish to establish normal contacts with
Austria. But there were still many difficulties. From time to
time incidents at the Iron Curtain between Austria and
Hungary resulted in bitter Austrian commentaries against the
Hungarian regime and equally bitter ripostes in which Austria
was often presented as a country on the verge of social and
economic collapse,, Austria's wish to become associated with
the Common Market was the subject of particularly harsh
commentaries in which the Budapest regime evinced great
concern about the need to protect Austria's neutral status.
Common Market membership was identified with a "sell-out to
Bonn capitalists," and as the only sound alternative, the
expansion of Eastern contacts was suggested. A typical
Hungarian commentary on this subject stated:

It is incontestable that the insubordination of
Austrian economic life to the Bonn state is by no
means the only solution of the country's economic
problems. The other possibility, which presents
itself is the expansion of the foreign trade
conducted with the countries of the socialist bloc.
These countries, already today, receive 15 percent
of Austria's exports. Austrian heavy industry, which

----------------------------------------
(77) Neue Zeit (Graz), 6 September 1959.

[page 55]

is predominantly state property, sells 27 percent
of its exports in the socialist countries. In
the case of the chemical and textile yarn
industry this percentage is 32 and 36, respectively,
and the tempestuously developing [Socialist]
industry is ready to increase the cooperation..
Yet, -Austrian leading circles dismiss this
solution because their class interests bind them
tightly to the West German bourgeoisie.[78]

Another question which greatly disturbed the Hungarian
Communist press was the Habsburg issue. The official Party
organ, for instance, felt that the reappearance of the
Habsburgs in Austria would closely affect Hungary, too.[79] Some
provincial papers even spoke of a direct threat to Hungary.
Since Otto Habsburg cannot claim openly his Hungarian throne,
wrote Tolna Megyei Nepujsag, he chose the indirect way via
Austria. Prom here, it would be only one step to the royal
throne in Hungary, and the next turn would be raising of the
Hungarian territorial claims... [80]

But while this press campaign was still going on, a
qualitative and quantitative' change took place in
Austro-Hungarian relations on the practical level. With 1962. the
number of contacts sharply increased, in 1963 and 1964 it
expanded markedly in all sectors of life... Hungarian
university professors, representing a varied field of expertise,
writers, and artists traveled to Austria to give lectures,
attend conferences, exchange ideas; Austrians traveled with
the same mission to Hungary. One of the first Hungarians to
show up in Vienna, heralding a change in East-West contacts,
was Tibor Dery. His appearance there induced a German
correspondent to the following commentary:

Beginning with the summer of 1963, seven years
after the October uprising, after the year zero
of the newest Hungarian time reckoning, finally
things are taking a different turn here: the arts,
on a journey of visit between Hungary and Austria,
have again been granted safe conduct. It all began
with the Vienna visit of the writer Tibor Dery... [81]

----------------------------------------
(78) Vozari, Dezso, "Ausztria valaszuton," Nepszava, 22 March
1963.

(79) C. Toth, Bela, "A Habsburg-ugy," Nepszabadsag, 5 June 1963.

(80) "A magyarok es a Habsburg-ugy," Tolna Megyei Nepujsag, 14 July
1963.81) Grieser, Dietmar, "Mit ungarischem Akzent," Frankfurter
Rundschau, 26 August 1963.

(81) Grieser, Dietmar, “Mit ungarischem Akzent,” Frankfurter
Rundschau, 26 August 1963.

[page 56]

Especially lively contacts--one might say mass
contacts--developed in the musical and theatrical field, both
professional and non-professional, in the exchange visit of
folklore, trade union and youth organization groups, and different
semi-official delegations, not to speak of a huge increase
in regular tourism.

In the same period of time, important official visits
were being exchanged between the two countries. On 17 May
1963, Austrian Socialist party leader and Vice Chancellor
Bruno Pitterman, director of the nationalized industries,
arrived for a one-day visit to the Budapest Pair. Returning
to Vienna, he declared in Parliament that Austria's Eastern
neighbors were traditional partners in her economic life.
Six days later, on 23 May 1963, it was Fritz Bock, Austrian
Minister of Trade, who toured the Budapest Fair. Next year,
in April 1964, a group of 25 Austrian industrialists,
representing private as well as state-owned industries, traveled
to Hungary. Speaking of their experiences, they pointed to
the barter system used by Hungary (as well as all the Eastern
European states) as a "major obstacle in the mutual exchange
of goods between the two countries." This created the
"unusual problem of being offered deliveries of Hungarian paint
for Austrian industries instead of hard currency as according to
the original contract," But they reported that an easing of
the barter system had been promised. Though Austrian
industries could not grant the Hungarians "cheap long-term credits
according to West European standards," Hungarian
representatives were willing to accept even Austrian short-term credits
at 7 percent interest.[82]

The first important Hungarian visitor to Austria was
Deputy Prime Minister Jeno Fock (to become Premier in 1967)
who arrived there at the end of July 1964. After conferring
with President Schaerf, Chancellor Klaus and Foreign Minister
Kreisky, Fock traveled in the company of Pittermann to Linz
to the VOEST combine and then both attended the opening of
the Salzburg Festivals. At the VOEST, Director-General Koller
spoke of the Danube's role in binding both peoples and
economies and expressed his hope for a further improvement of
Austro-Hungarian economic contacts, despite "different
political opinion and different social structures of both countries."
To this Pittermann added: "In spite of the different
Weltan chauLins and social systems, we, Austrians, while in
Hungary we never feel abroad but in the neighbor's orchard."

Fock, in his public speeches in Austria,was much more
restrained and practically limited himself to the statement
that he hoped for VOEST participation in the expansion of the
Hungarian steel combinate in Dunaujvaros and was looking

----------------------------------------
(82) RFE Special, Vienna, 28 April 1964

[page 57]

forward to a deepening of "mutual relations between the two
countries." But in a statement later to Nepszabadsag, he
was more forthcoming. He did not go to Austria, he said, to
conduct concrete economic negotiations, but to get acquainted
with that part of the Austrian industry with which
Hungary-intended to extend its economic contacts:

Our fundamentals are similar in many ways:
two small, neighboring central European countries,
the economy of which--relying on the traditional
contacts--can complement each other in many fields.
Beyond trade in the strict sense of the word both
parties see [new possibilities], e.g., in technical
cooperation, which is so far fulfilling our hopes,
as well as in the mutual exchange of manufacturing
procedures, technical-scientific exchange, etc.[83]

The next visitor was again an Austrian. Dr. Heinrich
Drimmel, Deputy Mayor of Vienna, a leading member of the
People's Party (Christian) and a former Minister of Education
went to Budapest in September 1964. Making contacts of a
cultural nature, he mainly emphasized Austria's role as a
bridge between East and West. In an interview to Radio
Budapest , he declared: 


Austria lies in the geographical center of
Europe where also the cultures of many nations
meet. A people, a country which lives on this
spot, cannot isolate itself in an ivory tower but
it is its natural duty to play the role of the
mediator.[84]

Answering questions about how to expand cultural contacts
between Austria and Hungary, Drimmel mentioned, as the first
condition, that the people, especially the youth, get to know
one another. The second condition was coexistence:

We have to live side by side. This is our
fate; we cannot choose other neighbors for
ourselves...and we have to be very good neighbors...
and we have to draw into our existence others, too.
Such is true coexistence. We are committed to this
[role] by the traditions of the past as well as by
the tasks of the present.[85]

----------------------------------------
(83) For Pock's statement, see: Nepszabadsag, 29 July 1964.
On the visit: Radio Budapest, 24 July 1964; Nepszabadsag
25 July 1964; RFE Special, Vienna, 24 and 28 July 1964.

(84) Radio Budapest, 21 September 1964.

(85) Ibid.

[page 58]

These various visits mentioned above set the stage for
Dr. Bruno Kreisky's trip to Hungary. As the head of a 14
member delegation, the Austrian Foreign Minister visited
Hungary between October 29 and 1 November 1964. His visit
closed the first phase of Austro-Hungarian contacts and
opened a new chapter in the relationship of the two Danubian
countries. Kreisky was the first Western foreign minister
to pay a visit to socialist Hungary and since his trip to
Budapest took place shortly after the fall of Khrushchev, he
was also the first Western politician to talk to Kadar after
the dramatic events in Moscow. The Hungarian Communist
leader had a one and a half hour long conference with Kreisky
who commented afterwards., "Premier Kadar talked with great
frankness." Kreisky also said that the Austrian delegation
would return home "in the firm conviction that Hungary,
regardless of foreign political developments, will keep to its
present policies."[86] This was a clear allusion to the
changes in Soviet political leadership.

In addition to meeting leading Hungarian officials,
Kreisky delivered a lecture for the Hungarian group of the
Interparliamentary Union, gave a press conference and signed
several documents. In concrete terms, the visit resulted
in four treaties:

a) A compensation treaty according to which Hungary was
to pay 87.5 million Schillings to Austria for the confiscated
property of Austrian nationals.

b) An agreement covering the clear marking of the
Austro-Hungarian border.

c) An agreement on the establishment of a joint border
commission to investigate any further border incidents.

d) Agreement to raise Legations to Embassies.

Kreisky considered the compensation treaty especially
significant, a kind of ideological break-through, since as
he said, "until recently Communist governments have been very
negative concerning questions of damage or material
compensation for confiscated property."[87]

Kreisky considered the discussion of border problems
equally significant. "Making the state border visible is a
matter of the normalization of our relations," he said,

----------------------------------------
(86) Kreisky's press conference in Budapest, 31 October 1964,
as reported by RFE Special (Vienna), of the same day

(87) Kreisky's telecast report from Budapest 30 October 1964,
as reported by RFE Special (Vienna), 31 October 1964.

[59]

expressing hope that the very existence of a joint border
commission would practically stop untoward incidents.[88]
But Kreisky also ha,d to quote Kadar who told him in the
course of the discussion on the Iron Curtain: "Where
prestige entere the scene, a solution is much harder to find...."[89]
Summing up the Budapest talks of Kreisky, the Austrian
Socialist daily, Arbeiterzeitung, commented:

The most important result of the visit...is
considered the complete probability of a little
by little removal of the so-called technical
border blocs, i.e., the Iron Curtain, and this
exactly eight years to the day after the Hungarian
people's revolution in October 1956.[90]

During the same visit, State Secretary Carl H. Bobleter,
a member of the Austrian delegation, saw Archbishop Hamvas
and predicted another visit by Cardinal Koenig to Cardinal
Mindszenty. He also conducted negotiations with Budapest
Mayor Istvan Siklos on the building of an Austrian cultural
center "to balance the recent opening in Vienna of a Hungarian
cultural center."[91]

Finally, much time was devoted in the Budapest talks to
economic problems. Pittermann described these as very useful.
Austria, he said, had been trying to make commercial
arrangements with Hungary for a long time, as far back as 1962.
Pitterman was hoping to increase contacts between Hungary
and Austria's nationalized industries for the construction in
Austria of machines under Hungarian licensing for delivery to
third countries as well as for direct delivery to Hungary.
But the head of Austria's state owned industry was pessimistic
about developing any sharp increase in Austrian exports either
to the East or West: "The West was offering (to the East)
four and one half percent interest credits of 15 and 20 years,
while Austrian firms were asking for six percent for only
5 years credit."[92] The same difficulties had been voiced by

------------------------------
(88) Ibid. The border commission, consisting of four Hungarians
and four Austrians, meets twice in a. year: in Budapest in
the spring, and in Vienna in the fall.

(89) Kreisky's Dress conference in Budapest, 31 October 1964.

(90) Arbeiterzeitung (Vienna), 1 November 1964.

(91) Kreisky's Dress conference in Budapest, 31 October 1964.
The Hungarian regime built a new home for Collegium
Hungaricum in Vienna which was completed in November 1963, and has
been used since as a Hungarian cultural center.

(92)Pittermann's press conference, 12 November 1964, as reported
by RFE bDecial (Vienna) of the same day.

[page 60]

other sources, too. The New York Times, for instance,
reported that officials believed that it would be hard to
expand this trade much beyond the $70 million attained in
1963.[93]

The most important result of the Kreisky visit was not
in any concrete arrangements but the fact that it
demonstrated a real rapprochement between these two Danubian
countries and signaled the development of a new
psychological climate in the Danubian valley.

The closing communique emphasized that the relations
between Austria and Hungary were now developing favorably,
not-withstanding the difference of the political systems. This
would bring about not only the normalization of
Austro-Hungarian relations in general but would also be a
contribution to peace and to constructive cooperation in Central
Europe. Foreign Minister Kreisky came to the conclusion that
Budapest had demonstrated the "renaissance of the concept of
Central Europe" and that:

...the Hungarian side has shown great interest
in the development of Austro-Hungarian relations and
...one has received the impression that the
Hungarians are giving this relationship great political
importance—-chiefly for the stabilization of
peaceful relations in Central Europe.[94]

Many newspapers concurred. "Happily," said The New York
Times, Hungarians now look on Austrians as equal partners and
the geographic and sentimental ties that bind the two Danubian
countries are resuming their proper proportions."[95] The
correspondent of a leading Austrian paper, Paul Lendvai, who
accompanied Kreisky to Budapest, saw much more in this
development than just the resuming of sentimental contacts. He wrote:

The Hungarian government wants to play a more
active role, than so far, in Central Europe and is
striving not only for the normalization of the
contacts, but also for embarking upon a more friendly
and constructive cooperation with her only Western
neighbor. This is the unequivocal impression of
political observers [after the Kreisky visit].[96]

----------------------------
(93) The New York Times, 30 October 1964.

(94) Kreisky's telecast report from Budapest, 10 October 1964, as
reported by RFE special, Vienna 31 October 1964.

(95) The New York Times, 30 October 1964.

(96) Die Presse, 9 November 1964.

[page 61]

His impressions were borne out by official Hungarian
comment on the visit. The Party daily Nepszabadsag stated;

We do not consider [this visit] a climax. We
consider it rather a very useful, unquestionably
successful stage which...will be followed by further
successful visits and agreements corresponding to
the interests of both countries and to the wishes
of both nations in the interest of even closer
relations.

The Austrian neutrality...is a fact which
corresponds to the interests of the Austrian people
and renders it possible that the development of
Austro-Hungarian relations contribute to the
strengthening of peace and to the multilaterally
useful cooperation in Central Europe.[97]

One month after Kreisky's visit to Budapest, a group of
seven Hungarian journalists left for Austria on the invitation
of the Chancellor's press office,, They were received by
Chancellor Klaus and Kreisky, and had talks with members of
the Austrian parliament as well as with the directors of the
Viennese newspapers. The conversations concentrated on
Austria's neutrality, and how it would be affected by a potential
association with the Common Market, and on political and
economic aspects of a closer cooperation with Hungary. The
journalists' visit resulted in surprisingly favorable Hungarian
reports. The profile of a hopelessly sick, dissatisfied
Austria disappeared. So also did the danger of Habsburg
restoration and of an economic sell-out to West German imperialism.
The Hungarian visitors conceded that, instead of working for
the reconstruction of the past, Austria had now chosen the
new mission of becoming the meeting place of peoples, an
international cultural center to promote friendship between the
nations. [98]

The Hungarian journalists also came to the conclusion
that the Austrian leadership had no intention of giving up
its neutrality but serious economic considerations were
forcing it to look toward an association with the Common Market.
The Hungarians recognized that serious efforts were being
made to counterbalance such a possible step by strengthening
relations with East Europe, and especially with Hungary:

...the improvement of the Hungarian-Austrian
relationship is at least as much in the interest of

-----------------------------
(97) "Sikeres latogatas," Nepszabadsag, 3 November 1964.
Emphasis added.

(98) Petho, Tibor, "A csaszarvaros uj hivatasa," Magyar Nemzet,
23 December 1964. Petho is one of the most prominent
Hungarian publicists in the cause of Danubian cooperation.
[page 62]

Austria as it is of Hungary, and as far as this
is concerned, we met sincere endeavors. The
great problem is, however, how to realize the
association with the simultaneous improvement
of the relationship to the Eastern countries.[99]

Even the Party daily, Nepszabadsag retracted from its
former rigidity and began recognizing that Austria was
sincerely striving to improve her relations with East Europe.
The one remaining concern of the paper was that, since
Vienna had been for a long time the center of anti-Hungarian
activities of different organizations, the sensitiveness of
the Hungarian regime on this point should be appreciated.
If the remnants of that kind of activity would cease, then
the only remaining problem would be "how to carry forward
the cause of mutual understanding and cooperation."[100]

V. DANUBIAN RENAISSANCE IN HUNGARY?

It was at the end of 1966-—on December 12-—that Janos
Kadar, at the time First Party Secretary as well as Prime
Minister of Hungary, delivered his now famous speech urging
the Danubian nations to establish closer cooperation.[101]
Several other statements followed, from Kadar as well as
from Foreign Minister Janos Peter. But these statements alone
do not answer fully the question of what is really being meant
by Danubian cooperation and a "community of fate." The answer
can only be found by studying these speeches together with
semi-official press commentaries and parallel cultural
activities in Hungary.

Chronologically speaking, the Hungarian initiative for
closer Danubian cooperation has been developed in two phases:
in 1964-1965 and 1966-1967. The first one was marked by
events like Khrushchev's fall, Austrian Foreign Minister
Kreisky's visit to Budapest in autumn 1964, Hungarian Foreign
Minister Janos Peter's trip to Paris and Vienna in spring of
1965; the second phase has been marked by the preparatory work
for the Hungarian economic reform, by the retreat of Budapest
on the question of diplomatic relations with Bonn, and
Chancellor Klaus' s visit to Hungary in May 1967. It was rumored that
the second phase, the renewed official Hungarian interest in
the Danubian project had also been prompted by the German
problenio When Hungarian efforts to establish diplomatic relations

---------------------------
(99) Petho, Tibor, "A hid es pillerei," Magyar Nemzet,
13 December 1964.

(100) Renyi Peter, "Regi bonyodalmak, mai megoldasok,"
Nepszabadsag, 17 December 1964.

(101) See above, p. 2.

[page 63]

with Bonn failed, the Hungarian-Austrian-Danubian cooperation
plan was revived by Budapest as a substitute for the tie with
Bonn.[102]

A. The Kadar Project

Kadar, after his December 1964 speech, returned briefly
to the subject in his address to the Hungarian parliament
on 11 February 1965. Referring to the improvement of the
Austro-Hungarian and Franco-Hungarian relations, due to
Kreisky's visit to Budapest and Peter's visit to Paris, Kadar
stated that the class struggle did not overrule geographical
concepts.[103] But, after this, it was just over two years
before Kadar again personally mentioned the Danubian question.
In a speech at the Budapest sports hall on 22 February 1967,

Kadar included the following sentence: "...Our aim is to
make the Danubian basin—which was the source of countless
conflicts in the past-—the factor of European peace and
security. "[104] Nothing more was said publicly by Kadar on the
subject of Danubian cooperation.

Foreign Minister Janos Peter made the first extensive
public statement on the subject during his official visit to
Austria in April 1964. On this occasion he delivered a
lecture on the problems of Hungarian foreign policy in the
course of which he returned several times to the Danubian
issue. It is legitimate to talk, he said with reference to
the statement by Kreisky in Budapest, about the renaissance
of the Danube basin and Central Europe. He also urged a closer
cooperation in this region of Europe, cooperation between the
socialist countries as well as between countries belonging to
different social systems.[105]

Peter referred to the subject again in January 1966.

