5 Jun 2023

National Service in the Gulf: Unsurprising Disparities

A decade ago Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait introduced – in the case of Kuwait, re-introduced – mandatory military service. What lessons have the three Gulf monarchies’ conscription experiences yielded in the past eight or nine years?

Nearly a decade ago three Gulf monarchies, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait introduced – in the case of Kuwait, re-introduced – mandatory military service. This was big news especially given the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ opposition to conscription since independence and Kuwait’s highly problematic four-decade (1961-2001) experience with the draft which was profoundly unpopular and poorly and inconsistently enforced1.  What lessons have the three Gulf monarchies’ conscription experiences yielded in the past eight or nine years?  In a region where state officials – unrestrained by genuine, popularly elected representative bodies – often announce ambitious laws that are soon forgotten or inadequately implemented, what actual results have the conscription laws produced?  Are there differences between the achievements of the three Gulf states in this regard?

Background

In March 2014 Qatar’s Emir, Shaikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, signed legislation that required all male Qatari citizens, aged 18 to 35, to serve in the armed forces for three months if they were high school graduates and for four if they were not.  Following the completion of their training there were reserve service obligations extending to age 40.  At the same time, the UAE’s Federal National Council passed a similar law specified military service to male citizens age 18 to 30: nine months for high school graduates and two years for those who had not completed their secondary school education.  In the UAE, too, those who fulfilled their basic service would become part of the reserves until the age of 58 or 60.  Finally, in April 2015 Kuwait’s National Assembly passed a law that reinstated mandatory military service, to start in 2017.  According to this legislation all men had to undergo a year-long military service – four months of basic training and eight months of service – as they reached age 18 and they were obligated to be in the reserve forces until the age of 45.  The conscription laws of all three states assigned heavy penalties to those who evade mandatory military service.

Reasons for the Introduction of Conscription

 It is hardly coincidental that the three states that introduced the draft are the wealthiest in the Gulf where young men have come to expect that the welfare state would provide them with everything, including public sector jobs, without the need for reciprocity. As Qatar’s ruler noted, “When I see on the streets of Qatar the phrase ‘Qatar deserves the best,’ I say, ‘Qatar deserves the best from its sons’.”2  In the same vein, military service in the Emirates is deliberately called “National and Reserve Service” to suggest that it is meant to engage the entire Emirati citizenry in the service of their homeland. Another often discussed aspect of conscription is the GCC governments’ growing realization of the worsening health standards of their (especially young) populations owing to their poor fitness and sedentary lifestyles.  

Especially since 2011 Qatar and the UAE have pursued a more activist foreign policy and have demonstrated their willingness and capacity to project military power. Although the link between this newly dynamic and proactive foreign policy ought not be overplayed, it is one of the stated reasons for conscription and, more broadly, the elevated presence of the armed forces in the life Qatari, Emirati, and Kuwaiti citizens. Political and military leaders of the three states have tried to assure the population that national service did not mean that “the country was under threat.” They also made it clear, however, that building a reserve force was needed to allow them to play a more robust role in the defense and security of the region3.  

The most important reason for the introduction of the draft in the GCC states is political: to foster stronger ties between citizens and the state. Kuwaiti supporters of conscription’s reintroduction argued that it would “build stronger character and reinforce young men’s sense of patriotism and sacrifice in the service of the country.”4  Mandatory military service gives the state an exceptional opportunity to mold its citizens.  Draftees constitute a truly “captive audience” for the regime’s propaganda messages; there are few better opportunities for indoctrination. The main idea, GCC leaders contend, is to strengthen the sense of belonging to the nation among young people and to inspire and deepen their patriotism.  

Assessment

Ruling elites, especially in the UAE and Qatar, have done their best to promote national service. They frequently visit training centers, participate in graduation ceremonies, and extol the virtues of military training to the media. The number of conscripts has been higher than expected; in the UAE, for instance, 8,000 youths joined in the first round of conscription in 2014.  By all accounts, the training has been serious and both physically and mentally challenging5. It has also had some welcome side effects, such as the reduction of crime and improved time-management and lifestyle habits among draft-aged men6. In April 2018 Emir Al Thani issued a new law on national service that took into account Qatar’s experiences with conscription and responded to the new security situation emphasized by the GCC crisis. The new legislation required all Qatari men to perform military service for one year.  