Speaking before the Hungarian parliament, he underlined
Hungarian interest in all efforts, including the Danubian concept,
which were aimed at the cooperation of various systems.[106]

Towards the end of the same year, speaking at the Ninth
Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) Party

--------------------------
(102) Tatu, Michel, in Le. Monde, 3 May 1967.

(103) Nepszabadsag, 12 February 1965.

(104) Nepszabadsag, 23 February 1967.

(105) Abridged version ins "Eszmecserek, mult es jelen. Peter
Janos eloadasa az osztrak kulpolitikai tarsasagban,"
Magyarorszag (Budapest), 18 April 1965.

(106) Nepszabadsag, 30 January 1966.

[page 64]

Peter warned that the road leading to European security
would be very long and it would be built in a "mosaic-like"
way by the "increasing cooperation of the immediately
neighboring countries." Peter concluded:

Gradually, such cooperation in-groups can
develop out of which organically can be further
developed the security system of the European
countries with different social systems. [Such
is] in the Balkans the cooperation of Rumania,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Turkey
in resolving their immediate problems. In Central
Europe, the cooperation of Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria offers particular
possibilities. The Danubian valley can render
possible a cooperation of a new type and in
various forms (as it is in the case of the Danube
Commission residing in Budapest) between countries
with different social systems extending from the
German Federal Republic to the Soviet Union... [107]

But more important-—in fact the authoritative statements
yet made on the whole subject-—were Peter's references in a
Christmas Day 1966 article in the Party daily. Trying to fit
Danubian cooperation in the framework of European policy, the
Hungarian Foreign Minister had this to say:

...the policy aimed at the peaceful coexistence
of countries with different systems is beginning to
attain success in Europe, although the front of a
possible international clash lies precisely across
Europe. The foreign political activities of the
Hungarian People's Republic are aimed at promoting
an abatement of threats in Europe and the peaceful
coexistence of the countries of the area. If the
European countries succeed in advancing on this path,
the European countries, no other than the countries
that have launched and first suffered from two world
wars, will manage to disperse the increasing dangers
of a third world war.[108]

In the course of 1967, a few, relatively short comments
have been made by Peter on the Danubian question, always urging
the cooperation of the interested nations with different
political systems. Such was, for instance, his "election speech"
at Szekszard on 10 March 1967 [109] as well as statements made

---------------------------
(107) Radio Budapest, 6 December 1964.

(108) Peter, Janos, "Magyarorszag es Europa," Nepszabadsag,
25 December 1967.

(109) Magyar Nemzet, 17 March 1967.



[page 65]

during Chancellor Klaus's visit to Budapest.

What are the major points emerging from the above
statements? They can be summed up under a few headings:

a) One can truly speak of a "renaissance" of the Central
European and Danubian concept. According to Peter, this
renaissance was brought about, first, as a, result of historical
research (which is more and more concentrating on the Danubian
monarchy and on events connected with the Austro—Hungarian
Ausgleich) and, second, by the growing importance of Europe in
international politics (dramatized by the Gaullist idea of
European Europe), The Danubian countries, generally, occupy
the center of Europe; thus their fate, their relationship to
each other should undoubtedly affect international relations
in general.[110] This same point was made, if in somewhat
different words, by Kadar, also: "Socialist Hungary," he said,
"is in the central part of this continent." The class struggle
did not overrule geographic notions; in fact, "the geographic
proximity lends itself to many-sided and useful possibilities
of cooperation..."[111]

b) Compared to the past, there is a new factor
characteristic of the life of the Danubian countries: six of them
live under a socialist system. Thus, Peter paid:

Changes in social systems did not put an end to
the possibility of cooperation arising from
geographic proximity and immediate neighborhood; they only
created new conditions for it... The economic and
political community of the socialist countries is an
important contribution to the [Danubian] coopera-
tion.[112]

A new form of (socialist) cooperation had been developing
among these states which, in the view of Peter, was of great
help to the countries concerned in their economic development.
Neither Peter nor Kadar sought to hide the fact that the
acceptance of the truth that these countries were socialist was
an essential precondition for a. wider Danubian cooperation;
both conceded, however, that the socialist countries should

accept a situation where some countries were not socialist. Thus
Kadar said in 1965:

In our view peaceful coexistence is accompanied
by the fact that we take notice of each others'

---------------------------
(110) Peter in Magyarorszag, op. cit.

111) Nepszagadsag, 12 February 1965.
(112) Peter in Magyarorszag, op. cit.

[page 66]

existence... Realistically thinking we have
always taken into account that in the same
geographic area there are many countries whose internal
social systems differ from ours, are not
socialist but capitalist. We can only welcome the fact
that a realistic acknowledgement of these
endowments has also been started by the other side...[113]

c) Hungary, due to her historical experiences and
geographic position is playing the role of initiator in the
speeding up of cooperation in the Danubian area. She is
hastening, in the first place, the cooperation of the
socialist countries in the hope, as Peter wrote, that this will
contribute to the cooperation of the countries living under
different social systems:

In accordance with its peculiar historical
experience and geographical position, Hungary is
today playing the active role of an initiator of
intensifying cooperation primarily between the
socialist countries, of course, and in expanding
cooperation on this basis between countries with different
systems. The foreign political and diplomatic
activities of the Hungarian People's Republic are
guided by the realization that the development of
cooperation among neighboring countries with

identical and different social systems leads gradually
and organically to an establishment of peace and
security in Europe. That is why we are seeking
possibilities of cooperation between the peoples of
central Europe and the Danube valley in our repeated
negotiations with the Austrian Government, while we
are trying to clarify the French Government's
concept of a European Europe.[114]

The importance, from this point of view, of Austro-Hungarian
relations had already been emphasized by Peter in his lecture
at the Austrian Academy in April 1966:

The government of the Hungarian People's
Republic is striving to make Austro-Hungarian relations
an example for the neighborly and amicable relations
of the countries with different social systems. I
state with pleasure that the Austrian government
has also shown encouraging signs of this... [115]

-----------------------------
(113) Nepszabadsag, 12 February 1965.

(114) Nepszabadsag, 25 December 1967,

(115) Magyarorszag, o.p. cit.

[page 67]

Speaking of Austro-Hungarian relations, Peter found
especially promising the development of the economic contacts
between the two countries as well as the sharp increase in
tourist traffic.

d) While advocating Danubian, or Central European
cooperation, Hungary is not aiming at reviving any of the past
forms or projects of multilateral cooperation in this area.
This was explicitly stated by Peter:

The new initiatives in which the Danube valley
—-from the German Federal Republic to the Soviet
Union—could become the stage of a new type of
cooperation, must be distinguished from the
characteristic and reactionary Danubian concepts of
the old generations, concepts which amounted to
attempts aiming at strengthening or preserving
the domination partly of the exiploiting classes,
partly of the opposing Powers.[116]

This does not mean, however, that the lessons of the past
should be rejected. As the same Peter put it in his
Christmas 1966 article:

The road to the organization of a system of
European peace and security is long and not easily
negotiable. Yet, the lessons of the recent and
remote past can help the search for a new road if
they are applied by the governments of today's
Europe to contemporary conditions. In the past,
great European powers tried through the
organization of systems of alliance to establish a balance
that would presumably help them defeat their
adversaries in case of an armed conflict. These
experiments seeking a balance were themselves the origins
of fresh military conflicts in the past...

Even if the lessons of the previous policy of
balance are asserted to some extent, the
establishment of peace and security in contemporary Europe
would not be particularly fostered by a continued
pursuit of the policy of balance of the past but
rather by the endeavor aimed at the establishment
of peaceful cooperation among countries with
different systems. This complete process is perceptible
in the present development of relations between
the Soviet Union and France...

Today, international reaction is still trying
to take advantage of the Trianon dictate of the

---------------------------
(116) Magyar Nemzet, 11 March 1967.

[page 68]

imperialist powers to foment antagonism among
the peoples of the Danube valley. Conversely,
however, it lies in the interests of the peoples
of the Danube valley to foster the heritage of
their life in accordance with the new living
conditions of the socialist countries and with the
closest possible fraternal and friendly
cooperation.[117]

e) As can be seen, the Hungarian project is being kept
in the framework of a "European Europe," with a slow shift
from the Gaullist concept to the Soviet one as it emerged at
the Karlovy Vary conference of the European Communist Parties.
In this sense, the Danubian cooperation plan should not be
considered as an end in itself but rather as one of the many
regional projects on which the future security of Europe
would repose. As Peter formulated it:

The cooperation of the countries of the Danube
valley, particularly those at the point of contact
between the two systems, could become factors
fostering, to a considerable degree, the development
of an organization for European peace and security,
in the same way as the mutual relations between
the Soviet Union, particularly its Baltic republics,
and the Scandinavian countries, Poland, and the two
Germanies, as well as the Balkan countries of
different systems, are opening up possibilities of a
new type of international cooperation.

Such a type of international cooperation is
sought and fostered by the Hungarian People's
Republic. Now, at the time of the building of a
socialist society, Hungary has become a force
building friendship among the peoples of the Danube
valley. Cooperation economically, culturally, and
politically and with regard to communications in
this part of Europe can truly become an effective
factor in the arrangement of a system for peace and
security in Europe.[118]

Earlier in a speech to the Hungarian Parliament, Peter compared
the Hungarian project to "the initiatives of Finland," aimed
at guaranteeing the security of Northern Europe. He also
stressed Hungary's readiness to participate in the elaboration
of any proposal the aim of which was all-European cooperation.[119]

----------------------------
(117) Nepszabadsag, 25 December 1966.

(118) Ibid,

(119) Nepszagadsag, 30 January 1966.

[page 69]

B. The Hungarisn Press on Danubian Cooperation

The statement quoted above leaves many essential questions
unanswered. It was, however, left to the Hungarian political
press to supply some of the missing information. The first
half of 1967 was especially rich with press material on the
Danubian question. For example, an article entitled "Danubian
Cooperation" and distributed to the Hungarian provincial
press contained the following paragraph:

...among the eight countries which are in the
Danube basin or border on the Danube, there are
countries which can be considered Danubian countries
in the real sense of the word. These are Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and
Bulgaria. The German Federal Republic and the Soviet
Union, too, are countries of the Danube basin. But the
problems of West Germany are far beyond the scope
of the Danube basin. The Soviet Union, the size
of a continent, cannot simply be considered a
country of the Danube basin, though its peace policy is
a decisive factor in the peace and stability of the
Danube basin.[120]

The article then emphasized that the point of departure of
Hungarian diplomacy was to organize a regional cooperation group
embracing the "Danube basin in the real sense of the word."
This would leave out the German Federal Republic and the Soviet
Union. From the remaining six qualified Danubian countries,
two (Rumania and Bulgaria) were primarily interested in a
Balkan initiative while Yugoslavia-—on the ground of her
geographical position-—belonged to the Balkan group as well as
to the more comprehensive Danubian "club" of Czechoslovakia.,
Hungary, and Austria. What Hungary had in mind, then, would
be, as a first step, the closer cooperation of Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria. (A point also stressed
by Peter before the Party Congress.)

...Austria will have a special position as a
capitalist state in this narrower Central European
Danubian circle. One of the goals of the Hungarian
foreign policy is the further strengthening of
Austro-Hungarian relations on the already established
realistic bases. Certainly, this will only be
possible if Austrian foreign policy will make creative
efforts as well. [121]

----------------------------
(120) "Dunavolgyi egyuttmukodes," Nograd, 21 January 1967.

(121) Ibid.

[page 70]

The attempt to limit, in the first phase, Danubian
cooperation to the four "genuinely" Danubian countries, was repeated
by the regime's leading Danubian publicist, Tibor Petho. Petho
first drew attention to the distinction he made between the
phrases Danube Basin and Danube Valley, the first having a
broader context than the second. Cooperation in the Danube
Basin had to start, gradually, first from cooperation in the
Danube Valley. Petho wrote:

...The nucleus of cooperation [is] between the
four countries of the Danube Valley, Czechoslovakia,
Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. This zone is better
adapted to improvements in East-West relations than
any other regional area in Europe. In Northern
Europe all the Scandinavian countries live under the
same capitalist system. In Central Europe the
unsettled nature of the German question complicates
East-West relations. In the Balkans and in the
Mediterranean region the socialist countries and
the capitalist countries belonging to NATO have
frontiers in common, which again adds to the complexity
of the problem.

The Danube Valley is the only area where the
countries of the two military blocs are not immediate
neighbors. Two of them, Czechoslovakia and Hungary,
are members of the Warsaw Pact, Austria is permanently
neutral and Yugoslavia is uncommitted. Economically
speaking, the picture is similar, for Czechoslovakia
and Hungary are Comecon countries, Austria-—at least
at present-—is part of EFTA, whereas Yugoslavia only

sends observers to Comecon conferences. In other
words, military and economic confrontations are least
sharp in the Danube Valley. This region, consequently,
offers the maximal objective opportunity for the
peaceful coexistence of countries belonging to
different economic systems.[122[

After so many futile attempts in the past at establishing closer
cooperation, said Petho, "practical conditions have come into
existence for the development of a new type of cooperation."
He had in mind two types of cooperation; one among the socialist
countries, and the other one among the socialist countries as
well as Austria. As far as the socialist countries are concerned,
Petho found Hungarian-Yugoslav relations particularly
instructive, for, after years of hostility, "they changed into a
friendly and unambiguously constructive connection which is
advantageous to both. The trend is towards still greater
cooperation and the gradual reduction in the importance of national

-----------------------------
(

122) Petho, Tibor, "Modern Forms of Cooperation in the Danube
Valley," The New Hungarian Quarterly (Budapest), Autumn 1967.


[71]

frontiers." But:

the keynote of peaceful coexistence in the
Danube Valley is the relationship between Austria
and her Eastern neighbors. From a strictly
historical point of view Austro-Hungarian relations
have a history of over a thousand years....

...true interdependence has always been
interpreted by the best minds of the two peoples as
meaning that more binds us than separates us, and
that the two peoples serve their own individual
interests and fulfill their European role to better
advantage when they choose honest cooperation... [123]

As to the form of Danubian cooperation, the press
underscored several times what Peter had previously said: nobody
wanted to return to the past for obsolete projects of
integration; at the same time, certain "lessons" from history
could not be rejected. The past role of Hungary in the
Danube Valley, linked with the German policy of conquest,
brought her more enemies than friends, wrote one foreign
political expert. It was only after entering the road of socialism
that Hungary could normalize her relations with the Danubian
peoples. For Hungary, the new situation meant the fulfillment
of her best historic traditions:

This situation justifies the concept of the
emigree Kossuth against the false
historical-philosophical theories with which, in the second
half of the last century (and in certain Western
circles even today) some had tried to justify the
existence of the Habsburg Monarchy... [124]

The specific forms of cooperation should, according to
Petho, begin with the establishment or improvement of bilateral
relations first; these must reach a certain level before
anything else can be considered. But even after these had reached
a high level there could be no question of a federal or
confederate solution.

What kind of bilateral relations were envisaged? In
addition to inter-state relations, human contacts should be
developed and extended, so should tourist traffic and
cooperation between cultural and social organizations, as well as
different forms of economic cooperation, and active cooperation

-----------------------------
(123) Petho, op. cit.

(124) Paal, Ferenc, "Ungarns Politik im Donauraum," Budapester
Rundschau, 9 June 1967.

[page 72]

in the frame of the Danube Commission. In Petho's words:

...in considering modern methods of
cooperation, no one is considering a federative solution.
The recent Hungarian and Austrian talks concentrated
on problems of economic, cultural, scientific and
technical cooperation, and certain advances were
made in each of these four fields. It is
particularly significant that a permanent committee was
set up designed to promote regular consultations
and create institutional forms for the more
effective development of new methods and techniques of
cooperation. In addition to the official
interstate contacts these also involve contacts on a
more human level between the two countries, a common
concern for literature, art, and music, the extension
of tourism, closer cooperation between sports and
associations and various social organizations.

The negotiations between Hungary and Austria
also show that the first step to be taken in the
development of cooperation in the Danube Valley is
to improve bilateral relations, and further
improvements can only be effected when these bilateral
relations have reached the proper level.

It is also worth noting that Budapest is the
seat of the Danube Commission. The Commission, it
is true,, is exclusively concerned with questions of
Danube navigation, but its mere existence directs
the attention beyond the Danube Valley in the
narrower sense, towards the prospects of closer
cooperation in the Danube Basin itself. The Danube flows
through eight countries and takes smaller rivers
from three additional countries to the sea. It
carries 30 million metric tons of cargo a year. 
Within its catchment area of 817,000 square kilometers
live thirteen peoples.... No other area in Europe
is so varied, in all senses of the word, which is one
more reason-—and opportunity—for the peoples of this
region to unite in making a model area of European
coexistence.[125]

Among the many concrete problems of cooperation, economic
contacts have been followed with the, greatest interest by the
Hungarian press. Many articles add up to a continuous effort
to convince Austria that Eastern relations, if properly developed,
could generously recompense her for the losses suffered by

----------------------------
(125) Petho, Tibor, op.cit.

[page 73]

giving up her Common Market ambitions, and that, in fact,
this would be the only way to preserve her neutrality and
independence. Since, however, most experts agree that
routine trade contacts could hardly develop beyond the stage
already achieved, great efforts have been made to find and
open new areas for economic cooperation.

These efforts are well summarized in an article by Vera
Vari in the Budapester Rundschau in May 1967. All in all,
Miss Vari said, Austro-Hungarian economic relations were
developing satisfactorily, but there was still room for
improvement. The first possibility lay in modifying the
structure of Hungarian exports which, for the time being, did
not adequately reflect the changes in the Hungarian economy,
especially as far as finished products were concerned. The
increase of the export of Hungarian industrial products would
have a beneficial effect on the improvement of trade
relations. A further improvement in the structure of the
Hungaro-Austrian trade could be achieved by increased industrial
cooperation with Austrian firms. The "joint action" of the
Austrian Simmering-Graz-Pauker A.G. and of the Hungarian
foreign trade agency Komplex in Lebanon in 1960 was cited as
a good example of this. About one-third of the power plant
built there was supplied by the Hungarian industries (mainly
turbines). Since then an agreement had been signed for
further joint deliveries, as well as for the cooperative
production of certain items on the basis of Austrian
documentation.

Similar cooperation agreements, said Miss Vari, had
been concluded between the Viennese firm Goerz and the
Hungarian Elektroimpex, between the Alpine Montanwerke A.G. and
the Hungarian Metallimpex, between the Austrian
Stickstoff-werke and the Hungarian Chemolimpex, etc. Such systematic
cooperation was a "useful means" to expand economic relations,
concluded the author, but more courage would be needed to make
a broader use of it. [126]

Another article in the same paper threw some light on
an interesting sector of the human-social contacts: trade
union relations between Hungary and Austria. During the past
few years lively contacts have developed, mainly at a factory
level. Thousands of Austrian workers, members of works
councils, and trade union activists have visited Hungarian
factories in order to meet their Hungarian colleagues and to
"exchange views on questions of mutual interest." These
Austrian visits were returned by the Hungarians and this
trade union contact has led to broader social contacts between
factories- exchange of choirs, orchestras, football matches,

----------------------------
(126) Vari, Vera, "Handelsbeziehungen Oesterreich-Ungarn,"
Budapester Rundschau, 12 May 1967.


[page 74]

and the like. Every year more than a thousand Austrian
workers spend their vacation in Hungary and vice versa. In
May 1967 a conference of Austrian and Hungarian trade union
representatives took place in Budapest with the aim of
securing better coordination of such contacts and expanding
them in new areas. [127]

The Danube Commission, as an additional means and
frame of Danubian contacts, was brought into the limelight
by a whole series of articles in the spring of 1967. Seldom
has the Commission ever received so much publicity in Hungary
during this period. The articles pointed to the international
character of the river, to the role it plays in the
rapprochement of different nationalities, to the Commission's key
role in organizing and directing the navigation of the Danube,
and to the "examplary cooperation" between the seven full
members of the commission and the German Federal Republic
as observer. "We can often read that the Danubian peoples
are looking for opportunities to increase their cooperation,
to expand their contacts, said one typical article. The
Danube Commission, with its widespread activities, contributes
to the realization of these efforts." And, the article added,
the political and economic importance of the Danube will still
increase with the building of the Iron Gates project, the RMD
canal, with the planned Danube—Oder-Elbe Canal. This will
also increase the coordinating activities of the commission.[128]

The German problem was brought into the Danubian
discussion on three accounts: the German Federal Republic's
participation in the work of the Danube Commission; the
Austrian Common Market controversy; and the Soviet propaganda
campaign against Bonn, against the Eastern policy of the Kiesinger
government. While Bonn's role in the Danube Commission was
rated as very positive by the Hungarian papers, West Germany
was still being accused of sinister intentions against Austria
(disguised in the form of the Common Market), and, of course,
against East Europe. In this connection, Tibor Petho, in one
of his articles, reminded his readers that there had been
attempts in the past to extend German rule over the Danubian
region, or at least to play off one people against the other:

Thus, the settling of the German question was
always primarily a Danubian question as well.
Instead of a Germany, which wants to enforce the
Danubian mission of the Germans, ...the development
of a peace-loving and democratic Germany in Central
 
---------------------------
(127) Dancso, Odon, "Gewerkschaftsbeziehungen, Budapest-Wien,"
Budapester Rundschau, 26 May 1967.

(128) Vig, Istvan, "Egyuttmukodes a nagy kek orszaguton,"
Magyar Nemzet, 26 February 1967.

[page 75]

Europe is in the vital interests of the peoples
living in the Danubian region... It is quite
obvious that the peoples of Europe, first of all
the peoples of the Danubian region, can imagine
the settling of the German question only within
the scope of an all-European security system.

Perhaps the best test to the real goals of
the "opening to the East," in other words, the
policy of the German Federal Republic announced
by the Kiesinger government, will be whether they
will really give up the traditional Danubian policy
of the Hohenstaufen, Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns
and Hitlerites, or the opening to the East would
not mean anything but a new attempt to divide the
Danubian peoples or the relaxation of the alliance
of the socialist countries... [129]

After dealing with so many different aspects of the
Danubian project, the Hungarian press insisted on its European
character; European in the sense of the Karlovy Vary decisions:

Reference to the Danubian Valley does not mean
and cannot mean any isolation or seclusion. We
consider ourselves part of Europe, of the true and
whole Europe which includes, from East to West,
every country of our continent. We would like to
realize the great idea of the European security in
a way which would span over the whole continent.[130]

Such a European security, however, could only be built
gradually, by partial agreements, partial solutions in the
regional zones of Europe. The Danubian area could develop
into such a regional zone serving the cause of European
security.[131]
 
Nobody should then misread the project as a "new course"
in Hungarian foreign, policy, warned Magyar Nemzet already in
1965, commenting upon a report in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung:

It is out of the question that there would be a
shifting of accent in our foreign policy or that
our ranprochement with the West European countries
would result in an estrangement from our present


-----------------------------

(129) Petho, Tibor, "Kozos hivatas a Duna volgyeben," Magyar
Nemzet, 5 March 1967.

(130) Reti Ervin, "A Duna volgyeben es Europaban," Esti Hirlap
(Budapest), 2 April 1967.

(131) "Europa erdeke", Dunantuli Naplo, 25 May 1967.


[page 76]

allies. On the contrary, as we can see it, the
growing interest of the West in fostering
friendship with our homeland [is a direct consequence]
of the growing prestige of the socialist world.
The deepening of the Austro-Hungarian friendship
fits into the general line of development which
evolves in conformity with the principles of
peaceful coexistence.[132]

C. Past History Remembered

The official and semi-official "meditation" in Hungary
on the Danubian cooperation was accompanied by increased
activities in the Hungarian cultural field. And the
interesting thing about this spate of cultural activity was that
it did not always fall in with the official line on Danubian
cooperation.

Thus, in spite of statements that the project had nothing
to do with previous historical schemes to reorganize the
Danubian Valley, the cultural interest began to concentrate
on the historical aspects of Danubian federalism and
integration in general. It produced some noteworthy, even
if partly distorted, writings on the history of federalism.
Simultaneously, efforts could be detected to modify the
generally accepted, negative Hungarian record of Danubian
coexistence by pointing to some positive aspects of it. This
led to the "rediscovery" of several chapters of the Hungarian
"progressive" movement .(including the Communists) and to some
open clashes with scholars from neighboring countries.

Interest in the life of the Hungarian minority groups as
a connecting link with the neighboring peoples and cultures
has increased. New projects of Danubian cultural cooperation
have been drawn up and discussed in conferences or in the press.

Among the more recent writings dealing with the problem
of federalism, a small book should be mentioned which was
written by a Hungarian historian, Gyula Merei.[133] It is a
review of the most important federalist projects in the
Danubian and Balkan areas, and all of them analyzed from a Marxist
point of views to what respect had they furthered the idea
of progress? The review was necessary, Merei felt, because of
the growing Western interest in the problem of federalism. The
Western interest was aroused, as Merei felt, by an endeavor to

----------------------------
(132) "A magyar-osztrak kapcsolatok uj allomasa," Magyar Nemzet,
28 January 1965.

(133) Merei, Gyula, Foderacios tervek Delkelet-Europabanuesa
Habsburg-monarchia, 1840-1918 (Kossuth, Budapest, 1965.

[page 77]

"learn from the past" so that "the practical [Western] policy
could avoid, in the present and in the future, the bankruptcy
of the supranational state it wants to bring into existence."
The Western adherents to the idea of the supranational state,
wrote Merei, concentrate their analytical studies on federal
projects which had been intended to reorganize the Habsburg
Monarchy: "in those projects they aim to discover the
prototype of a supranational state they prefer today... "[134]

Merei began his review with Czartoryski's federation
projects and concluded it withoszkar Jaszis efforts to
modernize the Habsburg monarchy on the model of Switzerland.
Merei's general attitude toward federation movements was
sympathetic but, as to the individual plans, his opinions widely
differed. There are three projects he presented as
particularly positive undertakings: Czartoryski's protracted efforts
to set up a Slav-Rumanian-Hungarian "free confederation;"
Nicolae Balcescu's project of the Danubian Federal States;
and Kossuth's South-East European federation. Czartoryski's
project," said Merei, "...points toward progress, since it
wanted to promote the union of the oppressed peoples with the
purpose of freeing them from the rule of the
feudal-absolutistic Habsburg monarchy."[135]

Merei also gave credit to Czartoryski for the fact that
Laszlo Teleki, a diplomatic agent of Kossuth,who actually
inspired Kossuth's confederation project, developed his
progressive ideas about cooperation of the nationalities under
Czartoryski's influence. Teleki's stand on this question
"was almost unparalleled in the circle of the Hungarian ruling
class."[136]

As to Balcescu, Merei found his federation project "truly
and consistently progressive, democratic," because it would
have guaranteed the right of self-determination (including
secession) and, "though directed against the Habsburg power,
it was an anti-Tsarist and anti-Turkish concept, too. If
carried out, it could have assured for a certain period of
time the peaceful coexistence and democratic progress of the
South-East European peoples."[137]

-----------------------
(134) Ibid., pp. 5, 10.

(135) Ibid., p. 22.

(136) ibid., p. 59.

(137) Ibid., PP. 67-68.

[page 78]
 
Kossuth's confederation project, in the view of Merei,
was as progressive as Balcescu's. The project

...recognized the self-determination right
of the nations; it was democratic...[mainly because]
even Kossuth was now beginning to accustom himself
to the idea of renouncing territorial integrity
since he was ready to accept the organization of
Transylvania and the Voivodship as separate
territories.[138]

In addition to the three outstanding projects, many
others were also classified by Merei as progressive. Those
he rejected were mainly those "bourgeois federal projects"
born between 1867 and 1917 which, in his view, tried only to
save the monarchy offering autonomous solutions instead of
the "real federation of peoples possessing equal rights."
Merei's opinion of Franz Ferdinand was as negative as his view
of Aurel Popovici, Adolf Fischhof, and of the Austrian
Socialists, Karl Renner and Oskar Bauer, because "they reasoned in
bourgeois economic categories."[139]

Finally, as to Jaszi: his greatest failure was, wrote
Merei, that he could not attain the point of recognizing the
nationalities' right to secession. Since, however, Jaszi
was a bourgeois, one cannot blame him, added Merei, for having
been unable to perceive that "durable interstate integration
union is not possible under the circumstances of imperialism.[140]

This central question of at what point the creation of a
true federalism is possible comes up several times in Merei's
book; the "final solution" is hinted at without being
explicitly stated. The trend of national development, said Merei,
is inseparably linked with capitalism, leading to the
establishment of independent national states. Thus, capitalism
is not the proper environment for federalism.

The truly democratic integration is realizable
only in the alliance system of independent states,
established under proletarian leadership as the
transitory stage on the road leading toward full
democracy attainable in socialist states, toward the
complete union of the states enjoying equal rights,
and of their peoples.[141]

----------------------
(138) Ibid., p. 86

(139) Ibid., p. 135.

(140) Ibid., p. 152.

(141) Ibid., pp. 128-129.


[page 79]

This perspective of federalism should not be interpreted
as excluding interim efforts to organize peoples against
"reactionary" powers hindering "progress" (Tsarist, Ottoman,
Habsburg empire), or against attempts at territorial autonomy
under certain conditions:

Territorial autonomy, if established as the
result of a union of the forces of progress, will
not serve-—not even from economic point of view-—
the cause of secession, but it will advance the
better, friendlier cooperation on the given stage
of capitalist evolution. It will only divide
forces and serve, in this way-—indirectly-—the
counter-revolution if the autonomous territory
is set up with the support of the
counter-revolution, or if they hope it will be' set up by
absolutist [forces] and for this reason join the ranks
of the: direct supporters of the counter-revolution.[142]

On the basis of the above concept Merei came out in the
defense of the Hungarian revolution of 1848-1849 and condemned
the attitude of certain nationalities. In his view, the
turning point in the clash between Kossuth and the
nationalities came in September 1848:

While in the previous months in the
Self-determination movements of the nationalities the
progressive features dominated, from then on the
misled masses of the nationality regions
strengthened only the reaction. In the interest of
fulfilling their national demands they joined forces
with the Habsburg counter-revolution. No doubt,
the wrong nationality policy of the Hungarian
government played a great role in this...which, however,
still does not justify the faulty policy of the
leaders of the non-Hungarian peoples... [143]

Merei's book, which was, as he feels, the first Marxist
attempt to analyze the Danubian and Balkanic federation
projects, [144] provoked some interesting press comments. One of
them-—especially noteworthy-—was published in the monthly
Tiszataj (but originally printed in the paper of University
Szeged).[145] This review is interesting because it reveals

----------------------
(142) Ibid., p. 27.

(143) Ibid., pp. 31-32.

(144) Ibid., p. 10.

(145) Laszlo, Peter, "A Duna-konfoderacio eszmei oroksege,"
Tiszataj, March 1966, originally printed in Szegedi
Egyetem, 10 January 1966.


[page 80]

above all how the federalist heritage is transmitted from
one generation to the other. Its author, Laszlo Peter, wrote:

My generation has been informed by Laszlo
Nemeth about the concept of foster-brotherhood, and
knows the idea of Danubian federation from the
dictionary of the populist writers. Our first
"proclamation"—-prepared in the last days of the
war-—made the demand, in its first point, that
Attila Jozsef's name be put on the University
facade. In its seventh point, the request was made
that a Rumanian and Serbian faculty be set up at
the University in the interest of "the
implementation of the Danubian confederation in the Kossuth
spirit." It was Bela Balazs who afterward became
our guide: his publicly known sympathy for the
Yugoslavs, his spiritual orientation toward the
neighboring peoples, acted as a ferment in the
cultural rapprochement among the liberated countries.

After reviewing Merei's book (especially those parts
dealing with the development of the Kossuth confederation
plan) Laszlo Peter pointed to some of its shortcomings, such
as his stand on Oszkar Jaszi:

...Though [Merei] criticizes the Hungarian
dreams with the greatest implacability-—-but not in
the manner of a masochist-—he also requests a
differentiated evaluation from socialist historians.
For example, he defends the Kossuth plan against
the summary contempt of Fran Zwitter, Jaroslav Sidak
and Vaso Bogdanov (Belgrade, 1960). It is only
toward Otto Bauer that he is slightly unjust, taking
the words of the latter for approval, though they
were simple compulsory statements. We also feel
that in connection with Oszkar Jaszi, the apostle
of an Eastern Switzerland, Merei was nearer to the
truth in his 1947 book. Now he seems to be more
severe toward him, forgetting under what conditions
...Jaszi dared to voice his views.

The last paragraph of Peter's book review pointed to the
present actuality of the federalist issue:
In our country, the mention of a Danubian
confederation was taboo for more than ten years,
because dogmatic prejudice saw in it-—without
justification—-an anti-Soviet sting. Now, when the 
cooperation between the socialist countries unites
the East European people in a close bond which also
includes economic and cultural relationships and
well carries out things included in the plans too
early presented by our forefathers, it would be high
time to take the measure of our heritage. Memory

transforms the struggle fought by our ancestors into
peace.

[page 81]

As it appears from Merei's book and other studies,
Kossuth still occupies a prominent place in Hungarian
federalist traditions. But it is not exactly the same
Kossuth whose figure had emerged, for instance, from
Jozsef Revai's writings: an almost faultless patriot and
revolutionary, with a program first fully understood and
implemented by Rakosi's Communist Party. The "new Kossuth"
is a much more human being who committed serious mistakes
and was especially slow in recognizing the aspirations of 
the national minorities. The program he offered to resolve
this problem was only the result of. a long process and of
many different influences; it was not his own work but a
collective Danubian scheme.

It was the Communist historian, Aladar Mod, who mainly
helped to paint this new profile of Kossuth. Mod argued
that, on the basis of Jozsef Revai's analysis, the concept
of Danubian confederation was, in Marxist public opinion and
historiography, attached unilaterally to Kossuth. In reality,
said Mod, the idea of a Danubian confederation developed as
a common concept among the national representatives of the
peoples in conflict with the Habsburg monarchy: Italians,
Poles, Rumanians, Southern Slavs. The idea was then taken
up by the democratic representatives of Europe opposing the
Habsburg monarchy and tsarism.[146]

The purpose behind Mod's argument should not be
overlooked. This is to release the idea of the Danubian
confederation from its Hungarian bias and overtones and to exhibit it
as a common property of the Danubian peoples, and not an issue
of Hungarian concern only. Mod wrote that he was taking up
this subject because of its timeliness. It was timely because

the freer evolution of the peoples, already in its
bourgeois-national phase, was raising the question of the correct form
of integration. In the era of transition from capitalism to
socialism, argued Mod, the question became even more acute.
Closer cooperation would certainly assume a) the liquidation
of the reactionary heritage of the nationalism; b) the
liquidation of the nationalist elements present in the bourgeois
democratic heritage, c) the reexamination of the democratic
national heritage. The reconciliation of independence with
common interests was an essential condition of socialist
construction and an urgent contemporary problem for the Danubian
peoples.[147]

What are the most suitable forms of integration? What
are the best traditions to follow? Many others have asked the

---------------------
(146) Mod, Aladar, "A Duna-konfoderacio," in: Mod, Aladar, Sors
es felelosseg (Magveto, Budapest ) ,1967, p. 233.

147) Ibid., pp. 237-238.

[page 82]

same questions in Hungary, encouraged by the developments on
the "Danubian front" and most probably also by the fact that
a similar discussion was underway in the Soviet Union also.
Some Communist authors went back to the Bela Kun experiment
for inspiration.[148] Others unwrapped the history of the
Sarlo. Edgar Balogh, the former leader of the radical
Hungarian youth movement in Czechoslovakia who became a
Communist and now lives in Transylvania, Rumania, was given
the opportunity to publish his memoirs in Budapest, with
large sections devoted to the problems of confederation in
East Europe. [149] Although in many respects it paints an
emotionally pro-Communist picture, Balogh's book has
attracted wide attention, mainly in non-Communist leftist circles
and received favorable reviews in the papers. One of its
favorable reviewers, Daniel Csatari, a Transylvanian living
in Budapest, himself wrote a small book on another important
chapter of Hungarian Danubian history the "Encounter at
Vasarhely."[150]

In revealing the story of Vasarhely, Csatari wanted to
demonstrate that Hungarian Communists played an important
role in this encounter, "a great effort" toward
Hungarian-Rumanian Ausgleich on the Danubian cooperation basis.
Although the effort failed, "it was still a contribution to the
smoothing of the road of rapprochement. The endeavors of the
participants had been exemplary, their errings could serve as
edification...[151]

In this context it should not be forgotten that several
attempts were made to rehabilitate Oszkar Jaszi, and that
even earlier Mihaly Karolyi had been almost fully
rehabilitated. He was used and misused for domestic political
purposes, but the Danubian aspects of his program have also been
praised, in spite of their miserable failure.[152] Istvan Gal,
former editor of the Danubian review Apollo, published a re-
markable essay on Bartok's role in Danubian cultural contacts
between the two World Wars. In the same essay, he promised
further writings on the same subject.[153]

---------------------
(148) See: Kovago, Laszlo, op.cit.

(149) Balogh, Edgar, op.cit.

(150) Csatari, Daniel, A Vasarhelyi Talalkozo (Akademiai Kiado,
Budapest) 1967. See also above, p. 38.

(151) Ibid., p. 141.

(152) E.g., Mod, Aladar, "Karolyi Mihaly ideologiai oroksegerol,"
first published in 1964, reprinted in: Mod Aladar, Sors
es felelosseg, pp. 190-231.