Given the paucity of available data, it is hard to make a confident judgment on how well conscription has fared in Kuwait in the past six years. Information about this subject is extraordinarily scarce. One senses mandatory military service has been no more successful than it was the first time around and perhaps reflects the weariness of the country’s elderly rulers and their aversion to enforce a deeply unpopular policy7. The law went into effect in May 2017 and 2,300 young men were expected to register.  But during the two months they were given to register, only half of those obligated to sign up did so.  At the time, Major General Ibrahim Salem Al Omairi said that those who failed to register would face “serious punitive measures” but even some of those who appeared at recruitment offices thought that the draft should not be mandatory8.  A 2021 law permitted women to volunteer for military service – perhaps Kuwaiti leaders hope that they would take their “sacred duty to protect the homeland” more seriously than their male counterparts.

Qatar – whose 380,000 citizenry generates about 2,000 conscripts annually – has been far more consistent in its conduct of the mandatory military service than Kuwait.  Doha’s recurrent squabbles with Saudi Arabia and the UAE have served to strengthen national identity and rendered military duty more popular.  The major recent news about Qatari conscription was the state pressing conscripts – along with hundreds of civilians including some diplomats – into service operating checkpoints and providing security during the FIFA World Cup in late 20229. Since the introduction of the draft, Qatari conscripts have been featured in national day celebrations and on national sports days.  Although draftees in Qatar appear to undergo less rigorous training than their Emirati colleagues, Doha has seemingly utilized conscription to good effect.

Of all the Gulf countries none takes national defense more seriously than the UAE, therefore, it is not unexpected that Abu Dhabi has taken conscription the most seriously.  In the Emirates, the compulsory service may be completed in the military, the Ministry of Interior, the States Security Service, or other state institutions designated by the military’s high command. Official UAE media outlets, unlike those of the other two states, regularly feature stories about national service that frequently feature testimonials by soldiers and their parents about the positive effects of their time spent in uniform10.  According to a recent large-scale study, behavioral maturity and soft skills acquired during national service significantly improve college students’ discipline, attitudes toward constructive feedback, and the ability to make informed decisions, academic development11.  Earlier this year the UAE made some amendments to the conscription law, exempting sole sons of Emirati families from military service permanently.  Another amendmentextended the service term for recruits (those with a high school diploma and above had their service period set at 11 months while those with lesser education would now serve for three years), further incentivizing the completion of secondary education.

In the GCC states, conscription was introduced, or reintroduced, in a similar context of regional uncertainty and post-oil/gas economic transitions. However, each country has modelled its own national service version, thus receiving a different feedback from citizens.


 

1 For a more comprehensive discussion see Zoltan Barany, Armies of Arabia: Military Politics and Effectiveness in the Gulf (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021), 96-110.

2 Cited in Nada Badawi and Shabina Khatri, “Emir: Time to Move Qatar’s People Off of Social Welfare and into Action,” Doha News, 1 November 2016.

3 See Mary Sophia, “Kuwait Reintroduces Compulsory Military Service for Citizens,” Gulf Business,9 April 2015; and Haneen Dajani, “Benefits of National Service Outlined to Mothers of Emirati Recruits,” National, 11 August 2014.

4 Habib Toumi, “Kuwait Becomes 11th Arab State to Have Mandatory Military Service,” Gulf News, 11 July 2017.

5 Interviews with GCC officers and former conscripts in Qatar and the UAE, 2015-2019.

6 Shireena Al-Nowais, “National Service Reduces UAE’s Crime Rate,” National, 30 May 2017.

7 Bilaly Y. Saab, “Beyond Post-Desert Storm: How to Elevate the US-Kuwait Security Partnership,” Middle East Institute, September 2022, 20.

8 Naser Al Wasmi, “Half of Eligible Kuwaitis Have Failed to Register for Compulsory Military Service,” National, 19 July 2017.

9 Andrew Mills, “Qatar Conscripts Civilians for World Cup Security,” Reuters, 27 September 2022.

10 See, for instance, Haneen Dajani, “Training Begins for the Latest Batch of Emirati National Service Recruits,” National, 28 December 2020.

11 Fatima Alhammadi, Impact of the UAE National Service on Academic Achievement Among College Students, PhD Dissertation, The British University in Dubai, February 2021.

12 Ismail Sebugwaawo, “UAE Announces Amendment to Mandatory Military Service Law,” Khaleej Times, 30 January 2023.



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