(153) Gal, Istvan, op.cit.
[page 83]

Pursuing this tradition, the Hungarians seem to have
been especially active in furthering cooperation in the
comparative historiography of East European literature.
Conferences have been held in Budapest on the subject in recent
years, and a Hungarian project to write a comparative history
of East European literature is under consideration. [154]

As all the various evidence cited above would indicate,
there is no official, concrete Hungarian plan of Danubian
cooperation, still less of federation. But the readiness
for a, closer cooperation with the Danubian peoples has been
clearly and repeatedly proclaimed, and all the statements to
this effect have been preceded, or are allowed by, efforts
to find ideological, political and historical justifications
for the Danubian rapprochement. Taking all the official
statements, newspaper articles and the parallel activities
together, they amount to an unwritten "project" of
cooperation, a cooperation not limited to the so-called socialist
countries, but extending also to the countries with different
social systems, concretely to Austria. If Austria were not
involved, all the Hungarian initiatives would simply have the
appearance of a new attempt to speed up Danubian integration
within Comecon. It is Austria's inclusion which gives the
whole project an East-West aspect. Therefore,
Austro-Hungarian cooperation has become a key issue in the project, on
which its success or failure depends. Thus the Austrian
reactions to the Hungarian initiatives should now be examined.

VI. THE AUSTRIAN ANSWER

Austria, after regaining her independence in 1955,
reestablished full diplomatic relations with all the Danubian
Communist states and concluded with them short-term
agreements of economic (and partly also of cultural) cooperation.
While the overall development has shown a steady improvement
in contacts, the emergence of problems of different magnitude,
such as the Hungarian revolution, border incidents, the
Habsburg question, Sudeten-German meetings in Austria, and the
possibility of Austrian entrance into the Common Market marred
relations from time to time and, in some cases, even led to
their deterioration. As a consequence, different qualities
and grades of cooperation developed between Austria and her
Danubian neighbors.

Czechoslovakia was the first Danubian country to adhere
to the State Treaty of 1955 establishing Austrian sovereignty,
but today, due to the border incidents in summer 1967, her
relations with Austria, are more strained than that of any

-----------------------
(154) Sziklay, Laszlo, "A szocialista orszagok irodalomtorteneti
intezetvezetoinek konferenciaja Budapesten," Helikon,
No. 4, 1965; see also: Chmel, Rudolf, op.cit.


[page 84]

other Danubian country. Thus, Czechoslovakia is the only
Danubian socialist country which has failed so far to
conclude a compensation treaty with Austria, a, treaty the
Austrian government has always considered as a
pre-condition for any real improvement of relations with Eastern
European regimes. (Rumania concluded such a treaty in
December 1962, followed by Bulgaria in May 1963, and by
Hungary in October 1964.)[155]

If Czechoslovakia represents one extreme in Austria's
relations with Danubian Europe, Yugoslavia could be
considered the other one, with Hungary and Rumania filling the
gap in between. Austrian leaders have often expressed
publicly their satisfaction over the Austro-Yugoslav
relations. In Spring of 1965 Chancellor Klaus put it this way:

...I wish to emphasize particularly that
relations with Yugoslavia serve as an example for
the establishing of good-neighbor relations between
countries whose people have chosen different social
organizations.[156]

Two years later he was saying the same:

•••the development of Yugoslav-Austrian
relations is a model of the possibility for friendly
relations and for the development of fruitful
cooperation regardless of differences in the social
systems of the two countries.[157]

---------------------
(155) New Austro-Czechoslovak talks on property compensation
were scheduled for 7 November 1967 in Vienna. According
to the official announcement, financial experts would
discuss the over-all Austrian claim on compensation
for Austrian property confiscated, expropriated and
nationalized in Czechoslovakia after World War II. This
meeting would be followed by talks between Austrian and
Czechoslovak diplomatic delegations: RFE Special,
Vienna, 20 October 1967. It should also be noted that
in non-Danubian Eastern Europe neither Poland nor the
Soviet Union has yet concluded such a treaty with Austria.

(156) Klaus, Dr. Josef, "Yugoslav-Austrian
friendship—-an important factor of European stabilization" (Interview),
Review of International Affairs, 5 April 1965.

(157) From an interview to the Belgrade weekly NIN as quoted
by Tanjug, 11 March 1967.

[page 85]


But the Austrians also derive considerable satisfaction
from their relations with Rumania, especially since Klaus's
visit to Bucharest in July 1967. In a television interview
on 13 July 1967, Austrian Foreign Minister Toncic expressed
his hope that the present good relations wich Rumania would
also be extended to Hungary but felt it necessary to stress
that progress here had always been slow and that successes
could not be registered on a day-to-day basis.[158]

But progress in relations with Hungary definitely has
been made and it is connected, on the Austrian side, mainly
with the names of three persons: Former Socialist
Vice-Chancellor Dr. Bruno Pittermann, who was head of Austria's
state-owned industry, former Foreign Minister and present
leader of the Austrian Socialist Party, Dr. Bruno Kreisky
and Chancellor Klaus himself from the People's Party. These
three men have been consistent public champions of the
opening to the East, promoting contacts by frequent visits to
the Danubian countries, breaking new ground with each visit.

The most important visits are worth noting: Pittermann
visited Yugoslavia in October 1961 and in January-February
1964; in May 1963 he went to Hungary; in April 1964 to
Rumania and in December of the same year to Czechoslovakia. In
January, 1965, he was again in Budapest with leading officials
of Austria's nationalized industry and in February of the
same year he conducted talks in Bulgaria. Kreisky's first
visit, in March 1960, took him to Yugoslavia, to which he
returned in March 1965 (accompanying Chancellor Klaus); at the
end of October 1964 he visited Hungary and in July 1965,
Bulgaria. Chancellor Klaus has so far paid four official
visits to Danubian countries: he traveled to Yugoslavia in
March 1965, to Hungary in May 1967, to Rumania in July 1967
and to Bulgaria in October 1967.

Such diplomatic activity cannot, of course, be developed
without some opposition at home. Dr. Pittermann,
particularly, has been criticized for trying to give a one-sided
orientation to Austrian trade by binding the state industry (and
especially its VOEST stronghold in Linz) almost exclusively
to Eastern markets. Each time the Common Market issue has
moved into the foreground of Austrian politics, the debate
about Austria's Eastern commercial contacts and their real
value also sharpened. In this connection, it might be noted
that Austrian's Eastern trade had, by 1966, developed to the
point where the Eastern European states (including the Soviet
Union, Poland and Albania) took 17.7 percent" of her total
exports. Most experts consider that this percentage cannot be
markedly increased in the next few years.

---------------------
(158) RFE Special (Vienna),14 July 1967.


[page 86]

A. Austria's Mission in East- Europe

The various domestic debates about Austria's Eastern
policy do not obscure the fact, however, that good progress
has been made in Austria's Eastern contacts. The
interesting question is whether this progress is the reflection of
the success of a routine, ad hoc policy or whether Austria's
efforts have been within the framework of a basic concept
founded on common Danubian traditions and looking forward
to prospects emerging from those traditions.

With regard to the latter, the development of Austrian
policy has been rather similar to the Hungarian: no
official program, no time-table, no single document on how to
develop contacts with the Danubian countries. But, on the
other hand, there are many unofficial or semi-official
sources which speak in great detail about Austria's "Danubian
mission." Austria now considers her neighbors along the
Danube as fully emancipated members of a unique family of
peoples, sharing many common problems which call for a closer
cooperation and, in specific cases, also for common
solutions. She feels that, as the former hub of the Danubian
world, she now has" to work for a new rapprochement in the
area without trying to recreate any of the old forms of
political coexistence, fully recognizing the realities of the
present situation and clearly avoiding any policy based on a
romanticising of Austria's past position.[159]

This "line" of Austrian Danubian politics had begun to
develop in the early 1960's and has been steadily emphasized
since 1964-65 by leading political, economic and cultural
elements in the country. It was in this spirit that
Chancellor Klaus, in a speech at Stanford University, described
Austria, as "Window to the East" and cited the historic
components which play a part in determining Austrian
relationship with the East and Southeast European peoples.

We coexisted with them for centuries, for the
last time in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In
the k.u.k. Army, Austrians served side by side with
Hungarians, Croats, Slovens, Czechs, Slovaks,
Poles, Ruthenians and other peoples.
Representatives of these peoples had their seat in the
parliament. Vienna, as the k.u.k. capital city, had an
enormous assimilating effect and one spoke of it as
the melting pot of the Monarchy.

The Vielvoelkerstaat could not withstand the
political storms of the time. The peoples of the

---------------------
(159) For an incisive appraisal of Austria's role on the Danube
see Otto Schulmeister, Die Zukunft Oesterreichs (Fritz
Molden, Wien), 1967, especially pp. 239 and 334.

[page 87]

Monarchy, after World War I, went their own way
and became independent members of the European
family of peoples. But since 1918 much time
has passed; it allowed these peoples to eliminate
from their memories the burdens of the common
past and made them aware of the values of the
earlier community. We should not overestimate
these feelings. But in a moment when the
ideological differences have become almost
insurmountable, they exhibit imponderables which can prove
to be of inestimable value in the resuming of
the dialogue between West and East.[16O]

This common heritage and the tasks connected with it
make Austria, said Klaus "a classical place of encounter,"
a "stabilizing factor in the Danubian area," an
"intersection between East and West," etc. All these notions
point to Austria having the mission of "uniting peoples."
It was in this spirit that Chancellor Klaus already in
January 1965 pleaded with the Council of Europe:

...East Europe is also part of Europe. Europe
does not end at the Eastern borders of my country.
The city of Vienna should not be regarded as "the
terminus of the West." The future house of Europe
would have to be viewed by us Austrians as an

unfinished and incomplete structure if it consisted
only of a central front and of a Western wing, while
the East wing would remain unfinished. Austria
adheres to the liberal-democratic way of life. We
hold fast to Western thinking, to Western traditions
and habits. We know that the countries of East
Europe have a social system which has nothing in
common with our own. But we welcome that evolution
in the countries of East Europe which makes us hope
that these peoples will come closer to greater
Europe... [161]

"Welcoming the evolution" has, however, never meant that
the Austrian leadership, of whatever political coloration, has
been blind to the political realities in Eastern Europe or
that it has entertained false hopes concerning future
developments. The socialist Kreisky, when Foreign Minister, always
maintained that the evolution in Eastern Europe was not a
trend away from Communism but rather a development within it.
Thus, the Communist States of today would remain Communist in
the foreseeable future but with essential differences between

--------------------
(160) Josef Klaus, "Penster gegen Osten," Neues Forum (Vienna),
January 1966.

(161) Address to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe on January 26, 1965. See special press release of this
assembly, 26 January 1967.

[page 88]

Hungarians, Czechs, South Slavs, Eastern Slavs, etc. Under
such circumstances, Kreisky argued, Austria's policy must be
a policy of "democratic presence." Her readiness to
cooperate with the East in no way implied any sacrifice of
principle or orientation. On the contrary, Vienna is ready to
embark on an imaginative Eastern policy precisely because it
feels ideologically strong enough and convinced of the
correctness of her ideas....

We are not afraid to grant reciprocity. We
have no fear from the encounter with the Communist
thinking, and even less do we fear the contact
with the Communist reality.[162]

These kinds of words were aimed at some Austrian
conservative circles, ideological opponents of the opening toward
the East. But they were also designed to allay the suspicions
of the Communist governments themselves which, in the early
stages at least, had to be assured time and again that the
Austrian initiatives did not hide any subversive motives or
aim at the reconstruction of disintegrated empires. This was,
for instance, one of the main points Chancellor Klaus made
in his 50 minute address to the 2nd Congress of Slavic
historians held in Salzburg in September 1967, and attended by
several hundred scholars from East and West. The address is
worth quoting also because it gives some concrete examples of
how East-West contacts could, in Chancellor Klaus' view, be
further expanded:

...All the East European states belong to the
socialist state and social system; they are and will
remain Communist. The socialist state leaderships
have partly brought their peoples from archaic forms
of life...into the technical, industrial
civilization of the 20th century. Nevertheless, one speaks
in these countries today of coexistence, of peace,
of improving relations in all sectors and with all
states of the world, of European cooperation end of
European security. In spite of the different social

systems, the East is interested in the resolving of
the main economic, scientific, political and
cultural problems on a bilateral and European basis.
Austria is...able to cooperate for a lasting system
of European security if a common ground can be found
on the basis of: Austria, world peace, community
of peoples, rule of law. What do we want, then?
Confrontation, discussion, encounter on the basis of
Weltanschauung, too. Important is, for instance,
the dialogue of the church with aetheistic Communism
(Paulus Gesellschaft, Marienbad 1967); also important

---------------------
(162) Bruno Kreisky, "Gespraech mit dem Osten,"Forum (Vienna),
August-September 1965.


[page 89]

are the scientific discussions at different
congresses...

The bridge-building between East and West
has to be attempted anew today. A good start
was made by the second Vatican Council, by the
self-critical Western research, and...by the
policy of integration, of relaxation, and of
visits... Encounters serving the cause of
bridge-building should not be considered simply
as a duty but also as a specific Austrian
obligation. An encounter between the Latin
Western and the Greek Eastern Church could
introduce such relaxation without commotion.[163]

These statements by Chancellor Klaus summed up succinctly
the ideological motivations of Austria's approach to the
Danubian problem. In practical terms, cooperation and its
expansion mean, first of all, diplomatic relations, economic
relations and different forms of cultural contacts.

In such contacts the Austrians do not intend to proceed
by big steps, to solve longstanding (and outstanding) problems
in a short period of time. "At this time we cannot think of
anything but a policy of small steps; everything else would be
an illusion. We are, however, ready to take these steps
gladly," said Klaus in one of his lectures. The structure of
Austria's contacts with the Danubian area should be built, in
Klaus' opinion, on the basis of a broad encounter of peoples,
and this should be continued in other sectors, too, in the
form of semi-official and official contacts.[164]

Austria's official, state-to-state contacts in the
Danubian area are strictly bilateral with the exception of her
participation in the multilateral Danube Commission. Austria
joined this organization in 1960 and immediately realized the
political as well as technical advantages of it. As Klaus
said in March 1967:

This institution has always been for us an
important, multilateral forum of discussions with the
governments of the other Danubian states. A short
time ago, I had the chance to greet the representatives

------------------------------
(163) Klaus, Josef, "Oesterreich als Mittler abendlaendischen
Gedankengutes nach dem europaeischen Osten.von heute,"
Press release of the 2nd Congressus Internationalis
Historicae Slavicae Salisburgo-Ratisbonensis.

(164) Klaus, Josef, "Der Aufbau der Beziehungen Oesterreichs
zu den uebrigen Laendern des Donauraumes, Osterreichische
Ogthefjte (Vienna), March 1967.

[page 90]

of all the eight member states of the Danube
Commission in Vienna and to express to them my
appreciation for this not so spectacular but
effective and voelkerverbindende work. I hope
the importance of the Danube for interstate trade
in the Danubian region will be increasingly
recognized and that we will succeed in making
out of it a connecting element for our national
economies, for our peoples. Austria is ready for
any discussions for this purpose between the
riparian states.[165]

Austrian economic relations with Eastern Europe in general
and Danubian Europe in particular have turned, as already
indicated, into a controversial issue, and this for two reasons:

1) Former Vice-Chancellor Pitterman, for many years head of
the nationalized industries, has been accused by conservative
circles of deliberately playing up Austria's chances in East
Europe so that, in case Austria would enter the Common Market,
the inefficient nationalized industry could escape competition
with the rationalized German and French heavy industry. [166]
The controversy on this issue tended to fade out when Pittermann
left office in 1966.

2) Independently of the controversy around Pittermann,
Austria's recurring efforts to join the Common Market have
raised the question whether this association would not endanger
her trade with the East as well as her political neutrality,
and whether an increase in Eastern trade could not remove some
of those pressing economic reasons which prompted the strong
desire to become associated with the Common Market. The
government denies the existence of such possibilities, nor does it
see any danger to Austrian neutrality in association with the
Common Market. It feels Austria can maintain or even develop
slightly her trade with the East but that this trade can be no
alternative to Common Market membership. The strongest advocate
of this view is the present Vice-Chancellor and Trade Minister,
Dr. Fritz Bock. His arguments can be summed up as follows:

a) Because of the insufficient convertibility of the Eastern
currencies, it is not possible at this time for Austria to
abandon the bilateral commodity exchange, i.e., clearing system.

b) A complete liberalization of the East European imports is
not feasible since reciprocity could not be introduced: the
state economy system is not really consistent with any real
liberalization. c) Austrian industry, with a small home market
at Its disposal, must depend heavily on exports. d) The
Eastern states, as a consequence of their currency situation,

------------------------------
(165) Ibid.

(166) RFE Special, Vienna, 5 October 1964.

[page 91]

are forced to export in order to pay for their imports, but
the limited capacity of the Austrian market puts limits to
their opportunities in Austria.

All this--Dr. Bock's argumentation goes on--hinders an
overall expansion of the Austrian trade with East Europe.
He concedes, however, that various new ways and means could
lead to some improvement. Cooperation on -third markets,
recently urged by practically all East European countries,
could lead to such improvement. Mineral oil and natural
gas could be another "important factor" in Austrian economic
contacts with the East. Austria has, like all industrial
states, a growing demand for these two sources of energy.
But Bock warns: Austria, in this respect, does not want to
depend exclusively on the East or on the West. "It is in
this perspective that the problem of building pipelines
should be seen... "[167]

Arguments like those used by Dr. Bock make little
impression, however, on the opponents of the Common Market
"line," who are also the protagonists of more trade with the
East. This latter school of thought is composed of a very
interesting assortment: old monarchists, liberals,
conservatives, leftist Catholics, socialists,
and--of course--Communists. The writings of the liberal Friedrich Wlatnig,
in support of more Eastern trade and against Austria's
association with the Common Market, are well received in all
these quarters. His recent book on the Crisis of the
Integration (with strong arguments against Austria's joining the
Common Market) was sympathetically reviewed by the Communist
monthly Weg und Ziel as well as by the left-of-center
Catholic weekly Die Furche.[168]

Dr. Wlatnig is also a contributor to Die Furche.
Commenting on the Austrian trade statistics for the first three
months of 1967 (which show an increase in the trade with
the Danube countries as compared to the same period of the
year 1966), he wrote:

Expanding trade with the five Danubian
countries (Hungary, Rumanian, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia) is without doubt one of the real
tasks of Austrian trade policy. Not only do the
past and the knowledge of local conditions point

------------------------
(167) Bock, Dr. Fritz, "Die wirtschafflichen
Ost-West-Eeziehungen Oesterreichs," in: Aussenwirtschaftsprobleme im
Donauraum (Jupiter Verlag, Vienna),1967, pp. 7-8.

(168) Wlatnig, Friedrich, Krise der Integration, Europa und
Oesterreich (Europa Verlag, Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich),
1 967.

[page 92]
in this direction, but also the geographic
situation and the vital interests of the contracting
partners, who could develop their contacts with
Vienna and Austria very quickly...; and last but
not-least, the short transportation distances
which--compared with all the other states of the
West-—ensure for Austria a mighty leap ahead...

It must be admitted that Tirol, Salzburg, and
Vorarlberg, show, for the time being, small
interest in the problem of Danubian trade, because
other markets can be reached more quickly and
easily. Since, however, trade policy is supposed
to constitute a unity, it cannot base its
orientation on special interests of the individual
Laender. In the current year, one has moved, in
a suggestive way, the cultural sector in the
foreground, in order to speed up the expansion [of
trade] and to arouse the interest of the public...[169]

The counter-arguments (raised inter alia by Bock) could
have been true "till now," writes Wlatnig, but the
"individualization" of the Danubian states now created a new situations
these states will have to depend more and more on imports, which
is "a natural process asserting itself already to a large
extent on the lower Danube." It is, of course, true that this
trade shows certain fluctuations; at all events, the
January-March 1967 exports to the Danubian countries exceeded Austrian
exports to Italy. But they were increasing only in relation
to Yugoslavia,[170] Bulgaria and Rumania, while exports to Hungary
and Czechoslovakia were declining as compared to the first
three months of 1966. Wlatnig feels that new chances are
offered, especially by Rumania and Bulgaria, two countries which
are following the Yugoslav example in looking for new avenues
for their trade and which would certainly be assisted in their
endeavors by the increasing income from the tourist traffic.
"Sofia and Bucharest have broken through the old principle"

according to which imports and exports have to be kept, under all
circumstances, in balance."

In conclusion, Wlatnig pleads for strengthening the
contacts with Rumania, since new chances are opening here for
Austria. In the past, he argues, interest in Bucharest was
hindered by Hungary: "Her revisionism often led the first

----------------------------------
(169) Wlatnig in Die Furche, 6 July 1967.

(170) The exports to Yugoslavia, in the first half of 1967,
increased by 50% while the imports rose only by 10.7% as
compared to the same period of 1966. Die Presse,
13 September 1967.

[page 93]

Republic to one-sided attitudes in the unfortunate dispute
over Transylvania..."[171]

In the same debate, the Austrian Communists have
concentrated on the neutrality issue. In their view Common
Market membership would be "in diametrical contrast" to the
principle of neutrality. An active policy of neutrality
must support all efforts aimed at surmounting and dissolving
the blocs; it is certainly not consistent with the Common
Market. Fortunately, said a typical Communist editorial
forces are growing in Austria which assess neutrality as the
supreme good. These forces include, in addition to the
Communists, "the greater part of the followers of the
Socialist Party as well as the Catholic democrats."[172]

As to the concrete problems of the Osthandel, the
Communists accuse the government, mainly Bock, of keeping it
deliberately within narrow limits in order to prove that
Austria has no alternative but the Common Market. Austria
wants to continue her trade with the East on the basis of
the experiences of the last ten years, trying to sell steel
against vegetables, and forgetting completely about the basic
changes which have taken place in the Eastern European trade
structure and potential. The Communists urge the foreign
trade policy makers to study the Eastern developments more
thoroughly and to adapt the Austrian trade structure policy
to the changing markets in the East. The Austrian chances
lie in the East, they argue, in true industrial cooperation,
in common research and development work, in founding
interstate financing institutes, in granting long-term and cheap
credits...[173]

The debate is still wide open and it will remain so
until the question of Common Market membership is finally
settled. In any. case, it has reflected a keen public
interest in Austria's foreign trade problems and the role of
Eastern Europe in them.

The cultural aspects of Austrian relations with the
Danubian countries are much less controversial. The Danube
Vallev is considered by the Austrian government as one of
those Intensivzonen in which Austria can fulfill a special
cultural mission on the basis of her geographic, historic and

------------------------------
(171) Wlatnig, Die Furche, op.cit.

(172) Scharf, Erwin, "Neutralitaet und Europaeische Sicherheit,"
Weg und Ziel (Vienna), May 1967.

(173) "Schaufenster zum Osten," Sonderbeilage der Volksstimme,
28-29 October 1967.

[page 94]

political traditions.[174] In view of this it may seem a little
odd that, while in the economic sphere all Danubian relations
are regulated "by formal contracts and agreements, only one
cultural agreement has been concluded between Austria and an
Eastern European country, and that is with non-Danubian
Poland.[175] with the Danubian peoples all cultural traffic is
conducted on the basis of verbal agreements, individual
invitations of persons, groups, orchestras, theaters and other
ensembles. This kind of informal approach was particularly
favored by Austria in the early period of its rapprochement
with the East. More recently, however, there has been an
effort to put these contacts on a more solid basis, in the
shape of formal agreements. According to recent reports,
Rumania could become the first Danubian country to conclude a
cultural agreement with Austria, the draft of which has
apparently already been circulated. With Hungary, negotiations
have been going on since 1964 to build an Austrian Cultural

Institute in Budapest. At present, the only such Austrian
institute in East Europe is in Warsaw. (There is also an
Austrian reading room in Zagreb, Yugoslavia.) The Budapest
plan had failed because of building site problems but it was
discussed again during Klaus' visit to Hungary, with a quick
solution promised. Preparations are also being made to send,
before the end of the year, an Austrian cultural attache to
Budapest with the purpose of intensifying cultural-scientific
contactS.[176]

The forms of cultural contacts are very varied:
individual visits of artists, writers, professors; exchange of non-

------------------------------
(174) Piffl-Percevic, Theodor, "Oesterreich und die kulturelle
Interdependence der Voelker in der Welt von heute,"
Oesterreichische Osthefte, May 1967.

(175) The first Polish-Austrian agreement on cultural and
scientific cooperation, covering the years 1966 and 1967,
was concluded on 30 October 1965. A new agreement for
the next two years was initialled in" Vienna on
27 October 1967 and will be signed in December of
this year. Parallel with it an agreement was reached on
a new five year trade treaty governing trade and mutual
exchange of goods between Austria and Poland from 1
January 1968 to 31 December 1971. (RFE Special, Vienna, 28
October 1967.)

A report on the activities of the Austrian Cultural
Institute in Warsaw was delivered at the Slavistentagung in
Vienna on 1 March 1967 by Fritz Cocron, Director or the
Institute. (Sees Cocron, Fritz, "Das Oesterreichische
Kulturinstitut in Warschau," Oesterreichische Osthefte,
September 1967.)

(176) Salzburger Nachrichten, 20 May 1967; DiePresse, 16 June
1967.

[page 95]

professional artistic groups; professional theater, opera,
orchestra performances on a reciprocal basis; round-table
discussions; scientific-academic conferences with Austrian
and Danubian participants, or general East-West congresses
with specific Danubian interest; artistic exhibitions; common
book publishing projects, periodicals specializing in
East-West contacts (Literatur und Kritik, Salzburg). It would be
difficult to say which are the most effective forms of
cultural cooperation. . But perhaps the following should be
particularly mentioned since they have attracted a good deal of
attention in Austria:

. congresses and symposia dealing with the problems of
Habsburg and Balkan history;

. the institutionalized Europa Gespraeche of the city
of Vienna;

. the equally institutionalized Ost-West Gespraeche in
Vienna;

. the congresses of Slav history in Salzburg; and

. study meetings of the East European and Danubian
institutes in Austria.

These Eastern European and Danubian institutes are worth
some attention. The most important are the following:


1) Oesterreichisches Institut fuer
Ost-und Suedost-Europa, Vienna, the official Austrian research institute, under
the auspices of the Ministry of Education. It is engaged in
East and South-East European studies, organizing and sponsoring
conferences on historical, social and economic problems with
prominent participants from East and West. (A good example of
such conferences was the one on nationalism in the Czech lands
in the 19th and 20th centuries held in Baden, Austria, 22-25
October 1966, with the participation of historians from
Czechoslovakia, the German Federal Republic and Austria.) The
Institute undertakes also study trips to Eastern Europe to promote
personal contacts between scholars in different fields. It
publishes Oesterreichische Osthefte, and several surveys and
research papers. The original title of this institution was
Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Ost- und Suedostforschung.

2) Forschungsinstitut fuer Fragen des Donauraumes, Vienna,
a private institute set up in 1953 with strong emigre
participation. It was the first Austrian institute of this kind; it
is primarily history-oriented, but also deals extensively with
economic and social problems. Publisher of the journal Per
Donauraum.

3) Donaueuropaeisches Institut, Vienna, organized in 1947.
This concentrates almost exclusively on concrete economic

[page 96]

problems of the Danubian era. Its president is Vice-Chancellor
and Minister of Trade Dr. Fritz Bock. It holds yearly
conferences mainly to disseminate information to the Austrian
world of business, with lecturers from East and West (sometimes
even with Soviet participants). It publishes a press
information bulletin.

4) Gesellschaft fuer Ost- und Suedosteuropakunde, Linz,
a private organization which is mainly interested in economic
and technical contacts. It organizes language courses.

5) The Oesterreichisches Institut fuer
Wirtschaftsforschung, Vienna. This is an economic research institute with
strong Danubian interest. Recently, the idea has been
propagated that this institute should be expanded into an Austrian
Center of East-West Researcho (Sees Nemschak, Dr. Franz,
"Die Welt von Morgen-—wie im Reagenzglas," Die Presse, May
20-21, 1967.)

The number of those participating in Austria's cooperative
ventures with the Communist Danubian states varies according to
the mood of the Communist passport authorities, the currency
situation, personal considerations, interference of political
events, border incidents, etc. A literary round-table
conference of writers from East and West, for instance, scheduled for
24-26 October 1966 had to be called off because the Hungarian
Communist authorities refused passports for the prospective
Hungarian participants on the ground that the date (10th
anniversary of the Hungarian revolution) and the theme of the
discussion ("Literature as tradition and revolution") constituted
a gross provocation. The discussion was eventually held six
months later, in April 1967, but with a more limited number of
East Europeans than originally planned. In some cases politics
do not seem to interfere at all with the volume of cultural
cooperation. Czechoslovakia, for instance, in spite of the
many ups and downs in her political relations with Austria,
seems eager to maintain cultural contacts. Though cooperation on
a Danubian basis is not a frequent subject of discussion in
the Czechoslovak press, a fairly impressive delegation from
Prague attended the 5th International Seminar of the Europahaus
in Vienna, the theme of which was: the Danubian
region--yester-day, today, tomorrow. Czechoslovak ensembles also participated
in the Vienna Festivals 1967, held under the motto of "Neighbors
on the Danube."

B. Klaus In Budapest

As a test case it is perhaps helpful to study as
specifically as possible Austria's relations with Hungary and how she has
responded to Budapest's call for Danubian cooperation.

In the first phase of Hungary's Danubian initiative Austria,
although actively interested in expanding contacts with Eastern
Europe, did not think of this in terms of anything specifically


[page 97]

Danubian. In the second phase, however ("beginning in the
spring of 1966), the Danubian stress in her Eastern European
policy became much more evident. Between the two phases,
political changes had taken place in Austria: the Socialists
(including Pittermann and Kreisky) left the government when,
as a result of the March 1966 election, the coalition was
discontinued and a new government consisting exclusively of
People's Party's representatives was formed by Chancellor
Klaus. This development led some observers to predict a
falling off in Austria's interest in Eastern Europe. Actually,
Klaus not only kept the former course but has even sought to
increase contacts with Eastern Europe, hoping at the same
time for an arrangement with the Common Market. In January
1967 a two-day conference of the heads of Austrian diplomatic
missions in East European countries was held in Vienna, and
this marked the beginning of a busy East European and Danubian
year. The conference paid special attention to Austria's
relations with the Danubian countries, and to the possible
expansion of the political, economic and cultural relations.
Klaus, in his address to the conference, emphasized that Austria
was not lacking the goodwill to expand such contacts with the
Danubian states. Foreign Minister Toncic said afterwards that
the meeting was of basic importance in formulating future
Austrian policies toward East Europe.[177]

Klaus's Budapest visit was preceded by some impatient
articles in the Austrian press urging the government not to
leave unanswered the Danubian initiative of the Hungarian regime.
The most outspoken was an editorial in Die Furche, the Catholic
weekly considered close to Cardinal Koenig. Die Furche, not
without amazement, took note of the many articles which had
appeared in the Hungarian press, especially in the semi-official
German language weekly, Budapester Rundschau, devoted to the
"common ideas and interests in the Danubian region." It did not
accept all the arguments coming from Budapest but felt that
"behind this curtain of iron, one can perceive, for the first
time, a new view of the central European policy." What
particularly attracted Die Furche was the Hungarian notion of regional
systems of security "as preconditions for an all-European system
of security and of peace." Die Furche commented:[178]

Budapest becomes even more concrete when it
suggests a closer cooperation between Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary, after having called
attention to the Tardieu and Hodza Diana of the
inter-war-period and having drawn a parallel with the
increasing cooperation in the Balkans between states
with different social systems.

------------------------------
(177) RFE Special, Vienna, 1.3 January 1967.

(178) Skalnik, Kurt, "Donau", Die Furche, 4 March 1967.

[page 98]

This diplomatic ball should be taken over and
put to the political test by the Austrian policy--
by an Austrian policy fulfilling the tasks of this
country. Meanwhile, it will mostly depend on
Hungarian willingness to procure a real basis for an
all-European discussion by [adhering] to the "model"
created by Yugoslavia and taken over by Bulgaria
(abolition of visas and of every "technical
border-blockade" ).

One speaks again about Danubian Furope. The
logic of history claims its rights... A
confederation of the two German states...can become a reality
only when the closer cooperation of the states in
the Danubian region will provide the "Ruropean
politics with an adequate balance...

One of the highlights of Klaus's four-day Hungarian visit
was his lecture delivered at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
on 3 May 1967, so far the most detailed public exposé on Austria's
Danubian policy as well as a declaration of readiness to enter
into close cooperation with Hungary in such a Danubian framework.
In the introductory part of his speech, Klaus expounded the
basic concepts of Austrian foreign policy:

1) Pursuit of "healthy relations" among the nations. What
does Austria understand by this term?

By that [said Klaus] we understand not just the
peaceful coexistence of nations under no military
menace. Respect for others is also seen in the
renunciation of the aggressive propagation of one's own
principles by other than military means. It is in
this spirit also that we accept the principle of
peaceful coexistence,, Which of the systems is better
must be left to the free choice of nations, to the
better arguments and better, results.[179]

2) Keeping to the principles of perpetual neutrality. In
this connection the Chancellor said:

...It is in this concept of permanent neutrality
and in the determination to maintain it by all
available means, that we see the essential safeguard of our
independence.

...The choice of permanent neutrality...is
dictated not only by the Austrian people's long-term need

------------------------------
(179) This and the following quotations from Klaus's address are
taken from the English language, The New Hungarian
Quarterly (Budapest), Autumn 1967. Here Klaus's full text was
printed under the titles "An Active Policy of International
Relations in the Danube Valley,"

[page 99]

for security; it is our corresponding contribution
to a relaxation of tension among the peoples of
Europe and to international understanding.
Precisely as a consequence of this we see it as an
obligation to regard permanent neutrality not as a
position of isolation, but as a spur to an active
policy of international relations.

3) Next, the Austrian Chancellor mentioned pluralism and
federalism as principles influencing foreign policy:

Austrian foreign policy, naturally, also
reflects the constructive principles guiding the state.
Our own recognition of the democracy of pluralism
also leads us to accept, on an international scale,
the principle of different social systems living
constructively together. Our federalist principles,
assuming the autonomous development of independently
growing units in our country, the principle of
solidarity...coupled with the principle providing
subsidies, help us to understand the desire of peoples
for independence and autonomous development in the
sense of the maxim: "As much freedom as is possible,
as much regulation as is necessary."

4) After reviewing the basic principles of Austrian foreign
policy, Klaus turned to the problem of Danubian cooperation,
presenting it as the fourth plank in Austrian foreign policy:

... I have to declare here that Austria is ready
in the first place to examine any proposal, and to
join in any initiative, which would promote a real
detente in the area in which we live. The
establishment of good neighborly relations between the countries
of the Danube Valley is, it seems to me, an important
factor in a general detente in Europe. It may possibly
be in this place, 'where the Danube connects Western
and Eastern Europe, that the greatest chance exists to
begin to strengthen understanding between East and
West.

Technological developments are driving the
sciences and the economy on to increasingly gigantic
projects. Investment, both in human skill and in
capital, is growing. A realistic awareness of this
development compels us to extensive cooperation if we
want to enjoy our share of scientific and economic
progress. Today isolation is no guarantee of peace,
and in economic and scientific fields it only
guarantees a further widening of the gap between the large
industrial nations and the medium-sized and smaller
countries. Effective cooperation among the Danube
Valley countries would conform to this maxim of our
time. It would be--and let us not underestimate this

[page 100]

political consideration—a cooperation between equals,
allowing of no position of hegemony.

Austria, particularly since 1955, has directed
its energies towards developing and improving her
relations with the neighboring states along these
lines.

Klaus recalled the UN resolution of 21 December 1965 which
welcomed the development of good neighborly relations and
cooperation among European states of different social systems:

In this resolution, the Federal Government of
Austria sees a permanent appeal to the peoples of
the Danube Valley, where history, geography and our
future tasks in fact oblige us to find our way from
coexistence to a sort of living together. This policy,
of course, must not be confined to declarations; it
must bring practical, concrete results.

Klaus considered the visits to Vienna of the Prime Ministers of
Poland and Rumania;, of the Soviet Head of State, Podgorny, and
of the Yugoslav Head of State, Marshal Tito, as providing valuable
opportunities for discussing problems of European detente. His
own visits to East Europe, Klaus added, were serving the same
purpose. But the final aim was much broader than just a regional
co-operations

I believe [Klaus explained] that at the same
time a valuable and essential precondition for all

European cooperation, especially in the economic
field, is being brought about. The Federal Government
of Austria takes an active interest in various efforts
for regional economic cooperation in Europe. But this
is not the final goal; our exertions are directed
towards an all-European cooperation, which will permit
this continent to organize its intellectual resources
and economic means by its own efforts, and to cooperate
for the progress of mankind in a systematic competition
with the large regional units outside Europe.

It is not romanticism, but a realistic view of
the past, present and future, if I here declare that
the past made us inhabitants of the same homeland, the
present made us neighbors, and the future calls for
cooperation if we are desirous of securing the
scientific and social progress which is within our reach.

Such good neighborly relations, Klaus emphasized, must
develop on the basis of the principles of independence and national
sovereignty, equality of rights of the peoples, non-interference
in internal affairs, and reciprocal advantages in economic,
scientific and social fields. -On the basis of such principles
Austria was ready to join in every initiative of closer Danubian

[page 101]

cooperation. This was especially true in respect to Hungary
since:

Our two European peoples are linked in social
intimacy by history; they live within a self-contained
geographical formation, the Danube Valley, and are
neighbors. In every continent "two nations on the
same river," one is tempted to say, means in
politico-geographical history particularly close relations
and contacts, either in a. peaceful or in a warlike
sense.

Austria and Hungary have traveled together over
long periods of their history. In the course of the
journey they have had moments of understanding and
misunderstanding, and it is a hundred years to this
very time that an attempt was made to give a new form
to the relations of the two peoples in the
Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich.


Chancellor Klaus then turned to the very specific problems
and possibilities of Auctro-Hungarian cooperation. In spite of
the many common chapters in their Danubian history and the
necessity to learn from past experience, Hungarians and Austrians
should not forget, Klaus said. that "the wheel of history only
turns forward; we want it to turn forward; we cannot do
otherwise; there is no turning back." This was obviously said to
forestall any suspicion (or hope) that Vienna's Danubian policy
was aiming at the reconstruction of obsolete political structures.
Klaus also mentioned mutual goodwill as another pre-condition
of a fruitful cooperation. This passage of his speech was
interpreted in political circles as a reference to the still remaining
"technical barriers" on the Hungarian side of the
Austro-Hungarian border, a source both of human tragedies and of political
tensions between the two countries. Klaus stated:

...This open manifestation of goodwill is an
important element in the development of good neighborly
relations. May I be permitted to say frankly that
good neighborly relations will only come about if this
goodwill is reflected in the everyday life of the
countries, if all the mistrust and obstacles which
separate man from man ere eliminated.

Goodwill and realism: not big word but a policy of small
steps could lead, in Klaus's view, to good results especially
in the following two areas:

a) Cultural cooperation; Klaus said that on the basis of
the principles he had enumerated,

...the Federal Government of Austria wishes for
intensified cultural relations with the land of Bartok,

[page 102]

Kodaly, Szondi, Semmelweis, Petofi and the other
scientists, poets, philosophers, medical men and
musicians who have enriched the whole of European
culture and science.

b) Economic and technical co-operations In this
connection, Klaus stated the following:

Austria wishes for increasing cooperation in
trade policies. We are anxious to promote contacts
between scientific institutions and the exchange of
information for our mutual benefit. An active
policy of international relations between Hungary
and Austria has to make itself felt in the future.
We have come to Budapest to declare quite plainly
our readiness to this effect, to express
unequivocally our will to progress, and to say openly that we
judge the value of such good neighborly relations
by the activities on which we have agreed.

The Austrian Chancellor concluded by expressing the
conviction that, by his presence in Hungary and the speech he had
made, he was "setting up another milestone in the
thousand-year-old history of Austro-Hungarian relations." But keeping to
the spirit of realism, he suggested that instead of the
pretentious "Austro-Hungarian Compromise" only the words
"Austro-Hungarian Communication" should be written on this milestone.

This speech which clearly indicated the Austrian
willingness to talk with Hungary about closer Danubian cooperation,
also set the tone for concrete political negotiations. The
final communiqué put the Hungarian-Austrian problem in its
Danubian context and once again reaffirmed both sides'
intentions "to expand further and to intensify Hungarian-Austrian
relations despite the differences in the two countries' social
systems," As to the details, it was agreed that "possibilities
for a wider exchange of goods were not yet exhausted" and that
a new trade agreement "will hopefully provide a basis for
mutually favorable (economic) relations in the years ahead,"[180]

------------------------------
(180) The new long-term treaty was signed on 27 November 1967.
It will cover the period from 1 January 1968 to 31
December 1972. According to Austrian sources, it is
"essentially a continuation of the present trade exchange accord
having the goal of topping present trade." In Hungary,
however, the new accord was greeted with some satisfaction.
Its main merit is seen in further measures of
liberalization. All in all, 40 percent of Hungarian exports to
Austria will be affected by the new Austrian policy of
liberalization. Furthermore, some new items have been
added to the Hungarian export list, and some old items
expanded. It is hoped that on (continued on next page...)
[page 103]

Reference was also made to "the possibility of increasing
industrial and economic cooperation and the elaboration of
some large-scale undertakings."[181] The two sides also agreed
on the development of cultural and technical-scientific
cooperation and decided to set up a permanent commission to
smooth the implementation of the program. No mention was made
in the communiqué of the border problems but, during his
Budapest press conference, Klaus confirmed that it had been
discussed. The atmosphere, he said, made it possible that "the
problem of technical border barriers could be aired during
the discussions with the same frankness as other questions."
He expressed hope that a total removal of mines along the
Austro-Hungarian border would follow, an announcement received with
skepticism in Austria.[182]

The Klaus visit to Budapest clarified, on the one hand,
Austrian readiness to enter into a Danubian cooperation with
Hungary but also set off, on the other hand, a wave of domestic
criticism directed against the Ostpolitik of the Vienna
government. Later, after the Bucharest and Sofia visits of the
Chancellor, the controversy only intensified. The Austrian
Socialists, now no longer in power, were among the strongest critics

----------------------------------------
this basis "trade relations and economic cooperation
between the two countries will increase and will create a
basis for the further expansion of the present mutual
exchange of goods." (Pataki, Miklos,
"Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Oesterreich im Aufschwung," Budapester Rundschau,
3 November 1967.) Meanwhile, it was disclosed that in the
first six months of 1967 Hungary exported some 13.8 million
dollars worth of goods to Austria, while Austrian exports to
Hungary amounted to. 22.8 million dollars. In 1966 the two
countries exchanged 77.5 million dollars worth of goods
with an Austrian export surplus of about one million
dollars. (RFE Special, Vienna, 12 October 1967.)

(181) Simultaneously with the economic talks, discussions also
started on a treaty of technical-industrial cooperation
to put the process of cooperation on a regulcir basis. In
this connection, newspapers reported talks between the
Austrian Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG- to revive the new
cooperation with the Hungarian motor industry and to extend it
to all kinds of vehicles from bicycles to tractors.
(Salzburger Na.chrichten, 22 August 1967; Volksstimme, 16
September 1967.)

(182) RFE Special, Vienna, 5 May 1967.


[page 104]

but they were also joined by different liberal, conservative
and Catholic elements. The main accusation was that Klaus
was consistently neglecting Austria's Western partners while
establishing contacts with the East. As Chancellor of a
coalition government, with Socialist participation, he had
visited one neutral, three Western and only one Eastern
country. Since, however, his party had been alone in the
government, so the accusation ran, he had visited four Eastern
states, only one Western state (Britain) and had not yet set
foot on neutral soil. Klaus's Ostpolitik was accused of
being a mixture of amateurishness and missionary zeal; he was
showing "buttersoft friendliness towards the Communist bosses
he shakes hands with cruel oppressors of human rights in
the course of pompous receptions, and returns home each time
with great expectations but without concrete results."[183]

Twice Klaus reacted directly to these attacks, once in a
newspaper article before leaving for Sofia, and then in a lecture
given while in the Bulgarian capital. It was an axiom of
Austrian foreign policy, he wrote in the Volksblatt,[184]
to develop good contacts not only with the signatory powers of
the 1955 State Treaty but also with all the neighbors in the
Danubian region,, He recalled the December 1965 resolution of
the UN General Assembly welcoming good neighborly relations
between the European states of different political and social
systems, but, at the same time, he insisted that Austria, while
fully subscribing to this, stedfastly rejected Communism as
an ideology and a social structure. Referring to his Eastern
European visits, Klaus discounted the "pompous reception"
charge; he went there for "personal talks with the ruled and
their rulers." All this was of a bilateral character and
brought considerable advantages. The Western countries had
similar contacts with the East and it should not be overlooked
that Austria was intensifying her contacts with these Western
countries also.

During his address in Sofia to the Bulgarian Academy of
Sciences,[185] Klaus stressed that Austria's neutrality and firm
adherence to the Western political and social system made it
possible for her to conduct an open dialogue with the Communist
states "without any missionary character." Professing the
principle of peaceful coexistence, which could be- effective "only
with the full recognition of pluralism, Austrian foreign policy
was exploring new openings in the Danubian region for the

------------------------------
(183) See, for instance, Die Presse, 8 May 1967; Express (Vienna),

20 October 1967':: Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 16 and 24 October
1967o

(184) As reported by Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 16 October 1967.

(185) Ibid., 24 October 1967.

[page 105]

relaxation of East-West tensions. Many more contacts of
goodwill were, however, needed in order to turn the policy of
relaxation into a true policy of peaceful coexistence and
European security.

The statements by Klaus were followed by several more --
official and semi-official, in and out of parliament --
defending the Eastern policy of the government. This
counterattack did not stifle all criticism as can be judged, for
example, from a full page attack published by the leading
Austrian newspaper, Die Presse, at the end of October 1967.
In perhaps the most polemical tone yet on the subject, Die
Presse denounced the Ostpolitik of the government as a
complete failure. It criticised Austrian contacts with the East
as mainly consisting of empty talk. What had been achieved
had also been achieved by other Western countries without all
the fanfare, wishful thinking and misleading information about
"liberalization" of the Communist system. The summer incidents
at the Czechoslovak-Austrian border were quoted as a typical
example of basically unchanged Communist attitudes. A new
assessment of the Austrian Ostpolitik was needed, wrote the
author of the Die Presse article, a sober, objective and
unemotional stock-taking free from any illusions.[186]

The violence of the Die Presse attack caused a strong
reaction both from government circles and from that section of
the press supporting the government's Ostpolitik. Speaking to
the Austrian Foreign Political Association, Foreign Minister
Toncic replied that the government's critics both underestimate
the ideological power of resistance of the West and overestimate
the ideological ability of persuasion of the East; in any case,
they revealed an insufficient knowledge of the evolutionary
developments in Eastern Europe. The goal of the Austrian
foreign policy would continue to be, Toncic stressed, that of a
stabilizing factor in the middle of the Danubian region.[187]

A strong riposte in Die Furche came from its
Editor-in-Chief, Kurt Skalnik. The "zealous brakemen," he wrote, did not
see (or did not want to see) the process of differentiation
going on in the Communist countries. Europe ended for them at
the Eastern borders of Austria. "To sit at the table with other
equal and mature nations of the Danubian region: this is a
thorny idea for them." It was ironical, thought Skalnik, that
the brakemen numbered Socialists among them, since the
Socialists had also been a target for the brakemen when they were in
office. In reality, said Skalnik, an Austrian Ostpolitik was
much more needed today than ever before. He then succinctly

------------------------------
(186) Observator, "Die Sage von den 'traditionellen Bindungen,'"
Die Presse, 28/29 October 1967.

(187) Ibid., 2 November 1967.

[page 106]

described what should be the character of such a policy:

...Short-range aims are in the foreground,
cultural agreements- here, small common economic
objectives there. The long-range aim, i.e., to
bring closer to each other the peoples
artificially-separated in the Danubian region for such a long
time, should not be overlooked in the meanwhile.
Spes contra spem. To hope even if all hope is
seemingly senseless. Even in such cases, this is
the proper attitude for a Christian. [188]

In the midst of all this fray, it is perhaps useful to
quote the opinion of a neutral observer- on the Austrian scene.
The Vienna correspondent of the Neue Zuercher Zeitung, after
reporting on the internal controversy in Ausxria, came to the
following conclusion:[189]

No doubt, ...the criticism of the Ostpolitik
of the government is not free of exaggerations. It
[the Ostpolitik] was certainly not as unsuccessful
as often maintained,, Aside from Czechoslovakia, the
border situation with the other neighbors has
essentially improved, Austrian trade with the East
is slowly but constantly expanding, and even Austria's
cultural activity in the Danubian region will bear
its fruit in the long run. One could, however, ask
the question whether the same results could not have
been achieved with a somewhat more unpretentious
display. Namely, the personal engagement of the federal
Chancellor carries with it, in the view of some
observers, a gain in prestige for the Communist rulers
which is perhaps not always and everywhere desirable.

VII. THE REST OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

The Danubian project of the Hungarian regime calls for a
closer cooperation between Hungary, Austria., Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia, as the first stage of a larger cooperation in
the Danubian Valley. The overall Austrian reaction to the
project, even taking into consideration the many justified
reservations, can be termed positive. No comparable attitude
can be found, however, in the rest of the Danubian countries.
At least on the surface it certainly appears that the Budapest
invitations to Danubian cooperation either remain almost
unanswered., or paralleled with calls for regional! cooperation in
a different framework, or indirectly refuted. In Yugoslavia

------------------------------
(188) Skalnik, Kurt, "Ostpolitik," Die 'Furche, 11 November 1967.

(189) Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 16 October 1967.

[page 107]

and Czechoslovakia, the concept of the Danube appears only
very rarely, and when it does it is mostly in connection with
some explicitly technical project about navigation or power
supply.

A. Yugoslavia

This is true, first of all, of Yugoslavia. The country
which was instrumental in producing the Tito-Dimitrov Balkan
federation project, and whose relationship with Hungary is
termed by Budapest sources as examplary for Danubian
cooperation, has manifested no direct public reaction to the
Hungarian project, and hardly makes any public mention of Danubian
cooperation.

Yugoslav-Hungarian relations have certainly developed
very favorably since the early 1960s and especially since
1964-65. There are regular meetings between Tito and Kadar,
the most recent taking place between 2 and 4 February 1967 in
Budapest. On his way back from the Soviet Union, Tito and
his wife stayed for two days on an "unofficial friendly visit"
in Budapest, which prompted Radio Belgrade to comment that such
visits "constitute a significant contribution and promotion
of the all-round Yugoslav-Hungarian collaboration." Radio
Belgrade also said that the two countries' basic interests and
efforts coincide both in the international and the internal
field. It continued:

The bilaterally useful and equal collaboration
can be promoted and strengthened under conditions of
a broader mutual acquaintance and of the raising of
mutual confidence to a higher level... In the
dynamic construction of socialism certain differences
in handling some problems are natural, but it is not
natural that they should be a hindrance to common
activities in the interest of peace and socialism.[190]

Shortly after Klaus's visit to Budapest, the Hungarian
Foreign Minister Janos Peter left for Yugoslavia for a five-day
visit (8-13 May 1967). He had official talks in Belgrade and
visited different provincial centers, including the Vorvodina,
the center of the Hungarian minority. As the Belgrade papers
pointed out, it was the first visit a Hungarian socialist
Foreign Minister had ever made to Yugoslavia. The talks touched
upon a whole range of problems, from Vietnam through European
security down to typical bilateral issues. Peter and his hosts
agreed that bilateral cooperation could be considerably
strengthened and laid particular stress on improving the various schemes
of industrial cooperation between the two countries. The subject
where the two sides came closest to Danubian cooperation was

------------------------------
(190) Radio Belgrade, 5 February 1967.

[page 108]

the UN resolution on the cooperation between European countries
with different social systems and European security in general.
But, at least publicly, nothing was said on specific Danubian
issues. The press praised the talks, stressing that Hungary
and Yugoslavia, although one is a member of the Warsaw Pact
and the other uncommitted, "can successfully cooperate in the
different fields of international life." In conclusion the
press quoted from the official toasts according to which "the
positive evolution of Hungaro-Yugoslav relations have a
favorable effect on the development of the situation along the
Danube and, beyond this, in all Europe.[191]

The Hungarian press, commenting on Peter's visit, reflected
the restrained tone of the Belgrade statements and did not
put the visit in any Danubian context. However, the specific
character of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations has recently been
strongly emphasised on both sides. In this respect, the
statement made by the new Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, Geza
Tikvicki, when presenting his credentials in June 1967, deserves
attention:

...the state reached in the contacts of our [two]
neighboring socialist countries...requires at the
present the application of higher, up-to-date forms
of cooperation. Present developments taking place in
the world resolutely demand the search for new forms
and methods of our political, economic and other
relations...[192]

Among such "other relations", the situation of the Hungarian
minority in Yugoslavia should be mentioned. All reports suggest
that the situation of this minority has improved rapidly in
recent years, especially in the educational-cultural field.
Direct contacts have been established with institutions and
personalities in Hungary. For example, Hungarian writers from
Yugoslavia participated as a collective group in the Book Week of
Budapest of this year, with official Yugoslav blessing. The
Hungarian press in Yugoslavia can openly discuss such contacts
and air specific problems of the Hungarian community. Early this
year negotiations were begun to establish in Novy Sad an
Institute of Hungarian Studies which would deal with the-specific
problems of Hungarian minority life in Yugoslavia.[193]

Dr. Ferenc Erdei, Secretary General of the Patriotic
People's Front of Hungary, made a ten-day study tour of Yugoslavia

------------------------------
(191) Nejjszabadsag, 14 May 1967.

(192) Ibido, 28 June 1967.

(193) Esti.Jlirlap, 7 April 1967.

[page 109]

in June 1966. At the end of the tour, when asked about his
impressions, he said:

My greatest satisfaction was that I did not
suffer any disappointment concerning the...[Yugoslav]
nationality policy. According to all previous
information the socialist policy of the coexistence
of the nationalities was put in practice here in an
exemplary fashion. All that I have seen and
perceived here confirmed this...[194]

The inter-state importance of the minority question was
also emphasized during Peter's visit to Yugoslavia. While
touring Voivodina, Peter, as well as Ilja Rajacic, head of
the local State parliament, repeatedly emphasized that "the
Hungarian minority of Yugoslavia plays the mediatory role
"between the two neighboring socialist countries."[195]

Yugoslav-Austrian relations took a similarly satisfactory
turn rather earlier--in 1959 and 1960. The relations have been
praised, as we have seen, in different forms, as an example
of "how easy it is to establish lasting relations without
friction with a state, "[196] and as a model of Austrian relations
with Eastern Europe. On these occasion of Tito's sentimental
journey to Austria in February 1967, Yugoslav Survey published
a 25-page review of the Austro-Yugoslav relations, showing
the greatest possible variety of contacts between the two
countries.[197] The favorable solution of the Slovenian minority
question greatly contributed, in the view of the experts, to
this positive development. Since October 1964, payments between
Yugoslavia and Austria have been made in convertible currency,
an Austrian concession no other East European country yet enjoys.
In 1965, Austria accorded to Yugoslav exports the same regime
of liberalization as applied to GATT countries. Moreover,
Austria has become the first (and only) Danubian country in the
narrower sense of the word which employs Yugoslav foreign
workers. In February 1965, agreements were concluded regulating
the employment of such workers and their social security and
health insurance.[198]

------------------------------
(194) Magyar Szo (Novy Sad), 23 June 1966.

(195) Nepszabadsag, 10 May 1967.

(196) Kreisky in an interview to Radio Ljubljana, 4 January 1964.

(197) "Relations Between Yugoslavia and Austria," Yugoslav Survey
(Belgrade), February 1967.

(198) RFE Special, Vienna, 12 February 1965.

[page 110]

Yugoslav scholars frequently participate in Austrian
undertakings, and show a lively interest in past, present and future
Danubian cooperation,[199] One can also say that the Yugoslav
press takes a friendly and sympathetic attitude to Austria.
Articles deal frequently with Austro-Yugoslav relations, praise

Vienna's "active policy of neutrality" which "contributes to the
relaxation of tension in Europe," her rapprochement with "Eastern
Europe," the "constantly developing" Yugoslav-Austrian economic
relations, etc.

But, despite these Yugoslav deeds and words, there has
been no specific stress on closer Danubian cooperation as such.
One might have expected Tito- to raise this topic during his
visit to Austria in 1966. But his main theme was the role of
the small countries, without openly referring to Danubian Europe.
In an interview with the Austrian press agency APA on the eve of
his visit to Austria, Tito said that the tendency of
underestimating the role of small countries in international affairs
was harmful "because it threatens the principle of equality, on
which alone stable international relations can be founded...."
Although they have no substantial economic or military potential,
small countries represent an important moral and political force
in international affairs. They could influence international
trends by their initiatives in the United Nations and elsewhere,
and especially by the example of their constructive policies.
As far as Europe was concerned, Tito continued, the initiatives
and actions of "some small countries" in improving relations and
cooperation among European states envisage "positive results."
In this connection, he referred specifically to the initiative
the nine European countries at the United Nations in calling
for a meeting of European parliaments. In the latter part of
the interview he praised Yugoslav-Austrian relations which were
"on the upswing," both sides hoped for "as wide and substantial
cooperation as possible in terms of equality*" In conclusion
he emphasized the significance of economic cooperation between
the two countries.[200]

The interview set the tone of the official talks in Austria.
It is not without interest, however, that shortly before the
issuance of the Yugoslav-Austrian communique on the talks in
Vienna, Radio Belgrade, in its domestic service in Serbo-Croatian,
was at pains to dispel the notion that there was anything
exclusively "Danubian" in relations between the two countries:

On the political level it can today be said that
the official visit of our President to neighborly

------------------------------
(199) At the 5th International Seminar of the Europahaus in Vienna,
Professor Jaroslav Sidak from Zagreb insisted that young
generations should also be initiated in discussions dealing
with future forms of cooperation. Varga, op. cit. p. 236.

(200) As reported by Belgrade Tanjug, International Service in
English, 11 February 1967.

[page 111]

Austria has completely succeeded in every respect.
Non-aligned Yugoslavia ana neutral Austria have once again
indicated that they can very closely cooperate, primarily
on the preservation of peace in Europe, and in the
preparation of even more favorable conditions for an
expansion of general European cooperation. Therefore,
for instance, the already existing very close
cooperation between the two—countries in the well—known club
of nine countries, which is working toward the
functioning of European parliaments on a general European
plan, should be further promoted and expanded to
other fields. In this respect, care should be taken
that certain European political circles should not
entertain the view that small, neutral or non-aligned
countries of the old continent want to create a
special club with narrow, special economic and
political interests. for instance in the Danubian area or
elsewhere.[201]

This broadcast seemed to be stressing that Yugoslav policy
was against "compromising combinations." But there is enough
evidence to show, however, that Yugoslavia is by no means against
regional combinations as such. Many Yugoslav voices clearly
refer to the useful role that regional grouping can play in
European politics, and devote much space to inter-Balkan relations.

For example, an article in November 1966 in the Belgrade
Review of International Affairs drew attention to the new spirit
increasingly manifest in all parts of Europe, especially within
"little Europe," in Scandinavia, the East European countries,
and the Balkans. This spirit indicated "a growing readiness...
to make way for deeper changes in inter-European relations."
The author felt the initiative of the "Club of Nine" to organize
an all-European parliamentary ¦conference deserved a special
place among the new attempts to promote cooperation in Europe.
It was in this new European context that he explored "the
evolution of the inter-Balkan relations" and came to the following
conclusions

...the mechanisms of inter-Balkan relations are
lagging behind the present trend in Europe..., The
Balkan policy is marking time as compared to the
rapprochement activities multiplying in the European
sphere.

...except for the already existing forms of
cooperation between Yugoslavia and her Balkan

------------------------------
(201) Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 16 February
1967. Commentary by Dragoljub Katic. Emphasis added.

[page 112]

neighbors (excepting Albania), relations between
the other Balkan countries have not advanced as
much as they could have in terms of the objective
possibilities and needs of the Balkan situation.,
If one Balkan country, Albania, chooses to stand
aloof, it is no reason for stagnation in the
development of inter-Balkan cooperation, just as, on the
other hand, extra-Balkan influences and interests
should not prevent individual Balkan governments
from clearing up disputes and making new moves
towards raising the level of Balkan-wide cooperation....

...[Inter-Balkan relations] must be in line
with the general changes and trends in the
contemporary European community which seeks to build up
new European relations...[202]

The country perhaps showing the greatest interest today
in improving Balkan relations is Rumania. Rumania and
Yugoslavia are together engaged in the huge Iron Gates project which
established a special relationship and community of interest
between the two countries. This project is being used in
Belgrade as an additional argument in favor of Yugoslavia's
primary Balkan orientation. The Iron Gates project is a bilateral
project. The navigation and financial aspects of it, however,
have become a subject of multilateral discussions within the
Danube Commission. Yugoslavia, therefore, cannot deny her
"multilateral" presence on the Danube, and she is striving to
establish the best possible contacts with Budapest and Vienna.
But these contacts have up to now been seen as essentially
bilateral, without any Danubian basis.

B. Czechos1ovakia

Hungary's Northern neighbor, Czechoslovakia, is the fourth
country {including Hungary) which has been earmarked for a pro
minent role in the Budapest plans of Danubian cooperation.

Official Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations have undergone
an essential improvement in the 1960's. There was certainly
much room for' improvement since, in the early years after World
War II, there had been great hostility because of the famous
population exchange projects. Later, however, these projects
were condemned by the Prague government as relics of bourgeois
nationalism and sectarianism in Party politics. Subsequently
a much more generous policy toward the Hungarian minority in
Slovakia was adopted and this removed the major cause of tensions.
In the sixties, official contacts on the highest level were
established and these resulted in two important visits: Novotny,

---------------------------
(202) Opacic, Nine: "Balkans and European Trends," Review of
International_Affairs (Belgrade), 20 November 1966.

[page 113]

with a Czechoslovak party and government delegation, visited
Hungary in 1964, and Kadar, accompanied by Prime Minister
Jeno Pock, returned the visit from 10 to 14 October 1967.
Nothing was heard during these talks about Danubian cooperation
as such but higher forms of cooperation, namely bilateral
economic integration occupied an important phase in Kadar's
agenda in Czechoslovakia.[203] This question was already aired
on the day of Kadar's arrival in Prague by the daily of the
Communist youth organization, Mlada Fronta. According to a
Ceteka summary, the paper stated that Czechoslovakia's and
Hungary's economic relations were not up to the desires or the
aims of the two countries. Stagnation in Czechoslovak—Hungarian
trade had been caused by foreign trade methods that were linked
with the old economic system of centralized management. The
need for closer relations, said Mlada Fronta, was felt on both
sides but it was certainly not yet "a simple imperative." Still,
important progress could be made by a sensible and quick
breaking down of barriers between the two economies.[204]

This need for bold new steps was mentioned several times
in official speeches and declarations during the Hungarian visit.
For example, Kadar at a rally in Prague said inter alia:
Of special significance are the economic relations
of our countries. In this field the question is no
longer that of simply increasing the volume of trade
and the exchange of goods but of higher forms of
cooperation, specialization and industrial
collaboration. The work is going on and we hail with pleasure
every result in this field and are striving for the
most effective economic cooperation with our
Czechoslovak friends... Our sovereignty is not threatened by
the fact that the socialist countries are solving an
economic task with joint forces in a field in which,
owing to economic backwardness, we become dependent
on the highly developed capitalist countries and are
at their mercy.

Economic cooperation between the Socialist
countries has produced considerable results in both
bilateral and multilateral collaboration and in the framework
of Comecon. But we must progress further in the joint
work if we are to exceed, in a historically short
period, the standard of economic development in the
capitalist countries.[205]

------------------------------
(203) After the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia is Hungary's biggest
trading partner, and Hungary is fourth on the Czechoslovsk
list (preceded by the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland),

(204) Mlada Fronta, 10 October 1967, as quoted by Ceteka.

(205) MTI (Hungarian Telegraphic Agency), 13 October 1967.


[page 114]

And Czechoslovak Premier Jozef Lenart declared:

...The objective demands of further progress...
in the interest of our countries and peoples call
for yet more resolute and bolder development of
specialization and cooperation-—direct cooperation
between productive, research and development
institutions.[206]

As a follow-up to these sentiments, that part of the final
communiqué devoted to economic cooperation called for further
cooperation and specialization in the industry and for the
"direct cooperation of industrial enterprises and associations."[207]

After his return to Budapest, Kadar felt able to declare
that the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Hungary was
an example of the kind of relationship which should exist
between two socialist states. He praised Czechoslovakia for
conducting a truly Leninist nationality policy and for taking
into account the fact that a considerable number of Hungarians
live in that country. In practical terms, said Kadar, there
are three nations in Czechoslovakia: Czechs, Slovaks, and
Hungarians. Each of the three safeguards its own language,
culture and historical traditions, but, at the same time, agrees
on the basic questions of socialism and helps to build a
socialist society. Thus, national diversity becomes a binding and
stimulating factor rather than a divisive one and strengthens
the friendship of the two countries. "All socialist states of
multinational character which properly handle the nationality
question also facilitate our own work on behalf of our common
goals," added Kadar. (The unfavorable allusion to Rumanian
nationality policy was clear enough.)[208]

As a consequence of the new nationality policy, praised by
Kadar, the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia have now been allowed
(already a few years ago) to revive their "progressive"
traditions, including the history of the Sarlo movement (a revival
which went parallel with a similar effort in Hungary).
Hungarian writers from Czechoslovakia can now also establish contacts
with their colleagues in Hungary itself; Hungarian book
publishing in Czechoslovakia is increasing; and some corrections have
been made in the school system more favorable to the Hungarian
minority. The Hungarian press in Czechoslovakia can take up
and discuss (though still in a cautious way) specific questions
of minority life; it can also relatively freely report about

------------------------------
(206) Ibid., 14 October 1967.

(207) Ubid., 14 October 1967.

208) Radio Budapest and Homeland Radio of Budapest as quoted by
RFE Situation Report of 17 October 1967.

[page 115]

cultural events in Hungary. The Hungarian press for its part
also pays considerable attention to the problems of the
Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.

All this good work is being done (at least ostensibly)
for the sake of building socialism more effectively in
Czechoslovakia and not in the national interest of the
Hungarian minority per se. In 1966, the Czechoslovak Party revealed
that efforts were being made to find an overall solution to
the Hungarian minority problem. As the main fortnightly tor
Party affairs reported:

The Secretariat of the Central Committee of
the Slovak Communist Party has approved the
constitution of a work group for the solution of questions
connected with the life of citizens of Hungarian
nationality; this group will be responsible for a
detailed survey of the position of the Hungarian
population in Czechoslovakia. If necessary, it will
form an actiy to ensure that the report will be
processed in the best manner possible. Surveys on the
economic development of the areas where the
inhabitants of Hungarian nationality have positions in the
school system and cultural fields, etc., will, of
course, also be included. Moreover, the group will
examine the influence of the Party, state and
economic organs on the federal development of the life
of citizens of Hungarian nationality, the level of
their education and their representation in social
and public life. This will be the basis for new
measures designed to solve the problems of citizens
of Hungarian nationality in the next phase of the
construction of socialism in the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic.[209] 

Measures like this, together with the strong statements
for closer economic cooperation between Prague and Budapest,
indicate a greater effort toward better relations. But they
still fall short of that closeness which the positions of the
two countries would seem to demand.

Czechoslovak-Austrian relations made a good start after
1955 but slowed down very soon. Prague, for one thing, refused
to sign a compensation agreement, and the more recent border
shootings and other incidents have only aggravated the
situation. Political contacts had reached the stage of stagnation
by the summer of 1967. On the state level, the last important
visit between the two countries occurred in December 1965 with"
the trip of Czechoslovak Deputy Prime Minister Otakar Simunek
to Austria. He spent five days in the country, conferred with

------------------------------
(209) Zivot Strany (Prague), No. 23, 1966.

[page 116]

Chancellor Klaus, Dr. Bruno Pittermann, and visited Austrian
industrial installations, among them VOEST in Linz. VOEST
has by now developed particularly good contacts with
Czechoslovakia, this cooperation starting as early as the late
1950's. Simunek's visit was interpreted as a sign that
Czechoslovakia was primarily interested in Austrian steel, steel
products, heavy machinery and capital goods. But Simunek also
discussed the project of expanding Czechoslovak-Austrian
cooperation oh third markets.[210] Plans to increase bilateral
trade, however, only partly succeeded.

In January 1967, a new long term trade agreement was
signed in Vienna by Trade Minister Hamouz and Vice Chancellor
Bock. The agreement, valid for the years 1967-1971, envisages
an increase in trade with renewed emphasis on semi-finished
and finished products from the Austrian chemical, iron, steel
and machine construction sector. Czechoslovakia will deliver
agricultural goods, mineral fuel, unprocessed chemical products" and
some machinery.[211]

Of considerable, though long term interest, is the fact
that later in 1967 Czechoslovakia revived the old plan of the
Oder Danube-Elbe canal, and started negotiations with Austria on
the subject.

There is also considerable cultural traffic between the
two countries, with Czechoslovak individuals and groups
participating in Austrian cultural or scholastic ventures. The
extent of this cooperation is small compared with that between
Austria and Hungary.

But despite the various forms of cooperation that Czecho-
Slovakia has--more with Hungary, less with Austria--there
seems precious little "Danubian" about it in the mind of the
Prague government. In fact, Czechoslovakia seems even more
cautious about committing herself to concepts of regionalism,
not to say federalism, than Yugoslavia. In a way her
predicament in this concept is similar to that of Yugoslavian Too
much talk about federalism, even regionalism,could create new
nationalist tensions on the internal scene. Earlier in this
study the article on federalism by the Czechoslovak writer,
Karel Pomaizl, was discussed at some length.[212] In this article
Pomaizl relied heavily on Lenin's authority to reduce the
importance of federal solutions and to point to future, higher
forms of state development. One could hardly miss the real
purport of his efforts: to refute the arguments of the nationalists

------------------------------
(210) -RFE Special, Vienna, 16 December 1965.

(211) RFE Special, Vienna, 18 January 1967.

(212) See pages 8-10.

[page 117]

at home who would like to use federal forms to promote their
own separatist aims. It must have been for the same reasons
that, in the early 1960's, the Czechoslovak official line
tried so hard to compromise federalism with German revanchism.
Thus, Prague wholeheartedly supports European cooperation
and European security, but seems less inclined to be interested
in any specific regional cooperation. She is, of course, one
of the Soviet Union's staunchest allies and a solid member of
the socialist camp. On certain issues she is thrown together
with one or more of her socialist allies as, for example, at
the moment with the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR on the
German issue. But even on this issue she has shown something
less than eagerness to become part of the so-called
"irontriangle" with Poland and the GDR. The truth seems to be that
there is a strong feeling among Czechoslovaks that the
geographic location (actually more Central European than East
European), industrial power, and different political traditions
of Czechoslovakia put her in a position transcending the narrow
regional limits such as would be imposed by the Danubian
concept.

Thus,when Hungary and Austria had already begun talking
about Danubian rapprochement, the Czechoslovak political
vocabularly was still more all-European than regional or
Danubian, insisting on continental rather than local economic
projects. It was in such a spirit that the Prague journal of
international affairs, Mezinarodni politika, for instance,
stressed Czechoslovakia's special position among socialist
states:

The Czechoslovak policy vis-a-vis the socialist
states, except the USSR, had been determined by some
specific factors. From the economic point of view,
Czechoslovakia was, relatively speaking, the most
developed state. [It] had and still has good
possibilities to contribute actively to the
industrialization of the less developed socialist states... The
development of the active economic cooperation
realized by Czechoslovakia with the socialist states
contributed to the successful mastering of certain
remnants of national rancour (Hungary, Poland)....
Positive traditional relations have existed with
Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Thus
Czechoslovakia could contribute in an appropriate measure to

the formation of the particularity of the socialist
camp and to the economic development of the world
socialist system....[213]

------------------------------
(213) "Dvacet let mezinarodnich vztahu CSSR," Mezinarodni Poli-
tika.. May 1965.

[page 118]

A second article, published by the xJarty political journal
Nova Mysl, explained the European aspects of the Czechoslovak
foreign policy. Czechoslovakia is, said Nova Mysl, both for
political and economic reasons, vitally interested in peaceful
coexistence in European security. She feels peaceful
coexistence should also be made the basis of economic relations:

...Czechoslovak foreign policy approaches
European cooperation primarily from its economic
angle and, in the last two years, has put forward an
interesting initiatives she proposed the
cooperation of the capitalist and socialist states in the
realization of all-European projects, e.g., linking
of waterways in Europe, building of water canals,
common use of sources of energy (electric power,
gas, mineral oil, etc.), common efforts of air
pollution, etc....[214]

In the many official statements and press articles along
these lines, no direct reference can be found to the Danubian
cooperation program as elaborated in Budapest and Vienna.
Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations have always been kept on
strictly socialist bases, while those between Czechoslovakia
and Austria are seen from Prague as emanating from the European
policy of coexistence. As Nova Mysl wrote:

...In our foreign policy we are doing our utmost
to establish truly friendly relations both in the
evolution of relations with "our immediate neighbors,
Austria and the German Federal Republic, and with
the rest of the states of Europe and the world....[215]


Only recently have there been some articles in the
Czechoslovak press which could be considered as a very distant, faint
echo of the Budapest-Vienna preoccupation with Danubian
problems. Shortly after the Hungarian press had begun publishing
detailed analyses about the concept of Danubian cooperation,
Slovansky Brehled, a Czech paper specializing in the- problems
of the Slavic world, announced a series of articles dealing with
"federalist efforts in Central Europe in the 20th century."
Judging from the series, the aim is not so much to attack the
concept of federalism but to prove that all projects founded on
old patterns are-doomed to failure. The imperialistic ambitions
of the Western powers, the rivalries of the small states, the
lack of a common denominator, the open and hidden anti-Soviet
tendencies in federalistic efforts--all these factors make up
what the journal calls the "artificial character" of the regions

------------------------------
(214) Sedivy, Jaroslav CSc, "Mirovy princip nasi zahranicni
politiky," Nova Mysl, 9 September 1966.

(215) Ibid.

[page 119]

projects of the inter-war period and led to their being
still-born. The message which the Slovansky prehled articles
seems to be trying to get across is that there can be no
feasible federation without Soviet participation, and even
control. Is it meant as an indirect answer to the
Budapest-Vienna dialogue?[216]

If it was, then this topic provides yet another
instance of the Czechoslovak press not speaking with    
one voice. Mezinarodni Politika published quite a favorable 
article on the Klaus visit to Budapest in May this year. It
was the first relatively extensive Czechoslovak review of the
Danubian policy of the Hungarian regime.

Because of her geographic situation and historic
traditions, Hungary was playing today, wrote the article, an
exceptionally active role of initiative in the Danubian region and
in Europe in general. It noted that Hungary was fully
supporting the activities of the European "Club of Nine" but remarked
that Hungary saw also "a great opportunity as well as a historic
mission" in encouraging the cooperation of the Danubian states,
"mostly between those which lie on the border of the two social
systems. Such a cooperation could transform the Danubian area
into a factor of European peace and security." Klaus's
Budapest visit was, the article said, an important contribution to
the Danubian cooperation. It concluded by praising "the
realistic European and Danubian policy of the Hungarian People's
Democracy."[217]

This was pertainly a favorable article as far as Hungary
was concerned but, as far as Czechslovakia was concerned, it
was careful and non-committal. It did not mention
Czechoslovakia by name among the countries which are supposed to cooperate
in the Hungarian project of Danubian rapprochement. But it
was progress indeed that the Hungarian project was mentioned at
all at such length. And it was perhaps not by accident that it
appeared in the same journal which had earlier initiated the
unconventional debate about the new role of the small states.[218]

----------------------------------
(216) Lewandowski, Jozef, "Polsko, Ceskoslovensko a integrace
stredni Evropy pocatkem dvacatych let," Slovansky Prehled,
No. 5, 1966.
Reckova, Eva, "Madarsko a Tardleuov plan hospodarskej
spoiuprace podunajskych statov," Ibid., No. 3, 1967.

(217) Hoffman, Rudolf, "Europska politika?" Mezinarodni politika,
July 1967.

(218) See pages 20-22.

[page 120]

C. Rumania and Bulgaria; The Danubia. -Balkan States

Rumania and Bulgarian are, naturally, Danubian states. The
fact that neither have been included directly in the Hungarian
project for Danubian cooperation is, of course, officially
explained by their primary Balkan orientation. This reason,
however, is only a more or less straight-forward one in the case of
Bulgaria. The situation and position of Rumania are, however,
more complex.

Rumania is an immediate neighbor of Hungary; a large
proportion of ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary (in the official
language the"bridge builders"between Hungary and her socialist
neighbors) live in Rumania. But even more important, many
past Hungarian projects for Danubian cooperation have included
Rumania, and some have considered a Rumanian-Hungarian alliance
as the basis of any larger scheme of Danubian cooperation.
Such traditional ideas of the closest cooperation were revived
by Petru Groza after World War II, and even Rakosi could not
simply disregard them. The Kadar-Peter project, however, has
conspicuously failed to echo this tradition, evidently because
strained relations between Budapest and Bucharest would make
any extension of the Hungarian project to Rumania utterly
unrealistic for the present. These strained relations have been
caused mainly by the difference in the Kadar and Ceausescu
approach to the role of the Soviet Union in Communist affairs, by
several ideological and organizational problems of the socialist
camp, by traditional rivalries, and by the Transylvanian issue.
In addition, Rumania has been actively engaged in the last few
years in promoting a project of Balkan regional cooperation
which has included Yugoslavia but excluded Hungary, as a
non-Balkan country. It was very noticeable that, with the emergence
of the Hungarian-Danubian scheme-, Bucharest's campaign for
Balkan cooperation considerably, increased, leading some observers
to conclude that they are two competing projects here, trying
to organize the Danubian world in two different "blocs." There
is no evidence of any serious response by Rumania to the
Hungarian project of Danubian cooperation; it has been treated as
nonexistent unless, of course, one agrees that the strong Rumanian
interest in Balkan affairs is a sort of answer to Budapest's
Danubian initiative.

Distant Bulgaria has remained silent because of her
exclusive Balkan orientation and lack of traditional regional ties
with upper-Danubia. Otherwise, her bilateral relations with
Hungary are close, especially in the economic sphere where two
jointly-owned Bulgarian-Hungarian enterprises were begun in 1966.

Austria, the key non-Socialist country in the Hungarian
project of Danubian cooperation, has been able to establish
relatively very good relations with both Rumania and Bulgaria.
Indeed, Rumania's" relations with Austria seem considerably better
than those with Hungary. Rumania was the second socialist
country to sign a compensation agreement with Austria, preceded
[page 121]

by Bulgaria. In 1965, a five year trade treaty was concluded
between Austria and Rumania, governing the exchange of goods
for the period from 1966 to 1970. Two years earlier, a
similar long term treaty was signed with Bulgaria for the
period of 1963-1968. Klaus's visit to Bucharest in July 1967
contributed to the extsnsion of contacts and to the
strengthening of friendship. Indeed, after the Klaus visit, some articles
appeared in the Western press indicating that Rumania would
like to follow Austria's example of neutrality in international
affairs.[219] The Chancellor's Bulgarian visit (17-21 October
1967) was termed equally successful. In addition to an
agreement signed on legal aid between the two countries, it was
decided to start negotiations on a consular treaty, to intensify
industrial relations and economic cooperation, and to expand
cultural contacts as well as tourism. A better utilization of
the Danube as an international waterway was also a subject for
discussion. The communiqué expressed a positive attitude to
the idea of an all-European conference for discussing the
problems of peace and security in Europe, and called for a climate
of trust on the continent:

...Bulgaria and Austria consider it of vital
importance that a climate of trust and understanding
between the European nations should be established by
expanding the political, economic, and cultural
relations among the European states, independent of the
differences between their social systems.[220]

If one compares, however, Klaus's visit to Budapest with
his later trips to Bucharest and Sofia, a striking difference
is soon apparent: the Danubian accent, cooperative efforts on
a Danubian basis, so strong a characteristic of the Budapest
talks, were almost entirely missing from those in Bucharest and
Sofia. Indeed, just prior to the Austrian Chancellor's visit,
Zhivkov used the event to praise the development of good
neighborly relations in the Balkans.[221] And about the same time, a
high-ranking Rumanian diplomat, writing on the "Postulates and
Goals of Rumania's Foreign Policy," made no mention of Danubian
contacts but nraised Balkan cooperation as follows:

It is a permanent preoccupation of this country's
foreign policy to advance cooperation and good
neighbor relations in the Balkans}where countries with

-------------------
(219) See, for instance, Rheinischer Merkur, 21 July 1967.

(220) Bulgarian-Austrian communiqué as reported by BTA, 21 October 1967.

(221) Zhivkov interview with the Austrian Press Agency, 13
October 1967, as quoted by RPE Situation Report of 17 October
1967.

[page 122]

different social systems live side by side. Rumania's
relations with the Balkan countries are developing
in a spirit of friendship and contributing to
improvement of the general climate in this area. 
Rumania's present contacts with the other Balkan
countries have revealed fresh opportunities for the
promotion of economic, trade, political, scientific
and cultural cooperation. Our country is determined
to persevere in its efforts to improve the general
atmosphere in the Balkan zone.[222]

Clearly, then, "Danubia" is for the moment not for Rumania
or Bulgaria., These two. states are pressing their own regional
concept, one further to the south, a complement--or a
competitor.—to that being urged by Hungary.

VIII. A SUMMING UP

The Hungarian "project" of Danubian cooperation, at least
what is publicly known of it, does not consist of a single,
official, authoritative document of a formal plan. Its scope
and aims can only be deduced and a.bstracted from various,
cautiously worded statements (mainly by Kadar and Foreign Minister
Peter) as well as from commentaries - and articles published in the
centrally controlled Hungarian press. Even, however, within the
limitations imposed by this situation, several conclusions can
be risked about the basic ideas and practical importance of
the Hungarian concept for future developments in the Danubian
Basin.

1) The Hungarian project distinguishes between three kinds
of Danubian riparian countries;

a) The Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic;

b) Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria; and

c) Rumania and Bulgaria.

The members of the first group, the Soviet Union and the
German Federal Republic, are excluded as "not truly Danubian
countries." The Hungarian project concentrates on the members of the
second group--Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria.
They would form the nucleus of Danubian cooperation. In a later
stage, however, the cooperation could be extended to the
remaining two Danubian countries, Rumania and Bulgaria. This
distinction is due to the specific Balkan orientation of these two
countries, strongly emphasized by Hungarian sources from the
very beginning. But another Balkan country, Yugoslavia, because
of her allegedly strong Danubian interest, has been given a
prominent place in the Hungarian project. Even more,
Hungarian-Yugoslav cooperation is praised by Budapest as an example for the
kind of relationship Budapest would like to establish with the

----------------------------------
(222) Malnasan, Aurel, Rumanian Ambassador to Belgrade, in the
Review of International Affairs, 5 October 1967.

[page 123]

socialist members of her Danubian neighborhood. (After his
recent visit to Czechoslovakia, Kadar also extolled
Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations as another good example of socialist
relationship.) At the same time it is recognized in Budapest
that the real touchstone of Danubian cooperation will be the
relationship Hungary is able to develop with Austria, the only
Western "capitalist" country included in the Danubian project.
This explains the great attention,whether it alternates
between friendly and hostile, the Hungarian press has been
paying to events in, or concerned with, Austria.,

2) The avowed purpose of the Hungarian project is to
promote the concept of European security. In this sense,
however, it runs parallel with the Soviet concentration on Europe,

and has clear affinities with other regional initiatives by
other Eastern European states--for example, Polish diplomatic
activity in north and west Europe. It also uses the
terminology of the Soviet concern about the future of the Continent.
At the same time, reference is often made to the UN resolution
of 21 December 1965 endorsing the development of good
neighborly relations and cooperation among European states belonging
to different social systems. In the Budapest interpretation,
Danubian cooperation would be one of the many pillars on which
the new security of Europe would rest. Hungary has initiated
this project, so goes the official explanation, because of her
central position in the Danube Valley, and she would like to
make this region, in the words of Tibor Petho, "a model area
of European coexistence." Hungary is striving first to
intensify contacts with her socialist neighbors in the hope that it
will promote cooperation with countries belonging to different
social systems (Austria). Such a cooperation has to start on a
strictly bilateral basis,developing political, cultural,
economic and human contacts, but after reaching a certain level it
should be replaced by other "higher" forms, eventually to be
crowned with a regional security pact. Other openings for
European cooperation, like the "Club of Nine", and, generally
speaking, every kind of contact between small states are being
praised as efforts leading towards the same goal: European
peace and security.

Thus, Danubian federation or confederation is not a
recognized aim of the Hungarian project, and any similarity of
relationship with such plans of the past is consistently denied in
Budapest. Peter, for example, rejected them as "reactionary
Danubian concepts of the old generations." But while the
federalist approach is absent from the statements and commentaries
dealing with Danubian cooperation, it reappears more and more
frequently in books and articles being currently published in
Hungary. This preoccupation seems to draw on two main sources
of inspiration.

The first is academic interest in the past history of the
Danubian area., including the problems of national coexistence
in the Habsburg Monarchy. It has produced a long series of

[page 124]

writings on the various aspects of Danuoian interdependence,
reviving also the same federalist plans so emphatically
rejected "by the Hungarian Foreign Minister. . The main point
being made is that federalism has become part of the best
progressive traditions in Hungary: leading figures of the
Hungarian intellectual world had" realized the community of fate
of the small nations in the Danubian region, and instead of
fostering nationalism, they worked on federalist solutions
to the problem of how to organize the small nations against
the oppressive ambitions of the neighboring great powers.

The second main source of new writings on federalism is
the growing Soviet concern about the "difficulties of the 
transition to socialism01 in East Europe. The essence of the
Soviet problem can be reduced to the question of how to
eliminate the numerous obstacles on the road to economic and
political integration in East Europe, a task made even more urgent
by the success of Western integration and its attraction for
the East, "Nationalism" in any form is considered as a major
obstacle on the road of Soviet intentions. Consequently,
Soviet policy has begun to favor new concepts and discussions
attacking the validity of the "rigid formulations" of national
independence, and urging higher forms of international
cooperation. Federation is accepted as such a form, but only as a
transitional one, to be followed by even higher stages of
cooperation. Communist ideologues and historians in East
Europe are already trying to adapt these Soviet ideas to local
circumstances, resulting in a federalist literature basically
different from all previous kinds. In Hungary, Bela Kun's
"federalist experiment" is being revived and reinterpreted in
the above sense, and the history of federalism in East Europe
(as presented, for instance, by Gyula Merei) is used as a
proof that truly democratic integration can only be achieved
under proletarian leadership, and as a transitory stage toward
the complete union of the states and nations.

The rediscovery of the Hungarian history of federalism
is, most probably, tolerated or even encouraged in the hope
that it will help to popularize the Kadar regime's concept of
Danubian cooperation. But, from an exclusively Communist point
of view, any such form of cooperation should be considered not
as an end in itself, but only a transitory stage toward the
complete merger of nations.

3) Viewing the Hungarian project in this negative light
(its undeniable connection with the new Soviet approach to
Europe., the official rejection of previous, sincere concepts of
federalism, etc.), then it would seem scarcely more than a tool
of Soviet foreign policy. As such, it might be considered as
having the following aims: to loosen up Western positions in
Central Europe and, more specifically, to Weaken Austrian ties
with the West by engaging her in East European undertakings;
to prevent Austrian association with the Common Market; and,
finally, to promote Soviet integration efforts in the Danubian

[page 125]

region. For the promotion of all these aims, Hungary might
well be considered a suitable instrument.

Speculation along these lines should not be dismissed
out of hand as cold war paranoia; there are too many
similarities between the Hungarian and Soviet concepts of regional
cooperation and integration. But, on the other hand, there
are evident signs suggesting that Hungary is using the project
of Danubian cooperation to grope her way toward some kind of
closer association with Central and Western Europe. It was
these signs that prompted some Western observers to see the
revival of the Hungarian project in 1966-1967 as a
compensation for the failure to establish diplomatic relations with
Bonn. There is also the fact, discussed below, that Hungary's
concept has met with no positive response from any Danubian
socialist state, even such a staunch Soviet ally as
Czechoslo-vakia. Thus, in spite of the dangers and the doubts, it would
be a mistake to view Hungary's project as one exclusively
serving Soviet interests. As with peaceful coexistence in
general, and East-West cooperation in particular, there are
risks as well as chances, and this is the case with this
subject under review. If the Hungarian proposals are properly
implemented and wisely responded to, they could guide the
Danubian peoples toward a greater regional consciousness, help
them to establish more stable contacts with the West, and also
keep alive the idea of Danubian interdependence. If the
project's aim is indeed a genuine East-West partnership, it has
to allow for the development of some institutionalized
cooperation between Austria and her Danubian neighbors in the form of
agencies, committees, and institutes in the political, cultural,
economic and technical field. As a consequence, East-West
Danubian contacts between the peoples would expand, hastening
also the growth of the spirit of mutual interest and
understandinge This is not federalism, but it is a precondition for any
eventual federalist solution. Prom this point of view, the
federalist debate going on in Hungary should not be disregarded.
It has not only disclosed the historical background of the
issue but also confronted the distorted Leninist version of
federalism with the traditionally Danubian and democratic
concepts, and provided food for the future planning of Danubian
coexistence.

But these are only the opportunities and possibilities
which are implicit in the Hungarian project. Whether any of
them will ever come to real fruition will depend mainly on
Hungarian sincerity and determination in practice. The
Hungarian government will have to show that its Danubian policy is not
just a variation on a Soviet theme but an earnest of Budapest's
intention to use, within the narrow limits of realities, the
new openings on the European scene to come to a closer, more
fruitful cooperation with her Danubian neighbors.


4) One of the most curious aspects of the Hungarian
project has been the official response given to it by the vast

[page 126]

majority of the Danubian states. The fact is that there has
been no real response, positive or negative, from any of
Hungary's socialist partners on the Danube: Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria, Cooperation, of course,
continues in varying degrees with them but this is on a
bilateral or a socialist, rather than on a Danubian, basis.

But, while official response from the Danubian socialist
countries has been non-committal to the point of being
negative, considerable interest has been evoked in the
intellectual circles of those same countries in the same problems of
integration and federation which are so preoccupying Hungarians.
Scholars from all these countries participate in the same

international conferences discussing past, present and future
problems of Danubian cooperation. Their regimes also are
concerned, like the Hungarian, with the question of transition
to socialism, and they, too, devote much attention to the
issue of European security. There is, however, an undeniable
reluctance on their part to accept the Hungarian project of
Danubian regional cooperation as an appropriate solution of
the present difficulties.

Is this because of the still strong reservations against
everything Hungarian, and especially Danubian-Hungarian? Or
are there some basic objections to the Hungarian project,
primarily on the Yugoslav and Rumanian side, such as its quite
obvious affinities with Soviet political objectives? Is it
that some governments, like the Czechoslovak, cannot
instinctively separate new Danubian from old Habsburg and prefer
cooperation under something other than a Danubian rubric? Or is it
simply because none of the socialist states Hungary is
addressing is sincerely interested in "higher forms" of international
cooperation, Danubian or anything else? But, no matter what
the particular objections might be, the question arises as to
why the Hungarians did not know about these attitudes before they
began their campaign and, if they did know about them, why did
they begin it? There is no answer to this but, as stated above,
the very question lends further credence to the view that the
Budapest initiative is more independent than the circumstances
of its birth would suggest.

5) Austria is the only Danubian country which has openly
and officially expressed her willingness to cooperate with
Hungary on a Danubian basis. As already indicated, without
Austrian participation the whole project would be just another
exercise in socialist cooperation. Only Austria's "democratic
presence" (these are the words of the Austrian Socialist leader
Bruno Kreisky) can give the undertaking a truly Danubian and
East-West character. The Austrian political leadership,
Christian as well as Socialist, has demonstrated a realistic approach
to the new challenge facing them from Hungary. They, too, see
the Danubian project in an all-European framework. But for the
Austrians it is the framework conceived by the UN resolution on
cooperation among European states belonging to different social

[page 127]

systems, rather than by the Soviet concept of a European mosaic
of regional security groupings. Austria feels qualified for
participation in the Danubian project on account of her
position between East and West as well as her historical ties to
the peoples of this region. She is ready to join their
community and to renew her old ties on the basis of equality,
reciprocity and mutual goodwill. In doing so, Austria does not
want to return to the past or to change existing social systems.
At the same time, she would not deny that a Danubian
cooperation will be successful only if, by preserving the
individuality of the partners, it can develop a close community of
interest sweeping away the present barriers to fuller contacts.
As to the ultimate form of desired cooperation, no "concrete
suggestion has yet been made by Austria. She does not advocate
the federalist schemes of the past, nor does she exclude the
possibility of a modern federalist solution for the future.

In the meantime, a policy of small steps is suggested by
Vienna, the next move always depending on the behavior of the
Eastern partner. It is felt that there is almost unlimited
scope for closer cooperation in cultural and human contacts.
In the economic field, the situation is more complex. Familiar
problems like the non-convertibility of the Eastern currencies,
structural and qualitative difficulties in socialist exports,
tight Austrian markets, etc., seriously interfere with the
expanding of such contacts. In the view of many experts it is
mainly in the sector of industrial and technical cooperation
that real economic progress can be made.

Simultaneously with her Danubian engagement with Hungary,
Austria is making great efforts to expand contacts with the
rest of the Danubian neighborhood., She is not doing this on
any Danubian basis--rather under the rubric of small state
solidarity, good neighborly relations, East-West cooperation,
European security, etc. But the net effect, of course, has been
to strengthen the feeling of Danubian neighborliness with
governments that have shown no interest in the more programmatic
campaign of the Hungarians. In a later stage of development,
Austria could become an important integrating factor in the
Hungarian project by using her existing contacts to expand
Danubian cooperation beyond Hungarian-Austrian relations to such
countries where Hungary alone could not succeed.

But--and this is important--Austria, a small country, can
enter the many-sided Danubian experience only if her mission
is fully understood and tactfully sustained by the West. In
this connection the example of the Danube Commission is often
mentioned. If the German Federal Republic could gain full
membership in the organization (which appears now to be a question
of persistent diplomatic efforts only), this would essentially
strengthen Austrian, and Western, positions in the Commission
as well as in Danubian affairs in general.

[page 128]

Finally, it should be kept in mind that the Eastern policy
of the present Austrian government is facing a mounting wave
of criticism at home. Even the Socialists, who did the
pioneering work in this sphere, object today to many aspects of
it from the ranks of opposition. It is argued that the
government is expanding Eastern relations at the expense of Western
contacts, a line said to be incompatible with the principles
of a neutral policy. Others raise objections against

increasing contacts-with regimes which, though milder, are still
repressive. In addition, the Common Market controversy will also
continue since Eastern economic crooperation cannot, according
to the experts, fully recompense Austria for her other needs.

All this shows that East-West relations in general, and
Danubian cooperation in particular, is still a very sensitive and
truly "multilateral" issue in Austria. Any suspicious attitude,
delaying tactics or double play on the side of the Budapest
regime could fatally compromise the whole Danubian project, and
would most probably lead to the termination of Austrian
participation in it. This would be fatal, since Danubian cooperation,
without Austrian participation, would be like a house built
without doors and windows.

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